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This study is undertaken with the intention of understanding why China adopts different 
approaches to the institutionalization of different regional institutions in Asia. An 
explanation with two causes is proposed to account for variation in China’s approaches to 
institutionalizing regional frameworks in Asia. They include the convergent interests 
between China and other major members of the frameworks as well as China’s relative 
influence in such frameworks.  
 
This study employs the case study method to examine the proposed explanation vis-à-vis 
two alternative explanations. Following the diverse-case method, the proposed 
explanation is evaluated by analyzing China’s approaches to institutionalizing four 
regional frameworks, including (1) the ASEAN Regional Forum; (2) the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (formerly the “Shanghai Five” process); (3) ASEAN Plus 
Three; and (4) Trilateral Cooperation. Data analysis is guided by the proposed 
explanation and two competing explanations, and the two techniques of the congruence 
method (or pattern matching) and process-tracing are used. 
 
Evidence from the four case studies provides support for the proposed explanation. 
Contributions of the present study and its implications for future research are discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
China’s Participation in Regional Institutions in Asia 
 
China’s foreign policy has undergone a major shift in the post-Cold War period. 
During the Cold War, China’s primary concern was its relations with the two 
superpowers: the Soviet Union and the United States (US).
1
 Relations with Asian 
countries were of secondary importance, and were largely conditioned by the 
ideological and strategic struggles between the superpowers. Since the late 1970s, 
China has adopted a more pragmatic, instead of ideologically-driven, foreign 
policy in Asia to facilitate its economic reforms and development at home. 
Subsequently, it has shifted towards a more regionally-focused foreign policy 
based on “good neighbourliness” (Mulin Youhao) to break out of diplomatic 
isolation after the events in 1989.
2
 By the early 1990s, it managed to normalize 




                                                          
1
 It moved from an alliance with the Soviet Union (1949-1960) to opposing both superpowers 
(1963-1969), rapprochement with the US (1971-1982), and then to adopting a more independent 
foreign policy (1982-1989).  John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall 1993), 32-111. 
2
 Under the “good neighbourliness” policy, China strives to improve ties with neighbouring 
countries and secure a peaceful peripheral environment. The policy is elaborated by the fourth 
generation of Chinese leaders. In 2002, President Hu Jintao included the words ‘yu lin wei shan, yi 
lin wei ban’ (being friendly to neighbours, having neighbours as partners) in the Sixteenth Party 
Congress Report. In the following year, Premier Wen Jiabao expanded the idea by adding three 
phrases ‘mu lin, an lin, and fu lin’ (to establish a friendly, peaceful and rich neighbourhood). Dao 
Jiong Zha and Wei Xing Hu, Building a Neighborly Community: Post-Cold War China, Japan 
and Southeast Asia (Manchester, UK; New York: Manchester University Press, 2006), 56 & 60; 
Xiao Ren, "Between Adapting and Shaping: China's Role in Asian Regional Cooperation " 
Journal of Contemporary China 18, no. 59 (2009): 306-07. 
3
 This does not mean that China’s relations with these countries is free from problems. 
Nonetheless, China has not allowed such issues to affect diplomatic exchange with these 
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China has also been involved in a series of regional institutions. The country 
joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991. It became a 
member of the ARF and ASEAN+3 in 1994 and 1997 respectively, both of which 
are driven by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Involvement 
in these processes has led China, Japan and South Korea to institute a separate 
process of Trilateral Cooperation in 1999. In Central Asia, China was a founding 
member of the “Shanghai Five” process established in 1996, which developed 
into the SCO in 2001. After 2000, China became a founding member of the Asia 
Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) in 2002, the Six Party Talks (SPT) in 2003 and the 
East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005.
4
 Its participation in these frameworks has been 
increasingly active, manifesting China’s ‘new regional posture’ 5  and ‘new 
diplomacy’.6 
 
Nonetheless, China’s active participation in a regional framework does not 
necessarily translate into support for institutionalization. It has adopted different 
approaches to institutionalizing different regional frameworks. For example, 
China has been a driving force in institutionalizing the SCO. It has supported 
broadening the organization’s agenda (both in breadth and depth), building up the 
organization’s capacity (e.g. the establishment of the Secretariat) as well as 
                                                                                                                                                              
countries. The only exception is Sino-Japanese relations. Mutual visits by top leaders were 
suspended from 2002 to 2005, and from late 2012 until today. 
4
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China Website, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/. 
5
 David Shambaugh, "Return to the Middle Kingdom? China and Asia in the Early Twenty-First 
Century," in Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2006), 25 & 30. 
6
 Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 
(2003): 22-23. 
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providing substantial financial support to the organization.
7
 In stark contrast, 
China has reservations to institutionalize the ARF. It has been hesitant to move 
the organization forward to the stage of preventive diplomacy (and also preferred 
limiting its scope to non-traditional security issues), opposed proposals to build up 
the organization’s capacity to manage regional security issues (e.g. the 
establishment of a separate secretariat for the organization) and has not 
contributed any financial resource to the organization thus far.
8
 What is China’s 
approach to the institutionalization of each regional process that it joins? What are 
the major causes for variation in its approaches to institutionalizing these 
frameworks? 
 
Objectives and Rationales of the Study 
 
This study endeavours to examine and explain China’s approach to 
institutionalizing regional institutions in Asia.
9
 Based on Keohane’s definition, 
regional institutions involve a set of rules and norms that ‘constrain activity, 
shape expectations and prescribe roles’ that are relatively durable.10 They are also 
                                                          
7
 Guang Pan, "China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organziation " in China and the New 
International Order, ed. Gung Wu Wang and Yong Nian Zheng (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; 
New York: Routledge, 2008), 249-50. 
8
 Chien-peng Chung, China's Multilateral Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific: Institutionalizing 
Beijing's "Good Neighbor Policy" (New York: Routledge, 2010), 48-52; Email Correspondence 
with ARF Secretariat.  
9
 Institution is a vague concept whose meaning is often assumed to be understood. For some 
widely cited definitions, please refer to Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime 
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D.  
Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions 
and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989). In 
this study, the terms regional processes and regional frameworks are used interchangeably to refer 
to regional institutions.  
10
 Keohane, Essays in International Relations Theory, 163-64. 
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defined by their membership, which should be largely restricted to states within a 
particular geographical region.  
 
This study focuses on regional institutions in Asia that emerged in the post-Cold 
War period, whose membership is mainly restricted to states in Asia. The 
objectives of this study are twofold: (1) to analyze variation in China’s 
approaches to the institutionalization of regional processes in Asia; and (2) to 
develop an explanation to account for such variation.  
 
Importance of the Research Topic 
Variation in China’s approaches on institutionalizing regional frameworks in Asia 
is noteworthy for two reasons. First, analyzing variation in China’s approaches 
will lead to a more nuanced analysis of China’s participation in regional 
frameworks. The conventional account stresses the evolution of China’s approach 
to these frameworks from a hesitant one in the early 1990s to a proactive one 
from the turn of the century.
11
 It shows that China has become more confident and 
skillful in utilizing these venues to advance its national interests. Nonetheless, 
China is not always supportive to the institutional development of regional 
frameworks in Asia. This study will allow us to gain invaluable insights on the 
issue. 
 
                                                          
11
 For example, Kuik notes that China’s participation in regional institutions driven by ASEAN 
evolved from ‘passive involvement’ in the early 1990s, ‘active participation’ from 1996 to 1999 
and ‘proactive proposition’ from 2000 onwards. Cheng-Chwee Kuik, "Multilateralism in China's 
ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration," Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, 
no. 1 (2005): 105-09. 
 17 
Second, as China is both a major regional actor and a rising power, its approach to 
regional processes in Asia will have important implications for the emergent 
regional order in Asia by determining the role of multilateralism in that order. If 
China engages regional countries bilaterally and undermines the development of 
regional processes, ceteris paribus, regional institutions will remain weak and the 
regional order is likely to be dominated by power politics. Whereas, if China 
allows regional processes to play a substantial role in regulating its relations with 
other countries in a variety of economic, political and security issues and pushes 
for their institutional development, the resultant order in Asia is more likely to be 
a rule-based one that ameliorates the effect of competition among regional powers. 
 
China’s involvement in Asian regional processes can be distinguished from other 
multilateral frameworks. From the late 1970s, China joined a series of 
international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1980, the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1992, as well as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001. Many of them were founded by the US and its 
allies after World War II. As a latecomer, China’s influence over the principles 
and organization of these institutions is marginal at best. In comparison, most of 
the regional processes in Asia were established after the end of the Cold War, 
with China as a founder or member in their early years of development. Hence, 
China has more leverage in shaping their development.
12
 Besides, China harbours 
                                                          
12
 Margaret M. Pearson, "The Major Multilateral Economic Institutions Engage China," in 
Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert 
S. Ross (London: Routledge, 1999), 217; Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's 
Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions," ibid., 257.  
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unique concerns to Asia like managing and resolving territorial disputes with its 
neighbours. As noted by Zhang and Tang, ‘Asia is the only region in which all 
aspects of China’s national interest—security, economic, and political—are 
present. Therefore, the way that China pursues the objectives of its regional 
strategy…cannot be easily applied to any other region’. 13  This is equally 
applicable to China’s approach to regional processes, which is a manifestation of 
its regional strategy. 
 
Since 2000, China became a founding member of several multilateral frameworks 
comprised of non-Asian states such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 
2000, the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum in 2004 and BRICS in 2006. 
China’s involvement in these frameworks does not accord it with the same degree 
of influence in shaping the emergent regional order as compared with those 
regional processes in Asia mentioned previously. 
 
A  Gap in the Existing Literature  
This study can contribute to the literature on variation in China’s approaches to 
the institutional development of regional institutions in Asia. Some scholars have 
noted the emergence of regional processes in Asia and China’s involvement in 
these processes. But most of the writings are on the development of Asian 
regionalism (e.g. East Asian regionalism)
14
 and specific regional processes (e.g. 
                                                          
13
 Yunling Zhang and Shiping Tang, "China's Regional Strategy," in Power Shift: China and 
Asia's New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 51. 
14
 Some studies on the development and prospect of East Asian regionalism are Naoko Munakata, 




 and fewer studies are on how individual states approach these processes. 
Available studies tend to focus on China’s approach to some of the frameworks or 
multilateralism in general, and they are largely descriptive. China’s participation 
in some regional processes is understudied, and variation in China’s approaches to 
these processes has not been given much attention. 
 
There are some studies on China’s approach to APEC. According to Zhang, 
China’s approach to APEC has the following features: (1) APEC should remain as 
an economic forum rather than venturing into political and security issues; (2) it 
should focus on both liberalization, as well as economic and technological 
cooperation; (3) cooperation in APEC should be achieved through ‘voluntary and 
unilateral efforts’ of its members instead of a highly institutionalized organization 
that can enforce decisions; and (4) the institutional development of APEC should 
proceed in a gradual manner. He contends that such an approach would serve 
China’s national interests. But Zhang’s comment that China ‘has taken an active 
role in APEC and formulated an aggressive policy’ towards it may be 
exaggerated.
16
 Similar observations on China’s approach to APEC have been 
made by Klintworth, Hurtzig and Sandschneider. While no explanation is offered 
                                                                                                                                                              
Brookings Institution Press, 2006); Edward J. Lincoln, East Asian Economic Regionalism 
(Washington, D.C.; New York: Brookings Institution Press; Council on Foreign Relations, 2004); 
Ellen L. Frost, Asia's New Regionalism (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008). 
15
 Some studies on the ARF’s development are Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: 
Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1996); Ralf Emmers and See Seng Tan, The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive 
Diplomacy: A Failure in Practice (Singapore: Singapore S. Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2009). 
16
 Yunling Zhang, "China and APEC," in Asia-Pacific Crossroads: Regime Creation and the 
Future of APEC, ed. Vinod K. Aggarwal and Charles E. Morrison (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1998). 
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by Hurtzig and Sandschneider, Klintworth suggests that ‘China’s APEC 
diplomacy is aimed, at large part, at dealing with the US’.17  
 
In general, studies on China’s approach to the ARF converge on its reservation  
over the institutional development of the ARF. Su observes that China’s approach 
to the ARF has the following characteristics: (1) to utilize the ARF to build 
confidence with regional states and promote China’s views; (2) to support the 
centrality of ASEAN in driving the regional framework; and (3) to insist that 
institutionalization should be gradual and evolutionary.
18
 Goh and Acharya adds 
that China wants the ARF to focus on confidence-building, limits its support of 
preventive diplomacy to interstate conflicts and opposes its development to deal 
with conflict resolution.
19
 Foot suggests four causes to account for China’s 
approach, namely: China’s strategic culture, the victimhood mentality of Chinese 
leaders, the divergent bureaucratic interests of the Foreign Ministry and the 
military, as well as the growing importance of nationalism for legitimizing the 
Chinese Communist Party.
20
 Focusing on China’s participation in the ARF,  
Johnston notes that China’s involvement in the ARF has led to positive changes in 
                                                          
17
 Julia Hurtzig and Eberhard Sandschneider, "National Interest and Multilateral Cooperation: The 
PRC and Its Policies Towards APEC and ARF," in International Relations in the Asia-Pacific: 
New Patterns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation, ed. Jörn Dosch and Manfred Mols (Münster; 
New York: Lit; St. Martin's Press, 2000), 219-21; Gary Klintworth, "China's Evolving 
Relationship with APEC," International Journal 50, no. 3 (1995): 491-92, 498-99 & 508. 
18
 Hao Su, Cong Yaling dao Ganlan: Yatai Hezuo Anquan Moshi Yanjiu From Dumbbell 
Framework to Olive Community: A Study on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (Beijing: 
Shijie Zhishi Chu Ban She, 2003), 383-384. 
19
 Evelyn Goh and Amitav Acharya, "The ASEAN Regional Forum and Security Regionalism: 
Comparing Chinese and American Positions," in Advancing East Asian Regionalism ed. Melissa 
G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas (Abingdon, Oxon, UK; New York: Routledge, 2006), 98-100 & 
107. 
20
 Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic 
Modes of Thought," Asian Survey 38, no. 5 (1998): 431-37. 
 21 
its official discourse on security multilateralism and more cooperative behaviour 
in the ARF. This is considered to be the result of the socialization of China’s 




As for the SCO, available studies concur on China’s activism in developing the 
regional framework. For instance, Pan notes that China has been ‘a major driving 
force’ in developing the SCO. It advocates the “Shanghai spirit” which guides the 
development of the SCO, promotes its institutional build-up as well as provides 
substantial financial support to it.
22
 Xu elaborates on China’s enthusiasm in 
promoting economic cooperation in the SCO.
23
 Scholars have offered different 
explanations to account for China’s approach to the SCO. Some argue that it is 
driven by China’s intention to balance (or soft balance) against the US.24  In 
another study, Wang suggests that China’s approach to the SCO is shaped by a 
mixture of instrumental motives (e.g. to define and secure its borders) and its 
desire to establish a new security order in Central Asia.
25
    
 
                                                          
21
 Alastair Iain Johnston, "Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and 
International Relations Theory," in International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. 
John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). 
22
 Pan, "China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organziation " 237 & 249-50. 
23
 Tongkai Xu, “Zhongguo yu Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Quyu Jingji Hezuo” China and Regional 
Economic Cooperation in the SCO, in Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Quyu Jingji Hezuo Fazhan 
Licheng yu Qianjing Zhanwang Economic Cooperation in the SCO Development and 
Prospect, ed. Tongkai Xu (Beijing: Renmin Chu Ban She, 2009).  
24
 Chien-Peng Chung, "The Shanghai Co-Operation Organization: China's Changing Influence in 
Central Asia," The China Quarterly 180 (2004), 989-1009; Weiqing Song, “Feeling Safe, Being 
Strong: China’s Strategy of Soft Balancing Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” 
International Politics 50, no. 5 (2013).    
25
 Jianwei Wang, "China and SCO: Towards a New Type of Interstate Relations," in China Turns 
to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security ed. Guoguang Wu and Helen 
Lansdowne (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2008), 119.  
 22 
Studies on China’s approach to ASEAN+3 tend to fall into two categories. One 
category explores China’s considerations and participation in particular initiatives, 
such as the China-ASEAN FTA.
26
 Another category focuses on China’s approach 
to East Asian regionalism, but includes some analyses on China’s approach to 
ASEAN+3. For example, Wu perceives that China’s mainstream view on East 
Asian regionalism is to focus on economic rather than traditional security issues. 





While there are various studies on trilateral economic cooperation (including the 
Trilateral FTA),
28
 there are few studies on China’s approach to Trilateral 
Cooperation. Some scholars have referred to China’s approach occasionally in 
their studies. For example, Yeo remarks that ‘Despite China’s initial reluctance to 
participate in trilateral meetings, since the early 2000s, China has welcomed 
trilateral relations.’ He attributes China’s approach to its intention to balance 
                                                          
26
 Some examples include Ding Ding Du, “Foreign Economic Policy Formulation and 
Implementation in China: China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement” (PhD diss., National University 
of Singapore, 2007), 137; Yuzhu Wang, “Zhongguo—Dongmeng Ziyou Maoyi Qu de Xin 
Jinzhan” Progress in the CAFTA, in Yatai Diqu Fazhan Baogao 2002 Annual Report on 
Development of Asia-Pacific 2002, ed. Yunling Zhang and Shihai Sun, 54-55 (Beijing: Social 
Sciences Documentation Publishing House, 2003). 
27
 Xinbo Wu, "Chinese Perspectives on Building an East Asian Community in the Twenty-First 
Century," in Asia's New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for 
Community ed. Michael J. Green and Bates Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 
59-61 & 67-69. 
28
 Some examples include Xiaoji Zhang and Gang Lu, “Zhongguo de Shidian” China’s 
Perspective, in Zhongrihan Jingji Hezuo de Xin Qidian A New Start for Trilateral Economic 
Cooperation, ed. Xiaoyu Sun, (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshu Guan, 2004); Xin Sun and Changwen 
Xu, Zhongrihan Jingji Hezuo Cujin Dongya Fanrong Trilateral Economic Cooperation Facilitates 
Prosperity in East Asia (Beijing: Zhongguo Haiguan Chuban She, 2005).  
 23 
against the US by promoting closer ties with the two US allies in Northeast 
Asia,
29
 but with no further elaboration.   
 
There are few studies on China’s approach to the SPT. This is evident from the 
contributions to three edited volumes on Northeast Asian regionalism, which 
include only general analyses of China’s approach to Asian regionalism. In a 
book chapter, Choo examines why there is no regionalism in Northeast Asia and 
China’s contribution to the development of regionalism there. He notes that China 
has contributed much to the SPT by organizing multilateral talks after the second 
North Korea nuclear crisis broke out in 2002, proposing institutionalizing the SPT 
into a regional security dialogue (dongbeiya anquan baozhang duihua), setting up 
a “special small group (tebie xiaozu)” to promote regular dialogue, and 
introducing rotating chairmanship in the SPT.
30
 Other authors in the volumes have 
suggested different explanations for China’s approach to Asian regional processes. 
Lin contends that China is trying to balance against the US, while Takagi suggests 
China’s relative influence in these regional processes as the explanation.31  
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Albeit limited, a few studies have examined variation in China’s approaches to 
regional frameworks. In his work on China’s multilateral diplomacy in the United 
Nations (UN) and in Asia (which covers APEC, the ARF, ASEAN+3, the SCO 
and the SPT), Wang asserts that China holds different priorities in regional 
frameworks in different Asian sub-regions. It adopts an ‘economy first, security 
second’ approach to regional frameworks anchored in Southeast Asia, which is in 
direct opposite to its approach to those in Northeast and Central Asia. China’s 
preference on institutionalization also varies. While it is the driving force behind 
the SCO’s institutionalization, such enthusiasm is absent for APEC and the ARF. 
He suggests two reasons to account for the differences, namely membership size 




More recently, Chung seeks to explain China’s interest and success in 
institutionalizing regional processes including APEC, the ARF, the SCO, 
ASEAN+3, the SPT and the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic 
Development and Cooperation Forum by two factors. They are the distribution of 
power within these processes and the attitude of other major actors towards China, 
and the relevance of the issues handled by these processes to China and other 
states. It is hypothesized that China would be more interested and successful in 
institutionalizing these processes when (1) there are few major powers involved; 
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(2) these major powers are not hostile to China; and (3) the issues addressed are 
important to China. Case studies are used to provide support to his hypotheses.
33
   
 
Notwithstanding its contributions, Chung’s study has several limitations. In the 
first place, he has mistakenly conflated China’s interest and success in 
institutionalizing regional frameworks as one dependent variable in his analysis. 
In fact, they are two separate variables as China’s interest in institutionalizing a 
regional framework may not necessarily be realized in reality. Second, he fails to 
operationalize and measure his independent and dependent variables clearly. 
Third, he does not spell out how his identified causes operate, making it difficult 
to evaluate his hypotheses. Finally, the criteria for case selection and data 
collection method are not included in his study.  
 
Contributions of This Study 
 
The significance of this study is as follows. First, by critically reviewing the 
literature on China’s approach to regional processes in Asia and international 
relations (IR) theories, the study can identify plausible explanations for China’s 
approach to regional processes in Asia. It hopes to develop an explanation for 
variation in China’s approaches to institutionalize these processes. The 
plausibility of the proposed explanation is examined vis-à-vis competing 
explanations in the case studies. Second, as China is a major regional actor, an 
analysis of its approach to regional frameworks can contribute to debates over the 
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prospect of regionalism in Asia. The study will be of interest to scholars and 




Research Design and Methodology  
 
This study adopts the case study method to examine the plausibility of the 
proposed explanation vis-à-vis alternative explanations. To be considered for 
inclusion, such processes should (1) be at the Track I/intergovernmental level; (2) 
emerge in the post-Cold War period; and (3) have China as a member. Altogether, 
there are eight plausible cases that meet the above criteria. Following the diverse-
case method of case selection, this study analyzes China’s involvement in four 
regional frameworks, including (1) the ARF; (2) the SCO; (3) ASEAN+3; and (4) 
Trilateral Cooperation. 
 
Regarding data collection, this study collects data mainly from documentation and 
supplements it by focused interviews. In the first stage of data collection, visits to 
libraries in Beijing, Hong Kong and Singapore were conducted to locate relevant 
documentation. In the second stage, a total of 13 researchers affiliated to 
academic and/or research institutions related to the Chinese government in 
Beijing and Shanghai were interviewed between October and November 2013. 
Data analysis in this study is guided by the proposed explanation and the 
 27 
alternative explanations. It adopts the congruence procedure (or pattern matching) 
and process tracing to trace the institutionalization of each selected process, so as 
to evaluate the robustness of the proposed explanation. Details of research design 
and methodology of this study are elaborated in chapter 3. 
 
Organization of Chapters  
 
This study is organized in two parts. Part I covers the objectives and rationales for 
the study, surveys the state of knowledge on the research question, presents the 
theoretical framework of this study and discusses matters of research design and 
methodology.  
 
Chapter 1 sets out the research question of this study and points out that the state 
of knowledge on the research question has remained relatively underdeveloped. 
Chapter 2 critically reviews the relevant IR literature and identifies six 
explanations for China’s approach to regional processes in Asia. They include (1) 
balancing against the US; (2) China’s relative influence in a regional framework; 
(3) membership; (4) convergent interests; (5) socialization; and (6) perceptions of 
collective identity. A theoretical framework is presented, which includes two 
causes to explain variation in China’s approaches on institutionalizing Asian 
regional processes, namely: (a) convergence of interests; and (b) China’s relative 
influence in these frameworks.   
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Chapter 3 presents the research design and methodology for this study. It begins 
by explaining the rationale for selecting the case study method, followed by 
detailed discussion of the research design, case selection criteria, data collection 
and data analysis of the study.   
 
Part II presents the findings of the study and discusses its implications. Chapters 4 
to 7 present the case study findings on China’s involvement in the ARF, the SCO, 
ASEAN+3 and Trilateral Cooperation respectively. The concluding chapter, 
Chapter 8, summarizes the major findings and arguments made in this study, and 
presents an overall discussion. It also discusses the contributions made by this 
study for understanding China’s participation in regional framework in Asia, 
China’s foreign policy and the prospect of Asian regionalism. Finally, it suggests 
areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: EXPLAINING VARIATION IN CHINA’S 
APPROACHES TO REGIONAL PROCESSES IN ASIA  
 
This chapter attempts two tasks. First, it examines the IR literature related to this 
study. Drawing from the literature on China’s foreign policy and IR theories, it 
then identifies and appraises six explanations of China’s approach to regional 
processes in Asia. Second, it presents the theoretical framework for the study. 
Two causes are proposed to account for variation in China’s approaches to 
institutionalizing regional processes in Asia, which include: (a) the convergence 
of interests between China and other major members of a regional framework; 




Insights from IR Theories  
The IR literature relevant to this study is examined below. More specifically, it 
includes the discussion of neorealism and neoliberalism on why states create 
and/or participate in alliances, international institutions and international regimes, 
as well as the discussion of constructivism on the approach of states to 
international institutions.     
 
Neorealism focuses on how the structure of the international system shapes state 
behaviour. Its understanding of international institutions resembles that of 
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alliances. While alliances are viewed as marriages of convenience for states to 
pursuing balancing,
34
 international institutions are considered as merely ‘tools of 
statecraft’.35 According to Mearsheimer, international institutions are developed 
by the major powers to further their relative power. Consequently, they ‘largely 
mirror(ed)’ the distribution of power of the system and ‘have no independent 
effect on state behaviour’.36   
 
Following neorealism, states may create and/or participate in alliances or 
international institutions for various reasons. One reason is to pursue balancing. 
Walt asserts that states form alliances to balance against threats.
37
 Another reason 
is to increase one’s relative power. In explaining the seemingly contradictory 
attitude of the US to international law, Scott argues that the US utilizes 
international law to increase its relative power. When the same logic is applied to 
international institutions, participation can provide states with ‘the means to 
enhance its influence over the policies of other states’.38  
 
A more complex explanation consistent with neorealism is provided by Ikenberry. 
In a study, he tries to explain international order building after major wars where 
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there is an increasing tendency for leading states to adopt institutional strategies 
and establish constitutional orders. He argues that leading states have incentives 
to establish ‘legitimate and durable’ post-war orders that will enable them to 
reduce the costs for upholding order and perpetuating their influence. As for 
weaker states, participation will enable them to bind the leading states and ‘buy 
protection against the threat of domination or abandonment’.39 As such, creating 
and/or participating in institutionalized, constitutional orders resembles a deal that 
serve the interests of both leading and weaker states.  
 
Neoliberalism is mainly developed as a response to neorealism and shares some 
of its assumptions. It notes that international regimes have ‘an independent 
impact’ in facilitating cooperation. They can alter preferences over outcomes, 
‘thereby permitting forms and degrees of cooperation that cannot be reached’ 
previously.
40
 Keohane argues that ‘regimes are developed in part because actors 
in world politics believe that with such arrangements they will be able to make 
mutually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to 
attain’. He proposes a functional theory of international regimes whereby these 
regimes can facilitate cooperation by formulating stable mutual expectations on 
the behaviour of other actors, lowering transaction costs, and providing unbiased 
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information to reduce uncertainty and monitor compliance. By linking issues 




According to neoliberalism, then, international institutions are the results of state 
bargains to facilitate cooperation where common interests exist. This view is 
developed by Moravcsik to explain why European states agree to pursue regional 
integration by pooling and delegating their sovereign authority to a regional 
institution, with particular focus on the policy decisions of the major regional 
players (i.e. Germany, France and Britain). His explanation combines elements of 
convergent economic interests, the relative power of the states concerned and the 
need to secure credible commitments. The last factor is considered crucial for 




Compared to neorealism and neoliberalism, constructivism emphasizes the role of 
ideas in influencing actors and the constitutive effect of these ideas on actors’ 
identity and interests.
43
 It offers two explanations of state approach to 
international institutions. One explanation concerns variations in socialization 
over the norms and practices of the institution, which is developed by Johnston to 
explain China’s participation in security institutions via the socialization of its 
foreign policy-makers in counter-realpolitik norms and practices by these 
                                                          
41
 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 88-97 & 103.  
42
 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 1-4. 
43





 Another explanation concerns perceptions of collective identity, 
which is developed by Hemmer and Katzenstein to explain the different 





Explanations for China’s Approach to Regional Processes in Asia  
Based on the literature on China’s foreign policy cited in Chapter 1 and the IR 
literature mentioned above, six major explanations are identified to account for 
China’s approach to regional processes in Asia. They include: (1) balancing 
against the US; (2) China’s relative influence in regional processes; (3) 
membership; (4) convergent interests; (5) socialization in regional processes; and 
(6) perceptions of collective identity. The first four explanations roughly fall 
under the rationalist camp,
46
 while the rest are constructivist. 
 
Balancing Against the US 
Some scholars and commentators have explained China’s approach to regional 
frameworks in Asia by its interest to balance against the US.
47
 Lin, for instance, 
asserts that China’s approach towards multilateral frameworks in Asia is primarily 
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shaped by Sino-US relations. It is driven by China’s interest to increase its 
relative power at the expense of the US and become the regional hegemon in the 
long run. Consequently, China’s participation in these processes demonstrates ‘a 
pattern of PRC opportunism in exploiting US weaknesses’.48 This explanation is 
rooted in offensive realism whereby states seek to increase their relative power 
and become the most powerful state in the system in their pursuit of security.
49
   
 
Notwithstanding its contribution, Lin’s argument raises two questions. First, the 
role of Sino-US relations in shaping China’s approach to regional frameworks in 
Asia is debatable. While some scholars observe that China and the US are 
“moving towards all-out competition” in Asia and beyond,50 many conceive that 
China does not seek to become the regional hegemon of Asia
51
 or question 
China’s feasibility and/or desirability of pursuing such an objective.52 A more 
plausible motivation for China is to address issues caused by the preponderance of 
the US in the post-Cold War period. Concerned about being contained by the US 
and areas of incompatible interests between the two countries, China has 
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participated in regional frameworks to make friends and complicate attempts by 
the US to exercise its power in ways contrary to China’s interests.53   
 
China’s Relative Influence in Regional Processes 
The second explanation concerns China’s relative influence in Asian regional 
processes. In analyzing China’s approach to security institutions in Asia, Takagi 
suggests that there is ‘a clear correlation between China’s enthusiasm and the 
degree of influence it can exert’ in these institutions.54 If China has considerable 
influence in a regional process, the latter may serve as a useful platform for China 
to pursue its national interests. Unfortunately, Takagi does not elaborate on his 
analysis nor explicate on how to measure China’s “enthusiasm” and “relative 
influence” in a regional process.    
 
In a more recent study, Chung explains China’s interest and success in 
institutionalizing regional processes in Asia by two factors, namely, the 
importance of the issues handled by these processes to China and other states, and 
China’s relative influence in these frameworks. The second factor is measured by 
the number of major participants and their attitude towards China (i.e. whether 
they are friendly or hostile to China).
55
 Unfortunately, Chung fails to define his 
measurement clearly. Determining the major participants in a regional process 
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raises at least two questions: whether power should be the sole criteria for making 
judgement, and what indicator(s) should be used for measurement. The second 
indicator (i.e. attitude) for measuring China’s relative influence is imbued with 
subjectivity. As interstate relations often experience ups and downs, it is difficult 
to measure whether one state is friendly to another state.  
 
Membership of Regional Processes  
In Wang’s study on China’s multilateral diplomacy, he suggests that China’s 
priorities and varied approaches on institutionalizing regional processes in Asia 
can be explained by the membership of these processes. China is noted to be more 
supportive of institutionalizing regional frameworks with a smaller membership 
as it is more likely for members to have convergent interests. In the same vein, 
China is more receptive to multilateral frameworks that are limited to regional 
players and exclude external major powers.
56
 Presumably, China fears that the 
latter might use such frameworks to contain China or compel it to act in ways that 
are contrary to its interests. 
 
Though membership size seems to be a plausible explanation, anomalies arise 
when applying this explanation to China’s approach to regional processes in Asia. 
For example, although the membership size of Trilateral Cooperation is smaller 
than that of the SCO, China is keen to promote institutionalization in the latter 
framework but not in the former. As for the involvement of external major 
powers, Takagi notes that China may not necessarily be more supportive of 
                                                          
56
 Wang, "China's Multilateral Diplomacy," 189. 
 37 
multilateralism in regional frameworks that only involved regional actors. This is 
evident in its lukewarm response to Malaysia’s proposal for establishing the East 
Asia Economic Group in the early 1990s and Japan’s proposal for the Asian 




Convergence of Interests   
Some scholars have developed this explanation to explain state approach towards 
international institutions. According to Chung, China’s interest and success in 
institutionalizing Asian regional processes can be partly accounted for by the 
importance of the issues handled by these processes to China and other states.
58
 
Regrettably, Chung does not elaborate on how this variable can be measured and 
how the explanation operates to shape China’s approach towards on the creation 
and further development of regional processes in Asia.   
 
Two studies have suggested how convergent interests lead to the development of 
international institutions. According to Haggard, the development of regional 
economic institutions can be explained by the changing policy preference of the 
US (which is shaped by the interaction among different government branches and 
domestic constituents), the preference and power of other members in these 
arrangements, as well as the interaction between them.
59
 Ikenberry notes that the 
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aftermath of major wars represents a critical juncture for order-building. The 
decision to establish a constitutional order involving a set of mutually agreed rules 
and institutions represents a bargain that serves the interests of both leading and 
weaker states.
60
   
 
Socialization in Regional Processes 
This explanation is usually found in analyses of China’s participation in the ARF. 
In Johnston’s study, he argues that China’s approach to the ARF is shaped by the 
socialization of its foreign policy-makers to counter-realpolitik norms embodied 
by the ARF through participating in the institution. At its simplest form, the 
explanation assumes the existence of a novice state (i.e. China), a pre-existing 
group of states that shares certain norms and constitutes the society that the 
novice state joins, and international institutions that embody such norms. After 
participating in these institutions, decision-makers of the novice state are 
persuaded to accept the appropriateness of these norms and the novice state 




A close examination of Johnston’s argument raises two issues. First, he fails to 
state clearly how the socialized foreign policy-makers operate domestically to 
induce changes in state behaviour towards international institutions. More 
importantly, it is doubtful whether China is merely a political novice to be 
socialized by other states in the region. In fact, ‘China has (both) adapted itself to 
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and helped shape regional dynamics’ by participating in regional institutions.62 
China’s influence over the ARF is evident in shaping its agreed evolution stages, 
its development from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy, as well as 
defining what preventive diplomacy means for the institution (to be elaborated in 
Chapter 4). Elsewhere, it has shaped regional processes (e.g. the SCO) and 
promoted norms such as delinking diplomacy and the regime type of states.  
 
In explaining the development of regional security institutions in Asia, Acharya 
develops a constitutive localization model which emphasizes the role of local 
actors and cognitive prior in determining one’s response to new ideas. He 
identifies four conditions for constitutive localization to occur, i.e. (1) whether 
existing norms are inadequate (yet relevant) in dealing with new problems; (2) the 
usefulness of external norms; (3) the existence of suitable local actors to promote 
new norms; and (4) whether norm-takers accept the argument of these local 
actors.
63
 This model may be extended to examine how domestic actors shape the 
outcome of socialization mentioned above.  
 
Perceptions of Collective Identity 
The final explanation concerns perceptions of collective identity developed by 
Hemmer and Katzenstein to explain differences in US approach towards 
multilateralism in the North Atlantic and Southeast Asia. It assumes that actors 
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would treat those they identify with differently from others that they perceive do 
not belong to the group. As the US identifies with the European states and view 
them as ‘equals’, it is willing to adopt multilateralism in dealing with them 
although multilateralism will give more influence to these states. In contrast, the 
US views Southeast Asian states as ‘inferior’ states and ‘aliens’. As a result, it is 




When applied to China’s approach to regional processes in Asia, this explanation 
directs our attention to China’s perception of other members, i.e. whether they are 
viewed as belonging to the same in-group and/or as ‘equals’. If this explanation 
holds, China’s tendency to engage in regional processes will be positively 
correlated with its identification with other members.
65
 Evidence suggests that 
China’s support for institutionalization is much stronger in the case of the SCO 
than ASEAN+3, though it has more commonalities with Asian countries in terms 
of culture and ethnicity. Also, it fails to explain variation in China’s approaches 
over institutionalizing regional frameworks with similar core members like 
ASEAN+3 and the EAS.  
 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the explanations on membership and 
perceptions of collective identity are not supported by empirical evidence, whilst 
the remaining explanations are plausible. The explanations on China’s relative 
influence in regional processes and convergence interests seem to have more 
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empirical support. They are chosen to develop an explanation to account for 
variation in China’s approaches to institutionalizing regional processes in Asia in 
this study. The remaining ones (i.e. balancing against the US and socialization in 
regional processes) are included as alternative explanations.  
 
Theoretical Framework of This Study 
 
Institutionalization Defined and China’s Approach to Institutionalizing a 
Regional Framework  
As stated in chapter 1, this study seeks to explain variation in China’s approaches 
to institutionalizing regional frameworks in Asia. It is therefore important to 
clarify what institutionalization means and how China’s approach to 
institutionalizing a regional framework is measured in this study.  
 
In a classic of comparative politics, Huntington defines
 institutionalization as ‘the 
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability’. It is 
shaped by the following: (1) an institution’s ability to withstand challenges and 
adapt to new tasks; (2) the complexity of its organizational structure; (3) its level 
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The concept of institutionalization can also be found in the IR literature. Since the 
1980s, IR theorists have debated on the role of institutions in world politics
67
 but 
they have paid scant attention to variations across institutions. From the late 
1990s onwards, and especially after 2000, a number of studies have been on 
different aspects of institutional variation.
68
Three of them concern 
institutionalization, but the ways they define and measure institutionalization 
vary.  
 
Grieco’s work on regional economic integration in Europe, Asia and the Americas 
suggests that the level of institutionalization of regionalism can be measured 
along three dimensions. They include the form of institutions that emerged (“the 
locus of institutionalization”), their scope and degree of centralization (“level of 
institutional authority”). 69  He provides illustrations to show how regional 
integration in the above regions differed in the level of institutionalization, but 
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does not spell out how to measure these dimensions. Most problematic perhaps is 
the first dimension on institutional form as the existence of a region-wide 
institution rather than multiple sub-regional institutions does not necessarily 
imply a higher degree of institutionalization for a region.   
 
In an edited volume on the institutionalization of Europe’s political space, Stone 
Sweet et al elaborate on the meaning of institutionalization. “We call a social 
space ‘institutionalized’ when there exists a widely shared system of rules and 
procedures to define who actors are, how they make sense of each others’ actions, 
and what types of action are possible. Institutionalization is the process by which 
a social space emerges and evolves.” They suggest three ways to assess degrees of 
institutionalization:  
 
Degrees of institutionalization can be assessed in several—overlapping—
ways. First, to what extent are the processes in question likely to be 
reversed or rolled-back? The more institutionalized the arena or mode of 
governance or process, the less likely it is that roll-back will occur, and the 
greater the collective action problem facing those actors who would wish 
to reverse institutionalization. Second, to what extent are the modes of 
governance stable, that is, likely to reproduce themselves over time? 
Institutionalization implies not only the emergence but the stability of 
forms. Third, how much of the future is determined by what has been 
decided in the past? The more past decisions tend to structure future ones, 
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The first two aspects concern the issue of stability, while the third concerns that of 
path dependence. Although the authors have helped to clarify the concept of 
institutionalization and highlighted some of its salient dimensions, they have 
failed to address how such dimensions can be measured.  
 
In a study on the relationship between violent conflicts and the institutionalization 
of Regional Integration Arrangements (RIAs), Haftel defines institutionalization 
as “the degree of the functional activity and political authority that states delegate 
to their RIA”. He measures institutionalization along the dimensions of 
institutional design and the implementation of such plans. The former dimension 
covers the scope of “economy activity”, “security linkages” as well as 
“institutional centralization” of specific RIAs. Utilizing 40 indicators from 
multiple categories, he constructs the variable “implemented regional 
institutionalization” (or IMRI).71  Up to the present, Haftel’s study is probably the 
most systematic attempt to measure the concept of institutionalization. 





                                                          
70
 Stone Sweet, Fligstein, and Sandholtz, "Institutionalization of European Space," 12 & 22. 
71
 Haftel, "Violent Conflict and Regional Institutionalization," 57-59 & 89. 
72
 Haftel defines RIA as a ‘political process characterized by economic policy cooperation and 
coordination among countries’. Accordingly, RIAs ‘must have a component that deals with 
economic policies’ though they can cover other issues as well. Ibid., 89-90. 
 45 
Based on the foregoing literature, institutionalization refers to the process in 
which institutions, political spaces, and relations among political actors mature. 
This entails the following: (1) the development of principles, rules, norms and 
procedures that regulate the relations among political actors; and (2) such 
principles, rules, norms and procedures should attain a degree of stability or 
stickiness. Drawing on Huntington, this study focuses on two dimensions of 
institutionalization, namely adaptability and complexity. Adaptability concerns 
whether China’s approach to a specific regional process is simply a function of 
bilateral ties or the issue that the process is set up to deal with, or whether China 
values the institution in itself. Complexity concerns China’s willingness to equip a 




In this study, I have developed some indicators for measuring China’s approach to 
institutionalizing specific regional processes along the two dimensions mentioned 
above (please refer to Table 1 below). The dimension on adaptability is measured 
by two indicators: (1) whether China has failed to attend the top-level meetings of 
a regional framework; and (2) whether China has initiated and/or supported 
proposals to expand the functions of a regional framework, including proposals to 
expand its scope or deepen a framework from dialogue to include more concrete 
forms of cooperation (e.g. the conclusion of free trade agreement [FTA] among 
members). The second dimension on complexity is measured by whether China 
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has initiated or supported proposals to introduce new sub-units within a regional 
process. 
 
Table 1: Measuring China’s Approach to Institutionalize a Regional Process 
Dimensions  Indicators 
Adaptability 1. Attendance of top-level meetings in a regional framework  
2. Supportive position on expanding the functions of a 
framework 
 




In the data analysis process, this study examines the attendance of Chinese leaders 
and/or senior officials in the top-level meetings of specific regional frameworks. 
Due to the significance of these meetings, the presence of Chinese leaders and/or 
senior officials can indicate that China values these regional frameworks and 
would not allow frictions in bilateral ties to affect its participation there. Besides, 
the study locates and analyzes statements by Chinese leaders and/or senior 
officials to gauge the country’s position on expanding the functions and 
promoting the institutional build-up of specific regional processes. These 
statements are not merely cheap talk; they will incur costs for China if it changes 
its position. Relatedly, this study also identifies concrete actions undertaken by 
China to back up its words. For example, a substantial financial contribution from 
China to support an initiative can indicate its support for institutional 
development of a regional process.   
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China’s approach to institutionalize these frameworks can be classified as high, 
intermediate or low accordingly. It will be classified as high only if China 
supports institutionalizing a framework in both dimensions. At the same time, it 
will be classified as low only if China fails to support institutionalizing a 
framework in both dimensions. 
 
The Proposed Explanation: Convergence of Interests and Relative Influence   
Based on the literature review on China’s foreign policy and IR, this study 
proposes an explanation with two major causes to account for variation in China’s 
approaches to institutionalizing regional processes in Asia. They include the 
convergence of interests between China and other members as well as its relative 
influence in these processes. The explanations on balancing and socialization in 
regional processes are also included as alternative explanations in this study.  
 
Convergence of Interests 
The first cause concerns the extent to which China’s interests converge with other 
major members of these processes. It assumes that regional processes arise only 
when there is some convergence of interests among member states. The attitude 
of members towards further developing these processes is shaped by the extent of 
convergent interests among them. In cases where China’s interests converge 
substantially with those of other states, these regional frameworks will be 
considered useful for China to pursue its interests. Otherwise, China may still 
participate in these frameworks but it will be largely motivated by the need to 
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contain and forestall developments that may undermine its interests. 





Proposition 1:  The greater the convergence of interests between China 
and other major members of a regional framework, the greater its tendency 
to support further institutionalization of the framework. 
 
The presence of convergent interests is initially determined by whether China and 
other major members of a regional process join it to address specific issue(s) of 
concern. This can be an external shock (e.g. a regional crisis) or a long-standing 
problem (e.g. a territorial dispute). The crucial point is that the issue renders 
existing channels of communication inadequate and makes it necessary for states 
to coordinate their efforts to address the issue(s). In the data analysis process, this 
can be gauged via the agenda and activities of a regional process. If a regional 
process is established to address specific issue(s) of concern, one is likely to see 
(1) that the issue is high on the agenda of the regional process in its early years of 
development; and (2) its activities are targeted at addressing the issue.  
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Subsequently, the convergent interests between China and other member states 
may be broadened or narrowed through various mechanisms. First, the ability of 
the regional process to address the issue(s) it is set up for will determine its 
relevance to its members and the convergent interests among them.  
 
Second, the interaction among domestic actors within China will shape how the 
country defines its interests regarding these frameworks. State preferences are 
defined largely through interaction among important domestic constituents. In the 
case of China which is not a democracy, several government bureaucracies such 
as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) play an important role in shaping the country’s interests. 
They are some of the key bureaucracies involved in making and implementing 
China’s foreign policy. As regional processes develop, they tend to involve an 
increasing number of government bureaucracies of member states. These 
bureaucracies may hold different views, due to different socialization and 
bureaucratic interests, and exert varying degrees of influence over China’s 
approach to these frameworks. The interaction among these officials in the 
foreign policy-making process will shape how China defines its interests and 
approach to these regional frameworks. This study explores and examines internal 
debates within China on the country’s approach to institutionalizing specific 
regional processes whenever available.  
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Finally, it is important to note the reaction of other major members to China’s 
initiatives and/or positions within a regional process. If they welcome China’s 
initiatives and/or positions in the framework, the convergent interests between 
China and other members will be expanded. On the contrary, if they oppose 
China’s initiatives and/or positions, or worse still remain wary of China’s role in 
the framework, the convergent interests between China and other members will 
remain narrowly-based.  
 
Even when China’s interests converge substantially with those of other members, 
it may not necessarily pursue its interests in a specific regional framework. As a 
major regional power, China may choose to pursue its interests unilaterally, 
bilaterally or via an alternative setting where it has more leverage. This brings us 
to the other cause which is China’s relative influence in such frameworks.  
 
Relative Influence 
The second cause concerns China’s relative influence in a regional process. It 
assumes that with considerable influence, China will be able to pursue its national 
interests in a regional framework. Hence, it will be more willing to accept the 
costs and binding effects associated with institutionalization.  
 
Proposition 2:  The more relative influence China can exert in a regional 
framework, the greater its tendency to support further institutionalization 
of the framework.   
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China’s relative influence in a framework can be measured by two indicators. The 
first indicator concerns China’s role in establishing the framework, i.e. whether it 
is a founder, a follower or a participant. China is a founder if it belongs to the core 
group that set up a framework. As a follower, it joins the framework from the 
beginning but does not belong to the core group of founders. If China joins a 
framework after its establishment, then it is a participant. As the institutional 
setup of the framework tends to incorporate primarily inputs from its founders and 
perpetuate their influence, China’s relative influence in a framework will be 
highest when it is a founder and lowest when it is only an ordinary participant.  
 
The second indicator concerns the roles accorded to China in these frameworks. 
This directs our attention to whether China can assume a leadership position in 
these regional frameworks, including its involvement in the supporting agencies 
and/or committees within these frameworks. As institutions can accord 
institutionally-generated influence to actors, a major power does not necessarily 
enjoy the influence commensurate with its power at a specific time in a 
multilateral institution.
75
 China’s relative influence in a framework is greater 
when it plays substantial roles in these frameworks.  
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While China’s relative influence in a regional framework may change, this tends 
to occur more slowly than changes in convergence of interests, as institutions tend 
to evolve and may therefore perpetuate a specific distribution of power.  
Following the logic of the proposed explanation, the plausibility of the proposed 
explanation will be severely undermined if one of the following conditions is 
found empirically: (1) if China is supportive towards institutionalizing a regional 
process that is not established to address specific issue(s) of concern; or (2) if 
China is supportive towards institutionalizing a regional framework whereby its 




Balancing Against the US 
As mentioned above, this alternative explanation assumes the centrality of Sino-
US relations in explaining China’s approach to institutionalizing regional 
frameworks in Asia. It argues that China seeks to increase its relative power vis-à-
vis the US via participating in regional frameworks in Asia. China will exploit 
situations when the US is pre-occupied or when its image in the region was 
severely damaged to promote or support initiatives to this end. This explanation 
also falls under the rationalist camp, yet its emphasis on the centrality of Sino-US 
relations in shaping China’s approach towards institutionalizing regional 
processes in Asia distinguishes it from the proposed explanation.  
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To explore the plausibility of this explanation, this study examines why China 
chose to join specific regional frameworks and the considerations that shaped its 
subsequent behaviour. If the explanation holds, one should observe that China’s 
decision to join these frameworks and/or subsequent actions are driven by its 
interest to balance against the US. For example, China may promote the 
establishment of regional institutions that exclude the US ‘to foster a common 
identity…, build capacity to withstand influence attempts by the unipole…, or 
create the potential to act independently of the unipole or at cross-purposes with 
it’. It may also promote initiatives that improve its influence vis-à-vis the US.76 
Ideally, such decisions and/or initiatives should follow those periods when the 
image of the US in the region is severely tarnished, or when the US is 
preoccupied with domestic crises or issues in other parts of the world. These 
decisions and/or initiatives should not be shaped by other major considerations. 
The explanation will be undermined if China is found to work collaboratively 
with the US in specific regional processes, if the timing of China’s decisions 
and/or initiatives does not follow the prediction, or if considerations other than 
balancing play a more significant role in shaping China’s approach to specific 
regional processes.  
 
Socialization in Regional Processes 
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Drawing on the constitutive localization model developed by Acharya, this 
explanation assumes that China is a recipient to the new ideas embodied by 
specific regional processes. It examines how China’s continued quest for 
economic development in the post-Cold War period renders some of its pre-
existing norms and beliefs inadequate while leaving others largely unaffected (e.g. 
its stern position on territorial sovereignty). This shapes whether China is 
receptive to the norms advocated by specific regional institutions. The influence 
of the local actors who promote the new norms also matters. In cases where other 
influential domestic players opposing the new ideas exist, the role of socialization 
in shaping a country’s foreign policy is questionable at best.   
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
A review of the literature indicates that there are few explanations of China’s 
approach to Asian regional processes, and they are fairly crude. These 
explanations share two common problems. First, they fail to take into account that 
China’s foreign policy is motivated by complex forces that go beyond the pursuit 
of material capability or socialization by the international society. It is also highly 
domestically-oriented with regime survival as a key objective of Chinese 
leaders.
77
 Second, they have not delved into the domestic politics and foreign 
policy decision-making process in China, which can influence China’s foreign 
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 A more nuanced explanation of variation in China’s approaches to 
regional processes in Asia is needed.  
 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the study, describes the 
dependent and independent variables and suggests ways to measure them. This 
study seeks to explain China’s varied approaches on institutionalizing regional 
frameworks in Asia. Based on a review of the major explanations derived from 
studies on China’s foreign policy and IR theories, I have proposed an explanation 
with two major causes to account for China’s varied approaches. They include the 
convergence of interests between China and other major members of these 
frameworks as well as China’s relative influence in such frameworks.  
 
This study also examines two alternative explanations of China’s approach to 
institutionalizing regional processes in Asia. The first explanation argues that it is 
shaped by China’s interest to balance against the US. Whereas the second 
explanation argues that it is shaped by the socialization of China’s foreign policy-
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
This chapter elaborates on issues of research design and method of this study. It is 
divided into five parts. It begins by explaining why the case study method is 
chosen for this study. Next, it specifies the scope of this study and elaborates on 
the issue of case selection. Then, the issues of data collection and analysis are 




This study employs the case study method to examine the proposed explanation 
vis-à-vis two alternative explanations. The case study method is a systemic 
method of inquiry with its own logic of research design, data collection and data 
analysis. According to Gerring, the case study method involves ‘an intensive 
study of a single case (or a small set of cases) with an aim to generalize across a 
larger set of cases of the same general type’. It is distinguished from a sample-
based or “cross case” research design over the number of cases studied and the 
intensity in which each case is studied.
79
 In addition, it is a flexible research 
method that can involve single or multiple cases, draw on quantitative and/or 
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The case study method is chosen due to its relevance to the research question and the 
number of available cases for this study. This method is most appropriate when ‘a 
“how” or “why” question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over 
which the investigator has little or no control’.81  Hence, it is well-suited to the 
objectives of this study to explain variation in China’s approaches to 
institutionalizing regional processes in Asia. Also, with the small number of 
available cases, it is not feasible to employ a cross-case research design for this 
study. Though it is possible to increase the number of cases by extending the 
proposed explanation to cover China’s approach to international institutions in 
general, this is not considered meaningful as China’s involvement in Asian 
regional processes differs from that in other multilateral frameworks elsewhere.
82
    
 
Scope of Study and Case Selection 
 
According to the case study method, a case refers to ‘a spatially delimited 
phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of 
time. It comprises the type of phenomenon that an inference attempts to explain’. 
Each case may include one or multiple observations, where the values of the 
independent and dependent variables are measured.
83
 The cases in this study 
concern regional institutions in Asia that emerged in the post-Cold War period 
with China as a member. Following Keohane’s definition as mentioned in Chapter 
1, a regional institution involves a set of rules and norms that shape the interaction 
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among its members, which is largely restricted to states within a particular region. 
The focus of this study is on regional institutions at the Tract I/intergovernmental 
level. Following this definition, there are eight plausible cases for consideration in 
this study. They include APEC, the ARF, ASEAN+3, Trilateral Cooperation, the 




This study adopts the diverse-case method to select the cases for inclusion. Such a 
method aims ‘to capture the full range of variation along the dimension(s) of 
interest’, 85  which are the independent variables of this study. Table 2 below 
illustrates where the eight plausible cases lie in terms of the two proposed causes 
in this study. Following the diverse-case method, this study analyzes China’s 
involvement in four regional frameworks in Asia. They include (1) the ARF; (2) 
the SCO; (3) ASEAN+3; and (4) Trilateral Cooperation. Among the cases with 
similar values in their independent variables, the ARF is chosen due to data 
availability and opportunity to examine the alternative explanation on 
socialization.  
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Table 2: Variation in the Independent Variables of Potential Cases 
  Convergence of Interest 












ACD, APEC, ARF, EAS 
 
 
A closer look at the four chosen cases shows that the ARF and the SCO are 
primarily regional security institutions. Both cases embody extreme values on the 
proposed causes (low convergent interests and low relative influence for the ARF 
versus high convergent interests and high relative influence for the SCO). As such, 
they offer great tests for the proposed explanation as its prediction is certain in 
these two cases.
86
 ASEAN+3 and Trilateral Cooperation are primarily regional 
economic institutions. The case of ASEAN+3 includes within-case variation, 
which provides an additional opportunity to examine the proposed explanation. 
Trilateral Cooperation is a relatively recent and under-researched regional 
framework. If the findings from this case confirm the proposed explanation, it 
could enhance our confidence in the proposed explanation.  
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This study collects data mainly from documentation and supplemented by 
interviews. The first stage of data collection focuses on locating, collecting and 
analyzing archival data, which includes: (1) documents of selected regional 
frameworks (e.g. chairman statements of meetings); (2) speeches made by 
Chinese officials and other official documents (e.g. the annual series on China’s 
Foreign Affairs); (3) media reports and commentaries;
87
 as well as (4) secondary 
data from academic studies. It covers data from the time when China joined the 
selected regional processes up to the end of 2012. At this stage, I conducted 





The second stage of data collection involves focused interviews
89
 to corroborate 
evidence from documentary sources and collect additional data for the competing 
explanations. Interviews were conducted in October and November 2013 in Beijing 
and Shanghai. Altogether, I interviewed 13 researchers who are currently or 
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previously affiliated to academic and/or research institutions related to the Chinese 
government with related research interests and/or expertise (e.g. involvement in the 
Track II process of regional frameworks). These institutions include the Foreign 
Affairs University, the China Institute of International Studies, the Chinese 
Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, the 
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies and the Fudan University.  
 
The interviewees were selected by purposive sampling and solicited by 
correspondence. To begin with, a list of potential interviewees was compiled by 
browsing the websites of relevant academic/research institutes and 
recommendations by scholars of China’s foreign policy.  An invitation email was 
sent to potential interviewees to solicit their consent to participate in the interviews. 
If no reply was received, a follow-up email was sent. Through snowballing, one 
interviewee was included in the sample following similar procedures. A protocol 
and interview guide was developed to guide the interviews (see Appendix 1). 
Anonymity and confidentiality were assured, and a written consent was obtained 
from the interviewers before conducting the interviews. Each face-to-face interview 
lasted for about 60 to 90 minutes. Most interviews were conducted in the office of 
the interviewees or meeting room of the academic/research institutions. All the 
interviews were conducted in Putonghua, the official language of China, to facilitate 
exchange. After the interviews, a summary was sent to the interviewees for 
verification and amendment. 
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Data collection was a time-consuming process and an overwhelming task in this 
study. During the process, I encountered several problems and complications as 
follows:  
 
1. Due to the huge amount of archival data available, I spent a lot of time to 
locate and analyze the data for the selected cases. For instance, it took me 
several weeks to browse and locate relevant information of the ARF, which 
spans over almost two decades.   
2. Due to the limitations of available library resources, I did not have access to 
all the relevant media reports and commentaries in some of the listed 
publications, particularly for news reports and commentaries that were more 
dated.  
3. Originally, I planned to visit the ASEAN Secretariat to locate relevant 
archival data in mid-2012. But it was extremely difficult to contact the 
ASEAN Secretariat in writing or by telephone. With the assistance of the 
Foreign Ministry in Singapore, I eventually managed to write to officials of 
the ASEAN Secretariat requesting for access to specific data and documents 
of ASEAN-related regional institutions, but my request was unsuccessful. 
Hence, I had to rely on documentation available on the website of ASEAN 
and explore other ways to collect the required data.  
4. It was difficult to locate potential interviewees for the interviews as many 
academic and research institutions in China do not include detailed contact 
information of researchers on their websites. I attempted to overcome this 
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hurdle by building connections during my stay in Beijing between June and 
July 2012, and by soliciting potential interviewees via snowballing. Due to 
the time constrain in fieldwork, snowballing was not an effective method for 
soliciting interviewees and only one interviewee was recruited through this 
method.  
5. As most of the interviewees are experts on the SCO and ASEAN+3, the 
interview data collected is particularly useful for the case studies on the two 
regional frameworks respectively. Among the 13 interviewees, six were 
researchers/ experts on the SCO, five on ASEAN+3 and only one on the 
ARF. Trilateral Cooperation was barely touched upon in some of the 
interviews that focused on ASEAN+3. Consequently, documentation 
remains as the major source of data for the cases of the ARF and Trilateral 
Cooperation.   
 
Data Analysis and Theory Development 
 
Data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, combining data from multiple 
sources, and testing the propositions of a study. Following the advice of Yin, this 
study relies on the proposed explanation and the two competing explanations to 
guide data analysis.
90
 This strategy enables me to remain focused, select relevant 
data and generate compelling analytical conclusions. The study begins with 
individual case analysis for each selected framework to understand each case as a 
unique, holistic entity, before doing cross-case comparison. For single case 
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analysis, it is conducted by analyzing the data according to the questions listed in 
the interview guide. This is followed by cross-case analysis to compare China’s 
varied approaches to the four cases by grouping and analyzing the answers to the 
same set of questions addressed in single case analysis plus additional questions 
to address the research questions of this study.  
 
Based on the abovementioned data analysis strategy, this study adopts two major 
techniques for data analysis. The first technique concerns the congruence method 
or pattern matching. George and Bennett capture the essence of the technique 
succinctly in the following: 
 
The essential characteristic of the congruence method is that the investigator 
begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or 
predict the outcome in a particular case. The theory posits a relation between 
variance in the independent variable and variance in the dependent 
variable…The analyst first ascertains the value of the independent variable in 
the case at hand and then asks what prediction or expectation about the 
outcome of the dependent variable should follow from the theory. If the 
outcome of the case is consistent with the theory’s prediction, the analyst can 
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In this study, the congruence method is applied in two ways. First and foremost, it 
is applied in analyzing each of the four cases. This study examines where each 
regional process stands in terms of the two independent variables proposed by the 
study and forecast China’s approach to on institutionalizing the process. Then, it 
examines whether this is consistent with the facts. Second, the method is applied 
within each case.
92
 Namely, this study locates times when the convergence of 
interests between China and other major members of a regional framework and/or 
China’s relative influence there change, and examines whether there are 
corresponding changes in China’s approach to institutionalizing the process. If 
there are, the findings can provide further support to the proposed explanation.   
 
Notwithstanding its usefulness, some scholars have expressed reservations on 
relying on congruence alone to infer causality. They point out that theories that 
pass the congruence test may still suffer from other problems (e.g. spuriousness). 
And given the complexity of the social world, it is often difficult for case studies 
to eliminate all rival explanations.
93
 In view of the limitations of the congruence 
method, this study also adopts process-tracing in analyzing the case studies. 
According to Gerring, 
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The hallmark of process tracing, in my view, is that multiple types of 
evidence are employed for the verification of a single inference—bits and 
pieces of evidence that embody different units of analysis (they are each 
drawn from unique populations). Individual observations are therefore 
noncomparable. Additionally, process tracing usually involves long causal 
chains. Rather than multiple instances of X1→Y (the large-N cross-case 
style of research), one examines a single instance of 
X1→X2→X3→X4→Y.94 
 
As the proposed explanation does not involve complicated causal paths, this study 
adopts a variety of process-tracing which involves the construction of ‘a general 
explanation rather than a detailed tracing of a causal process’.95 In the case study 
chapters, process tracing is used to assess the explanatory power of the proposed 
explanation vis-à-vis that of the completing explanations. Namely, the study 
critically examines whether the data can be stitched together to formulate a 
convincing account regarding how the two proposed causes operate to shape 
China’s approach to institutionalizing a regional process and whether alternative 
accounts can be ruled out. Process tracing may also contribute to theory 
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development by identifying causal processes or mechanisms unforeseen by the 
study.
96
     
 
Quality of Research 
 
Before moving on to the case study chapters, a final issue concerns how this study 
guarantees its research quality. According to Gerring, social sciences research 
involves the three central tasks of formulating concepts, propositions and a plan 
for research design, each with its own criteria for judgement.
97
 Similarly, Yin lists 
four criteria for evaluating social sciences research. They include (a) construct 
validity (i.e. measuring what one purports to measure); (b) internal validity (i.e. 
establishing causality); (c) external validity (i.e. whether one’s findings is 
generalizable); and (d) reliability (i.e. whether one’s findings is replicable). He 
also suggests how studies employing the case study method can address these 
criteria during the research process.
98
    
 
This study is well aware of the above criteria involved in each task in the research 
process and is cautious to address them. It has adopted some of the tactics 
suggested by Yin to enhance the quality of the case study, such as developing 
clear measures with indicators for both the dependent and independent variables, 
using multiple sources of data to increase construct validity; using the techniques 
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of pattern-matching (aka. the congruence method) and addressing alternative 
explanations to address internal validity; developing a theory for testing and using 
replication logic in the multiple cases to increase external validity; and following 
clear procedures of data collection and analysis, as well as developing a well-
organized database to enhance reliability.
99




To recap, this study adopts the case study method to examine the proposed 
explanation. Following the diverse-case method, it analyzes China’s varied 
approach to institutionalizing four regional processes in Asia. They are: (1) the 
ARF; (2) the SCO; (3) ASEAN+3; and (4) Trilateral Cooperation. As the research 
question concerns contemporary Chinese foreign policy, the data is scattered in 
multiple sources and some data is not readily available to the public. Hence, this 
study has collected data by documentation supplemented by interviews. Data 
analysis is guided by the proposed explanation and competing explanations, and 
adopts the two techniques of the congruence method (or pattern matching) and 
process-tracing. In conducting this study, I have taken caution in formulating its 
concepts, propositions and research design, and have adopted measures to 
enhance the quality of research.  
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During the early 1990s, the Asia-Pacific region underwent profound changes 
caused by the end of the Cold War, the rise of China and the settlement of the 
Cambodian problem. After more than a decade of reforms and opening up, China 
became an emergent power. The US was the world’s lone superpower, but its 
influence in Asia was perceived as diminished somewhat after the Vietnam War. 
As ideological rivalries receded, a series of old and new flashpoints carried 
potential threats to regional security. These included North Korea’s nuclear 
development, the territorial disputes between regional states and tensions across 
the Taiwan Strait. Regional states confronted a new and uncertain security 
environment.  
 
The ARF is the first regional security organization at Track I that encompasses 
the Asia-Pacific region.
100
 The organization was initiated by ASEAN, then with 
six members. During the 1992 ASEAN Summit, members decided to promote 
regional security dialogue beyond ASEAN by utilizing the Post-Ministerial 
Conference (PMC). When the senior officials of the ASEAN PMC met in May 
1993 to discuss regional security, they recognized that the participation of various 
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regional states like China and Russia was necessary for a fruitful discussion on 
the issue. In July 1993, the foreign ministers of ASEAN accepted the PMC’s 
recommendation to invite a number of countries (including China, Laos, Papua 
New Guinea, Russia and Vietnam) to join the forthcoming ARF in Bangkok in 
1994. Finally, on July 25, the foreign ministers of ASEAN, its dialogue partners 
and the invited countries attended an informal dinner and they agreed to convene 
the ARF in Bangkok in 1994.
101
 This marked the genesis of the ARF which 
comprises 27 members today.  
 
When initial discussion of establishing such a regional institution took place, 
China was unenthusiastic about the initiative. It argued that ‘the region was too 
diverse and that the time was not ripe for such a body’. Underneath, China was 
concerned that the Taiwan issue or the territorial disputes over the islands in the 
East and South China Seas might be deliberated by the regional institution.
102
  
Ever since joining the ARF in 1994, China has remained cautious of 
institutionalizing the regional framework. This chapter attributes this to the low 
convergent interests between China and the ASEAN countries and its limited 
relative influence in the ARF. China and the ASEAN countries do not share any 
common security threats necessitating closer cooperation in the ARF. The 
subsequent search for convergent interests is constrained by the residual 
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misgivings of the ASEAN countries towards China and the divergent views hold 
by China and many ASEAN countries over fundamental security issues. 
Meanwhile, China’s limited relative influence in the ARF means that it has little 
control over the agenda and development of the regional framework. Hence, 
institutionalizing the ARF would have little utility to China while having long-
term implications over the handling of territorial disputes with other Asian 
countries. 
 
This chapter is comprised of five sections. It begins by briefly introducing the 
ARF’s institutional development and China’s approach to institutionalization. 
Next, it examines the plausibility of two alternative explanations. The fourth 
section assesses the plausibility of the proposed explanation by analyzing China’s 
approach to institutionalization in three periods: (1) 1994-1995; (2) 1996-2001; 
and (3) 2002-2012. The final section summarizes the major findings of this 
chapter.  
 
The Institutional Development of the ARF 
 
The ARF began as annual meetings for foreign ministers to talk about security 
issues. A senior officials’ meeting (SOM) was held beforehand to prepare for the 
meeting and exchange views on outstanding regional security issues of the time.  
The 2
nd
 ARF Meeting in 1995 agreed to set up inter-sessional support group (ISG) 
and inter-sessional meetings (ISMs). The ISG on Confidence Building Measures 
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(ISG-CBMs) meets regularly and various ISMs have been convened at different 
time in the ARF’s history. In recent years, the ARF has convened four ISMs 
covering Disaster Relief (ISM-DR), Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime 





Over the years, the ARF has developed various meeting mechanisms including 
the Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting (HDUCIM), 
Defence Officials’ Dialogue (DOD), Security Policy Conference (ASPC), as well 
as the Experts and Eminent Persons (EEPs) Meeting. However, there is no 
meeting among the top leaders. Whereas meetings among the defence ministers of 
member states is realized by ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus launched 
by ASEAN in 2010. The ARF does not have its own secretariat; an ARF Unit was 
established under the ASEAN Secretariat in 2004 to support the functioning of the 
regional framework. Composed of officials seconded from the ASEAN countries, 
the Unit is modest in size and has little power. The Chair and Vice-Chair of 
ASEAN serve as the Chair and Vice-Chair of the ARF simultaneously.
104
   
 
The ARF does not have its own charter. According to the 2
nd
 ARF Meeting, it 
would evolve in three stages involving ‘the promotion of confidence building 
(Stage I), development of preventive diplomacy (Stage II) and elaboration of 
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approaches to conflicts (Stage III).’ 105 Since 1997, the ARF has been moving 
forward slowly from Stage I to and II, which is a tedious process. During the 4
th
 
ARF Meeting in 1997, participants decided to task the ISG-CBMs to identify 
matters where confidence building and preventive diplomacy overlap and explore 
how to address them while focusing on Stage I.
 
Subsequently, the ARF adopted 
the Paper on the Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy in 2001, 
decided to replace the ISG-CBMs with the ISG-CBMs and Preventive Diplomacy 
in 2005 and adopted the ARF Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan in 2011. 




                                                          
105
 ARF, “Chairman’s Statement: The Second Meeting of the ARF.”  
106
 ARF, “Chairman's Statement of the 4th Meeting of the ARF,” July 27, 1997.  
http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/library/arf-publication/459.html (accessed December 29, 
2013); ARF Website.  
 75 
Table 3:  Major Milestones of the ARF’s Institutional Development 
First Period: 
1994-1995 
 1994: The ministers decided to convene the ARF annually 
in the 1
st
 ARF meeting. 
 1995: The ministers adopted most of the proposals on The 
ARF: A Concept Paper in the 2
nd





 1996: The ministers reached agreement on the guiding 




 1997: The ministers agreed to request the ISG-CBMs to 
explore areas where Stage I and Stage II overlap and how to 
address them in the 4
th
 ARF meeting. Subsequently, the 
ARF developed four proposals covering an enhanced role 
for the ARF Chair, the development of EEPs, annual 
security outlook and voluntary background briefing on 
regional security issues. 
 2001: The ministers adopted the Paper on The Concept and 
Principles of Preventive Diplomacy in the 8
th




 2004: The ministers indicated their support for the creation 
of the ARF Unit in the 11
th
 ARF meeting. 
 2005: The ministers agreed to replace the ISG-CBMs by the 
ISG-CBMs and PD and adopted the TOF for the 
Establishment of the ARF Fund in the 12
th
 ARF meeting. 
  2007: The ministers welcomed the holding of the ARF 




  2008: The ministers agreed to institute the ASEAN Vice-
Chair as the ARF Vice-Chair in the 15
th
 ARF meeting. 
  2009: The ministers adopted the ARF Vision Statement in 
the 16
th
 ARF meeting. 
  2011: The ministers adopted the ARF Preventive 
Diplomacy Work Plan in the 18
th
 ARF meeting. 
 
 




                                                          
107
 ARF Website.  
 76 
China’s Approach to Institutionalizing the ARF  
 
China is a major party in many potential flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region. In 
addition to Taiwan, China is involved in a number of territorial disputes in the 
East and the South China Seas and has a huge stake in the future of the Korean 
peninsula. The institutionalization of the ARF will have important implications 
for China. So far, China has been circumspect on the institutionalization of the 
ARF though it has participated more actively in the regional framework over the 
years. 
 
China’s approach to institutionalizing the ARF took root in the first period. With 
regard to the dimension of adaptability, China preferred the ARF to remain only 
as a loose forum for security dialogue rather than developing more concrete forms 
of cooperation.
 
During the SOM in 1995, it stressed that the ARF ‘should 
maintain its forum nature, as a venue for confidence-building and expanding 
cooperation among members via discussing security issues, rather than serving as 
an organization for negotiation or arbitration.’ It also ‘opposed developing the 
ARF into a mechanism for preventive diplomacy or conflict resolution.’ 108 As for 
the dimension on complexity, China was against any rudimentary attempts of 
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institutional development. It even expressed reservations over the creation of 




During the second period, China participated more actively in the ARF by co-
hosting the ISG-CBMs in 1997 and distributing its first national defence white 
paper during the 5
th
 ARF Meeting in 1998.
110
 Nonetheless, it was unwavering 
over the issue of institutionalization. Regarding the dimension of adaptability, 
China remained vigilant over the development of preventive diplomacy in the 
ARF. Albeit some members wanted the ARF to proceed to Stage II in the late 
1990s,
111
 China emphasized that confidence-building should remain as the ‘core’ 
of the ARF.
112
 It suggested that it was necessary (for members) to discuss relevant 
concepts and principles before developing relevant capabilities, and sought to 
limit the scope of preventive diplomacy as applied to the ARF so that it ‘did not 
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involve the use of force, or ‘preventive deployment’, and that it was limited to 
inter-state, rather than intra-state conflicts.’113 
 
China’s participation in the ARF followed the same pattern in the third period. 
Though China co-chaired several ISG and ISMs and organized various inter-
sessional activities for the ARF from 2002, its support for institutionalization 
remained severely limited. Regarding the dimension on adaptability, China 
preferred the ARF to remain at the stage of confidence-building.
114
 It also sought 
to limit the development of preventive diplomacy in the ARF further by limiting 
its scope from interstate conflicts to non-traditional security issues.
115
 Regarding 
the dimension on complexity, it opposed establishing an independent secretariat 
for the ARF.
116
 Finally, it was noteworthy that China ‘has never contributed to the 
ARF Fund’ since its inception.117   
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Balancing Against the US 
The analysis below examines why China opted to join the ARF and its subsequent 
behaviour to assess this explanation. So far, the empirical evidence for the 
explanation is rather mixed.  
 
As suggested below, China was motivated by several factors to join the ARF 
other than balancing. In the early years of the regional framework, China had 
proposed some initiatives targeted at the US. For instance, when the Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen suggested several confidence-building measures to curb 
surveillance activities and joint military exercises targeted at individual ARF 
members in 1995, they were apparently directed at the US given its military 
activities in Asia. Another example was the New Security Concept proposed by 
China in the 3
rd
 ARF Meeting in 1996.
118
 The concept was described as having 
three components: ‘(1) relations between states have to be based on the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence; (2) economic interdependence needs to be 
deepened on the basis of mutual benefit and mutual opening-up of economies; and 
(3) countries should rely on dialogue and cooperation to resolve differences and 
disputes.’119 As the Concept called for the abolition of bilateral security alliances 
as being destabilizing and representative of Cold War thinking, it was apparently 
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directed at the US alliances and security partnerships in the region.
120
 However, 
similar initiatives could not be identified in recent years.
121
 On the contrary, China 
has worked with the US in the ARF on various areas such as non-proliferation. 
China co-chaired the Seminar on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 





Though balancing against the US did not seem to play an important role in 
shaping China’s approach to the institutionalization of the ARF, it did influence 
China’s position on an important organizational principle, i.e. that the ARF should 
remain driven by ASEAN. Confronted with the preponderant power of the US in 
the post-Cold War period, China has remained vigilant over the development of 
regional security institutions dominated by the US, which might embed China in a 
set of rules and institutions that would constrain its course of actions and 
influence. Worse still, they might develop into an Asian version of NATO with 
China as the target. Hence, China has insisted on the centrality of ASEAN in the 
ARF.
123
 During the formative years of the ARF, China was worried about 
participating in a regional security institution dominated by the US. The fact that 
the ARF is ASEAN-driven made it more acceptable to China and has facilitated 
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its participation in the regional framework.
124
 After joining the ARF, China has 




Socialization in Regional Processes 
China’s participation in the ARF is further examined to assess the plausibility of 
the explanations offered by Acharya and Johnston on socialization. The 
constitutive localization model proposed by Acharya seems to offer a plausible 
account of China’s approach to institutionalizing the ARF. During the post-reform 
period, China has shifted its focus to reform and development. This has 
contributed to its participation in a series of international institutions and changed 
its conception of some norms like multilateralism and economic sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, its conception of norms like territorial and jurisdictional sovereignty 
has remained relatively unaffected.
126
 This has constrained the extent to which 
China is socialized to the norm of cooperative security embodied by the ARF as 
the regional framework might entail arrangements that constrain China’s ability to 
uphold its territorial integrity. Given the rising nationalism in the Chinese 
populace, any efforts by the socialized foreign policy-makers to promote the norm 
of cooperative security would be unwelcomed. Hence, China has continued to 
adopt a cautious attitude towards institutionalizing the ARF over the years. It has 
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remained vigilant over the development of preventive diplomacy and conflict 
resolution in the ARF. It was due to China’s insistence that the Taiwan issue was 
not deliberated in the ARF. Though China became more receptive to managing 
the territorial disputes over the South China Sea via multilateralism (e.g. 
formulating a regional code of conduct with ASEAN), it refused to discuss the 
contested sovereignty of the South China Sea in the ARF.
127
   
 
As for Johnston’s argument, the empirical data seems to cast doubts on the 
importance of socialization in shaping China’s approach to the institutionalization 
of the ARF. Despite exposure to the counter-realpolitik norms of the regional 
framework for almost two decades, China has remained cautious about 
institutionalizing the ARF. It opposed the establishment of an autonomous 
secretariat for the ARF and sought to undermine the development of preventive 
diplomacy.
128
 This reminds us of a critique against Johnston’s argument 
mentioned in chapter 2, that is, it needs to elaborate on how the socialized foreign 
policy-makers operate domestically to induce changes in state behaviour. This is 
especially true in the case of China where there is still much to be learned about 
its foreign policy-making process.   
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Explaining China’s Approach  
 
The following analysis examines China’s approach to institutionalizing the ARF 
in three periods (see Table 3). As the independent variables of this study remain 
unchanged, periodization is guided by the ARF’s institutional development. Each 
period embodies major developments which provide good opportunities for 
observations and analysis. The first period (1994-1995) was marked by the 
decision of the ministers to adopt the document entitled The ARF: A Concept 
Paper, which guided the framework in 1995. In the second period (1996-2001), 
the ARF began to explore preventive diplomacy, cumulating to the adoption of 
the document ARF Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy in 2001. In 
the final period (2002-2012), the ARF introduced operational activities and 
continued its path towards preventive diplomacy. It underwent some institutional 
build-up including the creation of the ARF Unit, the ARF Fund and the ARF 
Vice-Chair. 
 
The First Period (1994-1995) 
At the outset, China’s convergent interests with the ASEAN countries in the ARF 
were low. Although the ARF is a regional security forum, a close scrutiny of its 
history shows that the regional framework was not established to address any 
specific security issue or common security threat. China and the ASEAN 
countries only shared two broad aims with regard to the ARF. One aim was to 
safeguard regional peace and security. According to Su, ‘Entering the 1990s, 
 84 
ASEAN countries began to actively explore cooperative security to manage great 
power relations and safeguard regional peace and stability. The emphasis of the 
ASEAN states was in line with China’s strategic goal, which was to create a good 
peripheral environment that would enable China to concentrate on domestic 
reforms and economic development.
129
 Another related aim was to build trust and 
confidence among regional states, which was important to China given the 
polarizing effect of the Cold War over Asia.
130
 Other than these aims, China and 
the ASEAN countries had little in common in the ARF.  
 
While the end of the Cold War affected all the states in Asia, it had different 
effects on China and the ASEAN countries, resulting in their divergent interests in 
the ARF. For China, the conclusion of the Cold War signaled the end of its 
strategic partnership with the US to contain the Soviet Union. Due to the events in 
1989, China had suffered from diplomatic isolation and sanctions from the 
international society led by “the West”. It was eager to achieve diplomatic 
breakthrough to ensure regime survival and continue its quest for economic 
development. Against such a background, China joined the ARF for various 
reasons. First and foremost, it hoped to secure a stable and peaceful periphery for 
its development.
131
  Second, it hoped to establish itself as a responsible power and 
reassure other states of its peaceful intentions as a rising power. Third, it felt 
compelled to support ASEAN’s initiative due to the latter’s goodwill after the 
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events in 1989 and the evolving China-ASEAN ties.
132
 Finally, it wanted to avoid 
exclusion from a major regional framework which could shape the evolving 
regional order. Participation in the regional forum also coincided with its new 
strategy of multipolarity based on multilateralism. 
133
    
 
As for the ASEAN countries, China was at the centre of the problem left by the 
end of Cold War. ASEAN’s motivations for initiating the ARF were analyzed and 
summarized by several authors 
134
 as follows: 
 
 First, a major purpose of establishing the ARF was to respond to China’s rise and 
engage China for the benefits of ASEAN. Due to its past intervention in the 
domestic affairs of Southeast Asian countries, many ASEAN countries harboured 
residual misgivings over China.
135
 During the post-Cold War period, various 
issues had resurfaced and caused tensions in the region including the territorial 
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disputes in the South China Sea involving China and a number of Southeast Asian 
countries. ASEAN was also worried about the transparency of China’s defence 
policies and its intentions, which might threaten regional stability. However, 
ASEAN recognized that it was important to maintain a good relationship with 
China as the latter played a crucial role in maintaining regional peace and 
development. By establishing the ARF, the ASEAN countries hoped to engage 
China to constrain its behaviour and ideally socialize it to act responsibly. 
 
Second, the ASEAN countries generally considered the US to be a benign great 
power in the region and sought to retain US presence to maintain a favourable 
balance between the great powers in the region. During the early 1990s, ASEAN 
was gravely concerned about the possibility of US withdrawal from the region. 
This would create a ‘power vacuum’ that other regional powers like China and 
Japan might attempt to fill, which could undermine ASEAN’s autonomy. By 
establishing the ARF, ASEAN hoped to keep the US engaged in Southeast Asia.   
 
Third, ASEAN hoped to ensure the ongoing relevance of the regional grouping in 
the post-Cold War regional order. By ‘grafting the new forum onto ASEAN’, it 
would ensure that ASEAN had a voice in shaping the evolving regional order. In 
particular, ASEAN hoped to build a stable regional environment that was not 
dominated by any single power (i.e. the US) or destabilized by rivalries between 
great powers (i.e. China and Japan).  
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The dearth of convergent interests between China and the ASEAN countries was 
reflected by the agenda of the 1
st
 ARF Meeting and the inter-sessional activities 
that followed. According to Leifer, ‘The working session had no agenda, only the 
single topic of “Asia-Pacific SecurityChallenges and Opportunity,” perhaps 
more appropriate for an academic seminar.’ The session ‘was in part a rhetorical 
occasion. The discussion, which lacked focus and was certainly not a dialogue, 
centred on identifying appropriate measures for the ARF’s declared purpose, as 
well as on the pace at which it should proceed’.136 The inter-sessional activities 
included three seminars on confidence-building, on peacekeeping and on 





China’s relative influence in the ARF was low. It was a follower in establishing 
the ARF, which had constrained its input over the development of the regional 
framework. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the ARF was initiated 
by ASEAN and to a lesser extent the PMC which was comprised of a group of 
states in the anti-Communist camp during the Cold War.
138
 In other words, China 
was not a member of the core group that established the regional framework.  
 
In short, as China and the ASEAN countries had few convergent interests in the 
ARF, China sought to delay and undercut its institutionalization. Institutionalizing 
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the ARF would have little utility to promoting China’s interest. Rather, it might 
constrain its options for defending its national unity and territorial integrity. This 
was exacerbated by the fact that China was merely a follower in establishing the 
ARF. Consequently, China insisted that the institutionalization of the ARF should 
proceed in a gradual and evolutionary manner at a pace comfortable to all 
participants. It also stressed that the ARF should remain as a forum for dialogue 
and confidence-building in the formulation of the Concept Paper and opposed 
naming the third stage as ‘development of conflict resolution mechanisms’. 
Likewise, China was hesitant over the creation of official working groups to 




The Second Period (1996-2001) 
During this period, the ARF had made some progress in enhancing confidence 
among its members and in facilitating regional peace and stability. As Foreign 
Minister Tang Jiaxuan mentioned in his speech in the 8
th
 ARF Meeting, ‘ARF is 
the most important venue in the Asia-Pacific region for discussing regional 
security issues. During the past seven years, all sides have frankly expressed their 
views over security issues of common concern, which enhanced their common 
understanding and mutual trust.’140  
 
Similar comments have been made by some Chinese analysts. For instance, Ma 
remarks that the ARF has contributed to regional security in several ways:  
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(1) It has facilitated the institutionalization of security dialogue among 
major states in Asia-Pacific, which enhanced their mutual understanding 
and communication on important international and regional security issues 
and reduced tensions. (2) It has strengthened military exchange among 
member states and improved military transparency. (3) It has strengthened 
cooperation over non-traditional security issues such as combating 
smuggling, drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, and search and rescue at 
sea, thereby maintaining regional security. (4) It has actively launched 
discussions over the question of preventive diplomacy, which broadened 




Nonetheless, the fact that China and the ASEAN countries did not face any 
common security threat remained unchanged. The search for convergent interests 
was undercut by several developments. To begin with, a series of events during 
this period reinvigorated the historical misgivings of the ASEAN countries 
towards China. Between 1995 and 1996, China was embroiled in a show of force 
over the Taiwan Strait Crisis and was discovered to occupy the Mischief Reef 
claimed by the Philippines. The latter incident was especially alarming to the 
ASEAN countries, which ‘showed unusual unity in confronting China 
diplomatically’.142 Therefore, it was not surprising for some ASEAN countries to 
push for the ARF to proceed to the stage of preventive diplomacy, which diverged 
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from China’s position that confidence-building should remain as the core activity 
of the ARF.  
 
At the same time, the controversy associated with the New Security Concept 
exposed the divergent views held by China and the ASEAN countries on the US 
military alliances and presence in the region. Many ASEAN countries 
(particularly its old members) are participants in the US alliance system either as 
allies or security partners. They perceive the US as the ‘preferred security 
guarantor’ and welcome its continued presence in the Asia-Pacific region to 
maintain a favourable balance of power in the region. Meanwhile, China’s 
attitude to the US alliances in the region is ‘ambivalent’ at best143 as they might 
not be in line with China’s strategic interests.144 When China promoted the New 
Security Concept and called for the abolition of the US alliances in the late 1990s, 
the idea was not well-received by many ASEAN countries who perceived that 
they were compelled to choose between China and the US. Consequently, they 
indicated stern opposition to the China’s initiative in private. 145  The lack of 
consensus on such fundamental security issues had hampered consensus between 
China and the ASEAN countries in the ARF, which was essential to push the 
ARF forward.  
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During this period, China’s relative influence in the ARF remained low. The ARF 
was driven by ASEAN, which played an important role in shaping the guiding 
principles of the regional framework as well as the pace and direction of its 
further development. For example, the Concept Paper on the development of the 
ARF was drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore.
146 
Alongside 
other non-ASEAN members, China had a limited role in shaping the agenda and 
development of the ARF. As such, there was considerable discrepancy between 
China’s roles as a key stakeholder in many potential flashpoints in the Asia-
Pacific region and its participant role in a major regional security institution, 
which could potentially interfere in these issues if it were to continue down the 
path of institutionalization.   
 
As the ARF progressed, China seemed to have adopted a more relaxed attitude to 
the regional process as reflected by its acceptance of ISG and ISMs. China also 
participated more actively in the ARF by co-chairing and/or organizing several 
inter-sessional activities like the ISG-CBMs in March 1997, the ARF Professional 
Training Programme on China’s Security Policy in 1999 and the 4th HDUCIM in 
2000.
147
 This could be attributed to the information and experience acquired by 
China after joining the regional framework.
148
 China found the ARF useful in 
many ways. First, it provided a venue for China to explain its views and intentions 
                                                          
146
 Ren, “Dongmeng Diqu Luntan,” 17 & 19.  
147
 ARF Website.   
148
 China was a newcomer in regional institutions. After joining the ARF and other regional 
groupings, China came to realize that ‘these institutions are neither intrinsically hostile to China 
nor set on constraining it. On the contrary, China has come to realize that these groupings are open 
to Chinese perspectives and influence…’ Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 73. 
 92 
and to reassure other members of its peaceful intentions. Second, it enabled China 
to learn about the perspectives of other participants and acquire experience about 




Nonetheless, China’s approach to institutionalizing the ARF did not shift 
fundamentally as evident in its position on the development of preventive 
diplomacy. Since China’s convergent interests with the ASEAN countries and its 
relative influence in the ARF remained low, it was cautious of the development of 
preventive diplomacy While preventive diplomacy would have little payoff to 
China, it might be applied to territorial disputes involving China and its 
neighbours. Consequently, when some ARF members attempted to push the ARF 
to move on to Stage II, China underscored that confidence-building should remain 
as the ‘core’ of the ARF and sought to limit the scope of preventive diplomacy as 
applied to the ARF.
150
 China also showed great reservations granting the ARF 




The Third Period (2002-2012) 
In the third and final period, the convergent interests between China and the 
ASEAN countries in the ARF was still low. The lack of common security threats 
necessitating closer cooperation between China and the ASEAN countries in the 
ARF remained. In analyzing China’s varied approach towards institutionalizing 
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the SCO and the ARF, one interviewee pointed out succinctly that ‘member states 
of the SCO face common threats, but members of the ARF do not.’ (Case A)152 
 
As suggested by the case of the SCO, the territorial disputes between China and 
some ASEAN countries over the South China Sea could serve as a catalyst 
promoting closer cooperation between them to address the disputes in the ARF. 
Unfortunately, China and some ASEAN countries held divergent views over the 
role of the ARF in managing and resolving the dispute. While China has adopted 
more flexible dispute management strategies over time,
153
 it insisted that 
territorial disputes should be settled through negotiations between or among the 
parties involved directly. The ARF was not considered to be an appropriate 
platform for addressing the dispute. For example, responding to the remarks of 
US officials in the ARF in 2010, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi remarked that 
ASEAN was ‘not an appropriate forum to resolve the issue’. He added that 
internationalizing the dispute ‘will only make matters worse and the resolution 
more difficult.’ ‘International practices show that the best way to resolve such 
disputes is for countries concerned to have direct bilateral negotiations.’ 154   
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In contrast, some ASEAN claimants have attempted to internationalize the 
territorial disputes in recent years. They hoped that the ARF could serve as a 
useful platform for such a purpose. For instance, the Philippines had accused 
China’s behaviour in the disputed area and sought support for its position in 
several ARF meetings. It advocated forming a ‘united front’ on the dispute within 
ASEAN and called for a meeting among all ASEAN claimants to discuss the 
issue. The Philippines even threatened to submit the territorial dispute to the 
international court for arbitration.
155
 Due to divergent views between China and 
the other ASEAN claimants, the potential of the ARF to manage and resolve the 
disputes could not be realized.  
 
Similarly, the 911 Incident and the resultant War on Terror had limited effect in 
facilitating closer cooperation between China and ASEAN in the ARF. The war 
mainly involved the US and its allies, and the two major operations took place in 
Afghanistan and Iraq in the Middle East, even though some incidents and 
operations occurred in the Asia-Pacific region.  
 
China and the ASEAN countries continued to differ over US military alliances 
and presence in the region, as reflected by their reactions to the US “pivot” to 
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 China was gravely concerned over further developments of the US 
alliances and partnerships under the “pivot”. It opposed plans by the US to 
conduct military drills with South Korea in the Yellow Sea following the Cheonan 
incident, and considered the joint naval drills of the Philippines and Vietnam with 
the US in 2011 ‘inappropriate’.157 Reference by US officials to the South China 
Sea dispute in the ARF were interpreted negatively by Chinese officials and 
analysts as efforts to attack China, hamper China-ASEAN ties, as well as to 




In contrast, most of the ASEAN countries reacted positively to the “pivot” since it 
would promote further development of ties with the US and balance China’s 
growing power.
159
 Some ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea dispute sought 
to bring in the US to balance against China. For example, the Philippines warned 
that it might request the US to send planes over the disputed region in the Spratlys 
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following the standoff in Scarborough Shoal.
160
 The existence of divergent views 
over the fundamental security issue had prevented the expansion of convergent 
interests between China and the ASEAN countries in the ARF.  
 
Finally, many ASEAN countries continued to embrace residual misgivings over 
China. Since 2000, China-ASEAN ties had developed rapidly and they reached 
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002. 
Nonetheless, many ASEAN countries continued to embrace ‘varying degrees of 
wariness’ of China and ‘took a variety of steps to preserve their independence and 
avoid falling under China’s sway’ as China’s relative power continued to 
rise.
161
The welcoming attitude expressed by most ASEAN countries to the US 
“pivot” to Asia was a clear illustration of such sentiments. All the 
abovementioned developments had undermined the efforts of the ARF to broaden 
the convergent interests between China and the ASEAN countries in the regional 
framework.  
 
During this period, China’s relative influence in the ARF remained limited. With 
ASEAN at the driver seat, China had limited influence in the development of the 
ARF. For instance, the ARF Unit was originated from discussions within ASEAN. 
Similarly, the introduction of the ARF Vice-Chair was ‘first announced’ by the 
ARF Chair to participants during the SOM in 2008.
162
 In other words, China was 
only informed about but not involved in such developments. Due to China’s 
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limited relative influence in the regional framework, it would be hard for China to 
address important regional security issues for its interests in the ARF.   
 
Table 4:  ISGs and ISMs Co-chaired by China (1997-2012) 
Year ISGs / ISMs 
1997 - Co-chaired the ISG-CBMs with the Philippines  
2003 - Co-chaired the ISG-CBMs with Myanmar  
2004 - Co-chaired the ISG-CBMs with Myanmar  
2005 - Co-chaired the ISM-DR with Indonesia  
2006 - Co-chaired the ISM-CTTC with Brunei  
- Co-chaired the ISM-DR with Indonesia  
2009 - Co-chaired the ISM-NPD with Singapore and the US  
2010 - Co-chaired the ISM-NPD with Singapore and the US  
2011 - Co-chaired the ISM-NPD with Singapore and the US  
2012 - Co-chaired the ISG-CBMs and PD with Brunei in inter-
sessional year 2012/2013 
 
 
Source: ARF documents (1994-2012) available on the ARF website
163
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Table 5:  CBMs Organized by China (1998-2012) 
Year CBMs 
1998 - The Symposium on Tropical Hygiene and Prevention and 
Treatment of Tropical Infectious Diseases  
1999 - The ARF Professional Training Programme on China’s 
Security Policy  
2000 - The 4t7h HDUCIM  
- The Seminar on Defence Conversion Cooperation  
- Established the ARF Regional Maritime Information 
Centre 
2002 - The ARF Workshop on Military Logistics Outsourcing 
Support 
2004 - The ARF Workshop on Alternative Development in Sep 
- Hosted the 1st ASPC  
2005 - The ARF Seminar on Enhancing Cooperation in the Field 
of Non-Traditional Security Issues  
2006 - Co-organized and co-chaired the Seminar on Non-
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction with the US 
and Singapore  
2007 - Co-chaired the ARF Round Table Discussion on 
Stocktaking of Maritime Security Issues with Indonesia  
- Co-chaired the ARF Seminar on Narcotics Control with 
Thailand  
2008 - Co-chaired the 3rd Meeting of the ARF EEPs with Vietnam 
  
2009 - Co-chaired the ARF Seminar on the Laws and Regulations 
in the Participation in International Disaster Relief by 
Armed Forces with Singapore  
2010 - Co-chaired the 2nd ARF Seminar on Laws and Regulations 
on the Participation in International Disaster Relief by 
Armed Forces with Thailand  
2012 - Co-chaired the 3rd ARF Seminar on Laws and Regulations 
on the Participation in International Disaster Relief by 
Armed Force  
- Co-chaired the 16th HDUCIM with Brunei  
 
Source: ARF documents (1994-2012) available on the ARF website
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In short, China’s participation in the ARF in this period followed the same pattern 
of the preceding period. On one hand, China participated actively in the ARF by 
co-chairing various ISGs and ISMs for the ARF (see Table 4). It also hosted, 
organized and co-chaired various inter-sessional activities like the 1
st
 ASPC in 
2004, the Seminar on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2006, 
the 3
rd
 Meeting of ARF EEPs in 2008, ARF Seminars on the Laws and 
Regulations in the Participation in International Disaster Relief by Armed Forces 
in 2009, 2010 and 2012 and the 16
th
 HDUCIM in 2012 (see Table 5).
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On the other hand, China’s approach to institutionalization remained low. Due to 
the lack of common security threats between China and the ASEAN countries, 
China was not enthusiastic in institutionalizing the ARF. The outcome might 
constrain China’s options in addressing the sensitive Taiwan issue and other 
territorial disputes while promising little in return. Such concerns were 
exacerbated by the fact that China had little influence over the agenda and 
development of the ARF. Taken together, these two factors could help to explain 
why China had sought unswervingly to limit the scope of preventive diplomacy to 
non-traditional security issues, opposed the creation of an independent secretariat 




The interview data provided further support for the above analysis. When asked 
about China’s stance on institutionalization, two interviewees stated the following: 
                                                          
165
 ARF Website.   
166
 See footnotes 114 to 117.  
 100 
China is open towards the development of preventive diplomacy. The key is 
how to intervene and through what kind of mechanisms…Development of 
the ARF needs to pass through two stages: the formation of security concepts 
followed by institutional development. Development is expected to be slow. 
As member states have different views over security issues, coordination is 
needed.  (Case A) 
 
China is quite cautious of the development of preventive diplomacy in the 
ARF. For China, there is no urgency to institutionalize the ARF, and more 
time can be allowed to build consensus. As the member states hold different 
views over establishing the ARF secretariat, China contends that the ARF 
should not impose its view on its members. Rather, the development of the 
ARF should be based on consensus. The ARF can remain at the stage of 
confidence-building for a longer period of time. It should have greater 




To recap, this case study provides support for the proposed explanation. China’s 
reserved approach to institutionalizing the ARF can be attributed to two causes. 
The first cause concerns the low convergent interests between China and the 
ASEAN countries in the ARF, as they do not face any common security threat 
since its foundation that requires closer cooperation under the rubric of the ARF. 
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The subsequent search for convergent interests have been hampered by the 
residual misgivings of the ASEAN countries towards China and divergent views 
over fundamental security issues like the US presence and the role of the ARF in 
addressing contested sovereignty over the South China Sea. The other cause 
concerns the low relative influence of China in the regional framework. ASEAN 
is the driving force in the establishment and subsequent development of the ARF, 
and China is only a follower. Similar to the role assumed by the other non-
ASEAN members, China has little control over the agenda and development of 
the regional framework.  
 
This chapter has also examined the plausibility of two alternative explanations. 
The available evidence does not provide strong support for the alternative 
explanations of balancing against the US and Johnston’s explanation regarding 
socialization. Rather, the constitutive localization model seems to offer a plausible 
alternative account for China’s approach to institutionalizing the ARF.  
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Historically, the SCO was originated from the border talks held bilaterally 
between China and four members of the former Soviet Union (i.e. Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) in the early 1990s.
167
 In 1996, the leaders 
of the five countries met in Shanghai. They signed an agreement on confidence-
building in the border region and decided to meet annually. This marked the 
beginning of the “Shanghai Five” process. Since its 3rd Summit held in 1998, the 
regional process has developed into a multilateral forum. On 14 June 2001, the 
leaders of the “Shanghai Five” countries and Uzbekistan met in Shanghai. They 
signed a joint declaration accepting Uzbekistan into the “Shanghai Five” process 
and announced that the six countries would become the founders of the SCO. On 
the following day, leaders of the six countries signed the Declaration on the 
Creation of the SCO, which marked its formal establishment. Currently, the SCO 
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China has supported the institutionalization of the “Shanghai Five” process and 
the SCO, particularly from the year 2000. This chapter argues that China and the 
four countries shared considerable convergent interests in the “Shanghai Five” 
process to address the border issue, and it was a key founder of the regional 
framework. Hence, China has been supportive of the development of the regional 
process. Since 2000, the convergent interests between China and other members 
of the SCO have expanded considerably. Aside from facilitating an amicable 
settlement of the border issue, the SCO has enabled China to achieve several 
objectives where its strategic and economic interests intertwined. With some 
exceptions, other SCO members are generally receptive to China’s initiatives and 
positions in the SCO. China’s relative influence in the SCO has also increased. 
Thus, China has actively promoted the institutional development of the SCO and 
cooperation among its members in various areas.      
 
This chapter is comprised of five sections. The first section provides an overview 
of the SCO’s institutional development. The second and third sections review 
China’s approach to institutionalizing the regional framework and assess the 
plausibility of the two alternative explanations. The fourth section examines the 
plausibility of the proposed explanation by analyzing China’s approach to 
institutionalizing the SCO in two periods: (1) 1996-1999; and (2) 2000-2012. The 
final section summarizes the findings of this chapter.    
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The Institutional Development of the SCO 
 
The SCO has its own charter which was adopted in 2002. According to the 
document, the highest decision-making body of the SCO is the Council of Heads 
of State. It meets annually and makes decisions on key questions concerning the 
organization like its priorities, the heads of standing bodies and the admission of 
new members. The Council of Heads of Government (i.e. Prime Ministers) makes 
decisions on the budget and concrete areas of cooperation, particularly on 
economic cooperation. The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is responsible 
for preparing the heads of state summits, discussing issues related to its daily 
activities as well as relevant international issues. The Council of National 
Coordinators coordinates the work of the SCO and oversees its daily operation. 
Other than the above mechanisms, the charter provides for meetings among the 




There are two standing organs in the SCO, the Secretariat and the Regional Anti-
Terrorist Structure (RATS),
170
 which commenced operation in 2004. The 
Secretariat is located in Beijing, China and is led by the Secretary-General. The 
RATS is located in Tashkent, Uzbekistan and is headed by the Director. Besides 
these standing organs, there are various entities associated with the SCO such as 
the SCO Business Council, the Interbank Consortium and the SCO Forum. The 
SCO has its own budget and is financed by annual contributions from its members. 
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 A copy of the SCO Charter is available on the SCO website. Website of the SCO.  
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 It is also named as the Regional Counter-Terrorist Structure (RCTS) in some sources. 
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Decision-making is generally by consensus, except on decisions related to the 
suspension and expulsion of members.
171
      
 
As mentioned above, the “Shanghai Five” process started off from the discussions 
between China, Russia and the three Central Asian states on their common 
borders. These talks cumulated to the signing of two landmark agreements on 
confidence-building and the mutual reduction of forces in the border region 
during the summits in 1996 and 1997. Since 1998, the regional process has 
broadened its focus from border issues to non-traditional security issues, 
particularly the “three evils” of terrorism, religious extremism and separatist 
activities. After 2000, it established the RATS and organized joint exercises 
between and among its members. For instance, China and Kyrgyzstan organized a 
joint exercise under the rubric of the SCO in 2002. A few years later, the SCO 
held its first joint exercise involving all members in 2007.
172
   
 
Aside from security issues, the regional process has promoted economic 
cooperation. In 2003, the heads of government of member states signed a 
framework agreement on multilateral economic cooperation which set out the 
objectives of economic cooperation in the SCO. In the short term, the emphasis is 
to promote the liberalization of trade and investment among members. In the 
medium term, the aim is to promote multilateral economic cooperation on a large 
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 Website of the SCO.  
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 Chung, “The SCO,” 1009; Wei Yan, “Partnership in Security,” Beijing Review 50, no. 32 
(2007): 18-19; Ying Ding, “Growing Regional Security Strength,” Beijing Review 50, no. 35 
(2007): 10-11. 
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scale by 2010. Ultimately, the long term objective is to take steps to realize the 
free movement of goods, capital, services and technology by 2020. In 2004, the 
heads of government agreed on a plan to implement the framework agreement. To 
promote economic cooperation, the SCO has set up several entities including a 
dialogue mechanism among the Ministers of Commerce of member states, the 
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 SCO Regional Economic Cooperation Website, http://www.sco-
ec.gov.cn/crweb/scoc/info/Article.jsp?a_no=32985 &col_no=293 (accessed June 15, 2014); 
Huaqin Liu and Lie Wang, “Buduan Shenhua de Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Quyu Jingji Hezuo” The 
Future Development of Regional Economic Cooperation in the SCO, in Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi 
Fazhan Baogao (2012) Annual Report on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2012, eds. 
Jinfeng Li and Hongwei Wu, 111-112 (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2012); 
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Hezuo, 29-39.   
 107 




– 1996: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
signed the Agreement on Strengthening Confidence in the 
Military Field in the Border Area. 
– 1997: The five countries signed the Agreement on Mutual 
Reductions of Armed Forces in the Border Area. 
– 1998: Discussions expanded to non-traditional security issues.  
– 1999: The first meeting of the security and law enforcement 





– 2001: On Jun 15, the leaders of the “Shanghai Five” countries 
and Uzbekistan signed the Declaration on the Creation of the 
SCO and the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, 
Separatism and Extremism. They adopted the flag and emblem 
of the SCO. In Sep, the heads of state of member states met for 
the first time.     
– 2002: During the Heads of State Meeting, the leaders signed the 
SCO Charter. They decided to establish a secretariat in China 
and the RATS in Kyrgyzstan (later relocated to Uzbekistan). 
These organs commenced operation in 2004. 
– 2003: The Heads of Government Meeting approved a framework 
agreement called “Programme of Multilateral Trade and 
Economic Cooperation of SCO Member States”. They also 
passed the first budget of the SCO for 2004.  
– 2004: The leaders decided to establish the SCO Development 
Fund, the SCO Business Council (realized in 2006) and passed 
The Regulations on Observer Status at the SCO. The Heads of 
Government Meeting approved the Action Plan on 
Implementation of the Programme of Multilateral Trade and 
Economic Cooperation.  
– 2005: The Interbank Consortium was established. 
– 2007: The first joint exercise involving all SCO members was 
held. 
– 2008: The Heads of State Meeting approved the Regulations on 
the Status of Dialogue Partner of the SCO. The meeting decided 
to establish an expert group to conduct research on the issue of 
expansion.  
– 2010: The Heads of State Meeting approved regulations on 
admitting new members. 
– 2011: The Heads of State Meeting approved The Memorandum 
of Obligations of a Candidate Country Applying for the SCO 
Membership Status. 
 
Sources: Pan and Hu, 2006; Zhao, 2006; and Zhongguo Waijiao (2002-2011)
174
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China’s Approach to Institutionalizing the SCO 
 
Ostensibly, the SCO is considered an important regional framework for China. It 
is the first regional organization established in China and named after a Chinese 
city. Not only does it serve as a platform through which China engages its Central 
Asian neighbours, it also exemplifies the country’s efforts to build a “harmonious 
world”.175 Fu Ying identifies the SCO as one of the two ‘key points’ for China to 
promote regional cooperation in Asia.
176
 In Eurasia, it is the only regional 
framework that involves China, while other SCO members are participating in 
regional institutions such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), 
the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC or EurAsEC) and the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS). Table 7 below provides a brief description of these 
regional arrangements. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Zhishi Chu Ban She, 2002), 6, 14 & 230; Zhongguo Waijiao (2003 Nian Ban) [China’s Foreign 
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 Fu Ying was a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. She was the Director-
General of the Department of Asian Affairs when she made this remark. The other key point is 
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Table 7:  Major Regional Arrangements in Eurasia 
Name Year Membership Description 
CSTO 2002 
 
Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus 
The CSTO is a military alliance. 
Its predecessor was the Collective 
Security Treaty signed in 1992. 
 
CIS 1991 Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Ukraine* 
 
The CIS is a loose, multi-faceted 
organization involving members 
of the former Soviet Union.  
EAEC 2000 Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 
Krygystan, Belarus, 
Uzbekistan** 
The EAEC is a regional economic 
organization. It originated from a 
customs union formed by Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia in 1996.  
 
 




*  Ukraine indicated its intention to leave the CIS in 2014. Its present membership status is unclear.  
   ** Uzbekistan suspended its membership in the EAEC in 2008 
 
China adjusted its approach to institutionalizing the SCO around 2000. Between 
1996 and 1999, China was moderately supportive of institutionalizing the 
“Shanghai Five” process. With regard to the dimension on adaptability, China 
attended the top-level meetings of the regional process but did not propose any 
initiatives to promote cooperation on concrete issues. As for the dimension on 
complexity, it supported the development of meetings among the ministers and 
senior officials of member states. All in all, China was not an active proponent for 
institutionalization during this period. It seemed to be contented to leave the 
“Shanghai Five” process as a dialogue mechanism.178  
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Since 2000, China has become more active in promoting the institutionalization of 
the SCO as suggested by its initiatives and financial contribution to the regional 
framework. Regarding the dimension on adaptability, China has been ‘most 
enthusiastic to transform the SCO into a full-fledged organization covering key 
functional areas.’179 These included economic and security cooperation.180 On one 
hand, China has promoted joint exercises among SCO members. Many of them 
were initiated by China and included China as a theatre.  Between 2002 and 2012, 
a total of 9 bilateral or multilateral anti-terrorist exercises were conducted 
between/ among SCO members.
181
 On the other hand, China has been ‘the 
locomotive for economic cooperation in the SCO.’ It was ‘the only financing 
source for SCO economic projects’182 and suggested various initiatives to promote 
economic cooperation. Examples included the development of dialogues among 
the Ministers of Commerce of SCO countries, the establishment of the SCO FTA 
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Regarding the dimension on complexity, China played an active role in 
developing the “Shanghai Five” process into the SCO as noted by several 
scholars.
184
 It had promoted further institutional development there. For instance, 
during the Heads of Government Meeting in 2001, Premier Zhu Rongji suggested 
speeding up the drafting of the Charter and the development of the RATS. China 
also pushed for the development of the Secretariat and provided the venue for 
it.
185
 China was a major contributor to the SCO budget to support the operation of 
the regional framework. For the first budget of the SCO in 2004, China 
contributed 24.5% or USD 931,000, making it the largest contributor together 
with Russia.
186
     
    
Alternative Explanations  
 
Balancing Against the US 
A popular view among Western analysts is to view the SCO ‘as a joint Russian-
Chinese geopolitical device to counter the growing US presence in Central Asia 
and as an anti-Western bloc in general’.187 The interests and presence of the US in 
the region have grown rapidly since 2001 because of the military operation in 
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Afghanistan. After the 911 Incident, the US acquired military bases in Central 
Asia, which is traditionally regarded as Russia’s backyard and is close to western 
China. A corollary of this view is that China’s approach towards institutionalizing 
the SCO is primarily driven by its interests to balance against the US. While the 
explanation is plausible, is this consistent with the empirical evidence?    
 
To assess this explanation, the following analysis examines why China chose to 
join the “Shanghai Five” process and its subsequent actions there. So far, the 
available evidence is mixed. Evidently, China was primarily motivated by 
considerations other than balancing to join the “Shanghai Five” process. Its major 
motive to participate in the “Shanghai Five” process was to address a common 
security concern (i.e. the border issue) with other members of the former Soviet 
Union. Hence, ‘it is fair to say that the initiation of the Shanghai Five was largely 
motivated by the concerned parties’ desire to find a resolution to the border 
disputes and had little to do with external balancing’.188  
 
After the US stationed its troops in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
balancing seems to have become one of the considerations in shaping China’s 
initiatives and positions on security issues in the SCO. One scholar considers the 
SCO as an important force for China in containing US influence in Central Asia. 
“The establishment of an antiterrorism center in Tashkent has created a 
competitive environment, with the U.S. military presence also in the region.
189
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Other scholars have remarked that the joint exercises promoted by China were not 
merely counter-terrorist exercises; they were utilized by China and Russia to 
balance against growing US influence in Central Asia.
190
  China also endorsed the 
declaration of the SCO summit in 2006, which called for the US and its allies to 
set a deadline for their military presence and use of military facilities in the 
member states of the SCO. Given China’s grave concerns over US presence in 
Central Asia,
191
 this could be interpreted as an attempt ‘to reduce the US influence 
in the region.’192   
 
Some scholars note that China has been more active in promoting the institutional 
development of the SCO after the 911 Incident to balance against the US.
193
 In 
fact, China had adjusted its approach to institutionalization way before the 911 
Incident.
194
 The 911 Incident and the subsequent US presence in the region only 
served to strengthen China’s resolve to promote institutionalization. The event 
challenged the SCO to expedite its institutional build-up and develop cooperation 
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 It also facilitated consensus on issues like the development 
of the RATS.  
 
Socialization in Regional Processes 
The constitutive localization model proposed by Acharya has limited applicability 
to this case. In essence, the model focuses on how domestic factors (e.g. the status 
of existing norms, the availability of local actors to promote new norms, the 
reaction of norm-takers) shape state response to socialization by international 
institutions.
196
 However, in the case of the SCO, China is not a norm-taker but a 
norm-maker. It proposed the “Shanghai spirit” which was enshrined in the SCO 
Charter adopted at a summit in St. Petersburg in June 2002.  
 
The “Shanghai Spirit” was first proposed by President Jiang Zemin during the 
inaugural summit of the SCO in 2001. It is represented by 20 Chinese characters 
which stand for ‘mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for 
diversity of civilizations, and the pursuit of common development.’ Embedded in 
the “Shanghai Spirit” are the notions of consultation and respect for diversity of 
civilizations that have a distinctive Chinese flavour. The former notion covers 
nonalignment, and the latter refers to due respect for the economic and social 
systems chosen by each state. These notions become the guiding principles for the 
steady development of the SCO. A closer examination of the “Shanghai spirit” 
shows that it has close resemblance to the New Security Concept proposed by 
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China in the ARF summit in the late 1990s.
197
 Interestingly, the “Shanghai spirit” 
made way into the SCO Charter while the New Security Concept was not 
favoured by members of the ARF.  
 
Explaining China’s Approach  
 
The First Period (1996-1999) 
The “Shanghai Five” process was evolved from the efforts by China, Russia and 
three Central Asian countries to manage and delineate their common borders. As 
such, China and these countries shared considerable convergent interests in the 
regional process. The border issue was brought over by the former Soviet Union. 
During the Cold War, tensions along the Sino-Soviet border were high at times 
and negotiations occurred intermittently in the 1960s and 1970s with little result. 
As the Soviet Union strived to normalize its relations with China under General 
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the third round of negotiations began in 1987. By 
1989, the two countries arrived at a consensus on the eastern section of their 
border and an agreement was signed in May 1991.  
 
After the Soviet Union collapsed, the Sino-Soviet border was replaced by 
common borders between China and four members of the former Soviet Union. 
For China and the newly independent states in Central Asia, the management and 
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delineation of their common borders was a top priority.
198
 To achieve a more 
favourable settlement, these countries chose to negotiate with China collectively. 
These talks cumulated to the first “Shanghai Five” summit in 1996 marking the 
genesis of the “Shanghai Five” process.199  Historically, China maintained ties 
with Central Asia via the Silk Road and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
aligned itself with the Soviet Union from 1949 to 1960. Nonetheless, the political 
and economic linkages between China, Russia and the three Central Asian states 
in the early 1990s were weak and a regional grouping among them seemed 
inconceivable. The effort by these states to address the border issue contributed to 
the development of the “Shanghai Five” process by bringing them together to 




In this sense, there is marked difference between the “Shanghai Five” process and 
the ARF. The former evolved from the efforts by members to address a common 
concern, i.e. the border issue. In the post-Cold War period, members of the 
“Shanghai Five” process were preoccupied with their own problems, and China 
was not considered to be a problem to them. Whilst China was recovering from 
the repercussions of the events in 1989, Russia and the Central Asian countries 
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were busy with state-building.
201
 In contrast, the setting up of the ARF was not 
motivated by the need to address any specific issue among its members. For 
ASEAN, China was part and parcel of the problem that it sought to address by 
initiating the ARF. Some ASEAN countries were particularly concerned about the 
territorial disputes with China over the South China Sea and the possible 




The convergent interests between China and other members of the “Shanghai 
Five” process were illustrated by several indicators. The focus of the first two 
summits of the “Shanghai Five” process was on the border issue, in which the 
leaders signed two landmark agreements. The Agreement on Strengthening 
Confidence in the Military Field in the Border Area was signed in 1996. 
Signatories were committed to confidence-building measures along their border 
such as restrictions over military exercises, notification of military activities and 
invitation to observe military exercises conducted by each other. In 1997, the 
leaders signed the Agreement on Mutual Reductions of Armed Forces in the 
Border Area, which limited the amount of forces and weaponry each signatory 
could deploy in the border region.
203
 Both agreements involved substantial 
commitments from signatories to manage their common borders.   
 
                                                          
201
 In particular, the Central Asian countries confronted the challenges of economic recession, 
ethnic tensions, civil war (i.e. in Tajikistan), terrorism, and integrating into the international 
community. Oleg, “Member Privileges,” 20-21; Zhao, Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi, 19-20.   
202
 Please refer to the discussion in chapter 4 for further elaboration.  
203
 Li, “Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Junshi Hezuo Zongshu”, 20-21. 
 118 
By being a founder of the “Shanghai Five” process, China could shape the 
direction and pace of the regional framework and enjoy considerable relative 
influence there. Meanwhile, it is too early to discuss China’s role in the regional 
framework as it was largely a dialogue mechanism during this period. The 
“Shanghai Five” process began as an annual summit attended by leaders of 
member states. Meetings at the level of ministers and senior officials were only 
introduced later. For instance, officials from the law enforcement and security 
apparatus of member states met for the first time in Kyrgyzstan in December 1999; 
and the defence ministers and foreign ministers of the “Shanghai Five” countries 
convened their first meeting in the following year.
204
 The regional process did not 
have any standing organ or institution to support its operation.  
 
In short, the “Shanghai Five” process emerged from the concerted efforts of 
China, Russia and the three Central Asian countries to manage and delineate their 
common borders. The existence of considerable convergent interests could 
explain why China supported the development of the “Shanghai Five” process. 
China was also ‘more active’ over the continuation of the regional process after 
the conclusion of the agreements in 1996 and 1997.
205
 Meanwhile, China enjoyed 
considerable relative influence in the regional framework though it was premature 
to discuss China’s role there. The combination of convergent interests and relative 
influence could explain why ‘China was quite comfortable and satisfied with its 
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remaining solely a forum and meeting mechanism’.206  It did not propose any 
initiatives for promoting the institutional development of the regional process.  
 
The Second Period (2000-2012) 
During the second period, the convergent interests between China and other 
members of the “Shanghai Five” process (and later the SCO) had expanded. The 
regional framework facilitated an amicable settlement of the border issue among 
all its members, which inspired its further development. Building on the 
momentum of the two landmark agreements, China and other members of the 
“Shanghai Five” process stabilized and delineated their borders. China delineated 
its borders with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan by the late 1990s. After 2000, China 
resolved its border disputes with Tajikistan and Russia in 2002 and 2004 
respectively.
207
 By reaching its original goals, the “Shanghai Five” process and its 
successor prove to be useful for members to promote further cooperation. 
  
Through participating in the SCO, China sought to pursue three major objectives: 
The first objective was to maintain peace and stability in western China, 
particularly in Xinjiang. The region is strategically important as it covers a huge 
area in China’s hinterland (e.g. Xinjiang constitutes one-sixth of China’s territory).  
The stability of western China is threatened by the Eastern Turkistan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM), which advocates the independence of Xinjiang and resorts to 
terrorist tactics to pursue separatism. As some members of the movement took 
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refuge and received support from sympathizers in Central Asia, cooperation with 




The SCO could also provide a useful framework for China to cooperate closely 
with its neighbours in combating terrorism, extremism, separatism and various 
cross-border crimes. As an interviewee remarked, ‘… From the security 
perspective, the Xinjiang region is confronted with the threats of separatism, 
religious extremism and terrorism. These “three evils” have bases in foreign 
countries in Central Asia. To maintain stability in Xinjiang, it is paramount to 
combat these destabilizing forces…’ (Case K)209 
 
The second objective was to enable China to utilize the natural resources in 
Central Asia to facilitate its economic development. As a rapidly developing 
country, China relies heavily on imported energy to sustain its economic growth. 
Since Russia and the Central Asian countries are net exporters of energy and other 
natural resources, the economies between China and these countries are highly 
complementary.
210
 As pointed out by an interviewee from CAITEC: 
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…Central Asia is rich in resources, while China suffers from energy 
shortage. Their economies are complementary. Countries in Central Asia 
are main exporters of energy, but their refining and manufacturing sectors 
(加工制造业) are relatively weak. China’s refining and manufacturing 
sectors enjoy a competitive edge over them. The economic relationship 
between China and the Central Asian countries is one of vertical division 
of labour, and is highly complementary… (Case H)211 
 
For China, importing energy from Central Asia has the additional advantage of 
geographical proximity. Central Asian countries offer China land-based routes of 
energy imports and transport, which is of strategic importance for China’s energy 
security and for its overall development. As pointed out by Chung, ‘By exploring 
the possibilities for energy cooperation with Central Asian states, China is seeking 
to diversify its sources of crude oil imports away from the volatile Middle East, 
and thus reduce its reliance on American goodwill and American guarantee of the 
security of the sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits.’212   
 
The third objective was to facilitate economic development in its western region, 
which is relatively backward when compared with the rest of China. Central Asia 
is a ‘crucial economic partner and market for Xinjiang,’ and trade with Central 
                                                                                                                                                              
. 
211 This objective was also mentioned by two interviewees (Case D and Case K). 
212
 Chung, “The SCO,” 1000.  
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Asia made up about three-quarters of its foreign trade in 2011.
213
 Facilitating 
economic development in western China could also help China to achieve the first 
objective by alleviating poverty, which is the seed of ethnic conflicts and 
terrorism in western China. As suggested by the above interviewee:  
 
 …Central Asia constitutes part of the Silk Road. China faces uneven 
development in which central and western China have lagged behind other 
parts of China… As Central Asian countries are close to central and 
western China, they can provide a new platform for developing trade with 
China. For example, trade with Kazakhstan constitutes about 50% of the 
total trade of Xinjiang… (Case H)214  
 
The intersection of multiple objectives could explain why China had promoted 
both security and economic cooperation in the SCO. Some skeptics have casted 
doubts on China’s emphasis on economic cooperation based on trade statistics. As 
shown in Table 8 below, China’s trade with SCO countries only constituted about 
2% to 3% of its total trade from 2000 to 2012. Most of the trade was with Russia, 
and to a lesser extent with Kazakhstan. China’s approach becomes clearer when 
we consider the strategic importance of energy imports from Central Asia and of 
maintaining stability in Xinjiang. Hence, the Ministry of Commerce, the leading 
department (牵头部门) in China for promoting economic cooperation in the SCO, 
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was an active participant in the SCO. According to Xu,
215
 the Ministry of 
Commerce had conducted and commissioned researches on trade and economic 
cooperation, generated ideas for China’s recommendations in the SCO, as well as 





Table 8:  China’s Trade with SCO Members in 2000, 2006 and 2012 (in USD) 
 2000 2006 2012 
Kazakhstan  1,556,960,000 8,357,750,000 25,681,570,000 
Kyrgyzstan 177,610,000 2,225,700,000 5,162,320,000 
Russia 8,003,240,000 33,386,810,000 88,210,990,000 
Tajikistan 17,170,000 323,780,000 1,856,700,000 
Uzbekistan 51,460,000 972,090,000 2,875,190,000 














In general, members of the SCO were receptive to China’s initiatives and 
positions in the SCO, particularly on security cooperation.
218
 This could be 
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attributed to various factors. First, the stabilization and delineation of their 
borders with China helped to remove an impediment of security cooperation as 
China was no longer considered as a potential security threat to them. Second, all 
the SCO members were concerned about the US presence in Central Asia. For 
China, it might pose a serious threat to the country’s energy security, place 
western China under close scrutiny, embolden separatists in Xinjiang and contain 
China’s rise.219 Both China and Russia were also concerned about the expansion 
of NATO in Central Asia and the development of the missile defence system by 
the US, which threatened their security and political clout in the region.
220
 Despite 
supporting the US war against Afghanistan, the Central Asian countries were 
suspicious of US involvement in toppling the president of Kyrgyzstan and inciting 
the Andijan incident. Third, the 911 Incident and the response of the US had 
fostered consensus among SCO members to deepen security cooperation in the 
SCO. For example, Kazakhstan and Russia changed their minds and supported 
developing the RATS after the catastrophe.
221
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One exception was in economic cooperation, in which members hold divergent 
views. Russia was lukewarm at best over economic cooperation in the SCO.
222
 
Two reasons are often cited by the interviewees to account for Russia’s position, 
including the existence of alternative platforms for Russia to promote regional 
economic cooperation and that economic cooperation would enable China to 
increase its regional influence in the SCO at the expense of Russia. For example, 
one interviewee noted that:  
 
Russia does not want the SCO to develop economic cooperation. It has 
other platforms like the EAEC, CIS and the customs union with Belarus 
and Kazakhstan that are suffice to promote regional economic cooperation. 
These platforms cover all the members of the former Soviet Union, in 
which Russia has a dominant position. Russia does not want China to 
wield too much economic influence over Central Asia as China’s edge lies 
in its ability to provide economic benefit to other countries. Consequently, 
China is enthusiastic in promoting economic cooperation in the SCO while 
Russia is apathetic. (Case G) 
 
The Central Asian countries shared China’s view that economic cooperation in 
the SCO was at least equally important as security cooperation. They were 
interested to take advantage of China’s growing economy to facilitate their own 
development. China was among the top three trading partners of the Central Asian 
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countries. Through economic cooperation, they seek to attract foreign investment, 
develop regional transportation networks, utilize their natural resources and adjust 
their economic structure.
223
 Nonetheless, these countries had alternatives to 
promote regional economic cooperation. They also harboured concerns of being 
subjected to an unequal division of labour by serving as suppliers of raw materials 
to China.
224
 Hence, the importance they attached to economic cooperation in the 
SCO and their focus might not be identical with those of China. These divergent 
views surfaced in the discussions on the long-term objectives of economic 
cooperation in the SCO (i.e. the development of the SCO FTA) and the 
development of the SCO Development Fund, when China’s initiatives failed to be 
accepted by other members.    
 
Overall, China’s relative influence in the regional framework increased during 
this period. After the establishment of the SCO, China had played substantial 
roles in the regional framework. One example was its active involvement in 
setting up and operating the Secretariat. The Secretariat of the SCO was 
established in Beijing, China and a Chinese diplomat Zhang Deguang served as 
its first Secretary-General. While the officials in the Secretariat were drawn from 
SCO members, China had provided ‘the largest contingent of its staff of 30 
                                                          
223
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secretaries’.225 Besides, China was actively involved in entities associated with 
the SCO. For example, the President of the China Development Bank Chen Yuan 
was the first Chair of the Interbank Consortium.
226
 Zhang Xinfeng, a senior 
official of the Ministry of Public Security, was the appointed Director of the 
RATS from 2013 to 2015.
227
 As China enjoyed a high level of relative influence, 
the SCO had presented an ideal channel for China to pursue its interests and 
promote regional cooperation in Central Asia.   
 
In the second period, the convergent interests between China and other members 
of the SCO had expanded. The SCO facilitated the management and settlement of 
the border dispute between China and other members. By participating in the 
SCO, China could pursue several interrelated objectives whereby the interests of 
its domestic actors converged. With the exception of economic cooperation, the 
SCO members were generally receptive to China’s initiatives and positions. 
China’s relative influence in the SCO also increased considerably in this period. 
Hence, China assumed an active role in promoting the development and 
institutionalization of the SCO. It provided substantial financial support to the 
SCO and promoted the development of security and economic cooperation in the 
regional framework.
228
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In summary, the case study of the SCO seems to lend support for the proposed 
explanation. The border issue brought China and four members of the former 
Soviet Union together to delineate their borders and formed the basis of 
convergent interests among them. China is also a founder of the regional 
framework. Henceforth, China supported the development of the “Shanghai Five” 
process. From 2000 onwards, the convergent interests between China and other 
members of the SCO have expanded. The “Shanghai Five” process and the SCO 
contributed to the delineation and management of the borders between China and 
other member states. Through participating in the SCO, China could achieve 
several interrelated economic and strategic interests, while other SCO members 
have been generally receptive to China’s initiatives and positions. When the SCO 
moves on and focuses on institutional build-up, China is deeply engaged in its 
organs and has been more active in promoting the institutionalization of the 
regional framework.  
 
This chapter has also examined the plausibility of two alternative explanations. 
While the evidence for the explanation on balancing is rather mixed, the 
constitutive localization model has limited applicability in accounting for China’s 
approach to institutionalizing the SCO.  
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From the late 1980s, regional cooperation in Asia was largely pursued through 
various frameworks covering the broader Asia-Pacific region such as APEC and 
ARF. ASEAN+3 is the first regional framework encompassing states in East Asia. 
Its origin could be traced to Malaysia’s proposal for establishing the East Asian 
Economic Grouping in 1990
229
 and the participation of East Asian states in the 
Asia-Europe Meeting in 1996.
230
 During the Asian Financial Crisis, ASEAN 
invited the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea to attend a meeting in 
December 1997, which marked the inception of this regional framework. At 
present, the membership of ASEAN+3 includes the ten members of ASEAN plus 
China, Japan and South Korea.
231
    
 
Since China joined ASEAN+3, it has been generally supportive to 
institutionalization. This chapter argues that the Asian Financial Crisis provided a 
strong impetus to strengthen cooperation between the ASEAN countries and their 
Northeast Asian counterparts. After 2000, the convergent interests between China 
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and the ASEAN countries expanded. The initial proposal to develop ASEAN+3 
into the EAS, if realized, would increase China’s relative influence in the regional 
framework. Hence, China adopted a more proactive approach to 
institutionalization. In recent years, ASEAN+3 has continued to deepen financial 
cooperation among its members. However, the concern of some ASEAN 
countries and Japan about China’s participation has constrained further expansion 
of convergent interests. As the original proposal for the EAS failed to materialize, 
China’s relative influence in the regional framework remained limited. China 
retracted from its proactive approach in the second period.  
 
This chapter is organized into five sections. Following a brief introduction of the 
institutional development of ASEAN+3, the second section elaborates on China’s 
approach to institutionalizing the regional framework. In the third section, the 
plausibility of the two alternative explanations is assessed. The next section 
examines the plausibility of the proposed explanation by analyzing China’s 
approach to institutionalization in three periods: (1) 1997-2000; (2) 2001-2005; 
and (3) 2006-2012. The final section sums up the findings in this chapter.   
 
The Institutional Development of ASEAN+3 
 
ASEAN+3 is largely consisted of a series of dialogue mechanisms. At the highest 
level is the annual summit attended by leaders of the member states. There are 
also a plethora of meetings at the level of ministers, senior officials, CPR+3 and 
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working groups. Other than the Track 1 meetings, there are several entities 
associated with ASEAN+3 at Track 1.5 and Track 2, including the East Asia 
Forum, the Networking of East Asia Think Tanks (NEAT) and the Networking of 
East Asian Cultural Heritage (NEACH).
232
 Similar to the ARF, an ASEAN+3 
Unit was created within the ASEAN Secretariat to support the regional 
framework. During the 11
th
 Summit in 2007, the leaders agreed to establish an 
ASEAN+3 Cooperation Fund to support joint projects in ASEAN+3.
233
     
 
Since its establishment, ASEAN+3 has made substantial progress in financial 
cooperation. In 1999, the vice finance ministers and the vice chairs of central 
banks of the member states met. In the following year, the meeting was elevated 
to the level of finance ministers, and the meeting agreed on the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI). Starting from a series of bilateral currency swap arrangements, 
the initiative was multilateralized and renamed as the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization (CMIM) in 2008. Its reserve pool was expanded twice in 2009 
and 2012. Other major accomplishments included the Asian Bond Markets 
Initiative (ABMI) introduced in 2003 to develop bond markets in the region and 
the establishment of the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) in 
2011 to support the CMIM.
234
 ASEAN+3 has also made some headway in other 
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areas of cooperation. An example is the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice 
Reserve (APTERR) that addresses the issue of food security.
235
   
 
Important discussion on the future of ASEAN+3 commenced in the late 1990s. In 
1998, the leaders of ASEAN+3 countries decided to establish the East Asia 
Vision Group (EAVG) to chart a vision for East Asia cooperation. In the report 
submitted to the 5
th
 Summit, the EAVG envisaged the development of an ‘East 
Asian community’ in the region, in which economic cooperation ‘is expected to 
serve as the catalyst in this community-building process’. To achieve this end, the 
EAVG made several recommendations including the establishment of an East 
Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA), the East Asia Investment Area (EAIA), a 
regional financial mechanism, an East Asia Forum, a network of think tanks in 




In 2000, the leaders decided to establish the East Asia Study Group (EASG) to 
examine the EAVG’s recommendations and the implications of establishing the 
EAS.
237
 The resultant report enumerated a total of 26 recommendations which are 
categorized into short-term and long-term measures, and those that required 
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further deliberations. The creation of a network of think tanks in East Asia and the 
East Asia Forum are placed under short-term measures. Proposals for the EAFTA, 
the EAIA and the EAS are placed under long-term measures, and the proposal for 
setting up a regional financial mechanism is considered to require further 
exploration.
238
 Up to the present, only the short-term measures abovementioned 
were realized. The EAS eventually emerged as a separate regional framework in 
2005. Instead of developing the EAFTA, negotiations for a regional FTA have 
been centred around the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) instead. Up to the present, 
ASEAN+3 remains a regional framework with some functional cooperation and a 
low degree of institutionalization.  
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- 1998: The leaders agreed to convene meetings among the vice 
finance ministers and the vice chairs of central banks of the 
member states in the 2
nd
 Summit. They also reached consensus on 
the creation of the EAVG. 
- 2000: The dialogue among the vice finance ministers and the vice 
chairs of central banks was elevated to the level of finance 
ministers. The meeting reached an agreement on the CMI which 
was endorsed by the leaders in the 4
th
 Summit. The leaders also 





- 2001: The EAVG submitted a report entitled Towards an East 
Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress to 
the 5
th
 Summit.   
- 2002: The EASG submitted a report to the 6th Summit. China and 
ASEAN signed The Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Co-operation between ASEAN and the PRC (“the 
Framework Agreement”). 
- 2003: The ASEAN+3 Unit was created within the ASEAN 
Secretariat. The NEAT and the ABMI were also developed.  
- 2004: An expert group was established to study the feasibility of 
the EAFTA. The study was undertaken in two phases and 





- 2007: The leaders adopted the Second Joint Statement on East 
Asia Cooperation and the ASEAN+3 Cooperation Work Plan 
(2007-2017) in the 11
th
 Summit. The initiatives suggested by the 
Joint Statement included the multilateralization of CMI, the 
enhancement of the ABMI, the creation of the ASEAN+3 
Cooperation Fund and the strengthening of the ASEAN+3 Unit.  
- 2008: The finance ministers of the member states agreed to 
develop the CMIM.  Later in the year, the leaders met in Beijing to 
exchange views on the global financial crisis. The 12
th
 Summit, 
originally scheduled in December 2008, was postponed.  
- 2010: The leaders agreed to establish the EAVG II in the 13th 
Summit. 
- 2011: The AMRO was established in Singapore.  
- 2012: The EAVG II submitted its report to the 15th Summit.  
 
Sources: Website of ASEAN; EASG (2002); Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation: 
Building on the Foundations of ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation (2007); Zhang (2003); 
Zhang (2010); Zhongguo Waijiao (2000, 2001, 2009)
239
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China’s Approach to Institutionalizing ASEAN+3 
 
As suggested by the statements and writings of its officials, China has positioned 
ASEAN+3 as an important vehicle for promoting regional cooperation. During 
the 4
th
 Summit in 2000, China suggested developing ASEAN+3 into the ‘main 
channel (主渠道)’ of cooperation in East Asia.240 In 2003, the Director-General of 
the Department of Asian Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fu Ying 
identified ASEAN+3 and the SCO as the ‘two key points’ for China to promote 




China has been generally supportive towards institutionalizing ASEAN+3, with 
some adjustments over the years. During the first period (1997-2000), China was 
moderately supportive of institutionalizing the regional framework. Regarding the 
dimension on adaptability, China promoted economic cooperation within 
ASEAN+3. It proposed a free trade area with ASEAN during the ASEAN+3 
Summit and the ASEAN-China Summit in 2000,
242
 which encouraged the 
development of bilateral FTAs between ASEAN and the other Northeast Asian 
countries in subsequent years. Regarding the dimension on complexity, China 
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promoted financial cooperation in ASEAN+3 through the development of 
relevant dialogues. In the 2
nd
 Summit in 1998, it proposed to convene meetings 
among the vice finance ministers and the vice chairs of central banks of the 
member states. In the following year, it proposed to convene meetings among the 
finance ministers and the chairs of central banks of member states.
243
  
   
In the second period (2001-2005), China adopted a more proactive approach to 
institutionalization. Regarding the dimension on adaptability, it sought to deepen 
economic cooperation in ASEAN+3 by promoting the EAFTA. In 2003, China 
suggested exploring the feasibility of the EAFTA and took the lead in the first 
phase of the feasibility study.
244
 China also advocated expanding the scope of 
ASEAN+3 to cover political and security issues during the 5
th
 Summit in 2001, 
starting from non-traditional security issues.
245
 Regarding the dimension on 
complexity, China took the initiative to implement the recommendation of the 
EAVG and EASG on the establishment of NEAT, 
246
 offered to donate USD 
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200,000 to the ASEAN+3 Unit in 2004
247
 and supported the evolution of 






In the third period (2006-2012), China continued to support cooperation in 
ASEAN+3. Nonetheless, it reverted from its proactive participation in the 
preceding period and only supported proposals for institutionalization when there 
was consensus among members. Regarding the dimension on adaptability, China 
supported the joint study on the CMIM and agreed to contribute 32 percent of its 
reserve pool (amounting to USD 38.4 billion) in 2009. It also supported the 
second phase of the feasibility study of the EAFTA and agreed to contribute USD 
900,000 to start up the ASEAN+3 Cooperation Fund. Regarding the dimension on 
complexity, China indicated its willingness to support capacity-building of the 




Alternative Explanations  
 
Balancing Against the US 
As proposed in this study, an evaluation of this explanation will require the 
analyst to examine why China opted to join ASEAN+3 and its subsequent 
behaviour there. The available evidence is rather mixed. Regarding this first issue, 
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Haacke observes that a major reason for China’s participation in ASEAN+3 was 
to ‘promote multipolarity,’ which would enable it to prevent attempts by the US 
to contain China’s rise.250  When China joined ASEAN+3, the US was resented 
by regional states due to the Asian Financial Crisis. Nonetheless, as the following 
analysis suggests, China’s decision to join ASEAN+3 was also shaped by other 
considerations including its growing awareness that regional economies were 
highly interdependent, evolving China-ASEAN ties as well as its good 
neighbourliness policy adopted in the post-Cold War period. 
 
Regarding the second issue, a similar conclusion can be drawn after examining 
China’s initiatives and positions in ASEAN+3. Take the CAFTA as an example. 
Some scholars have argued that the initiative was motivated by China’s urge to 
increase its relative power vis-à-vis the US and to achieve regional hegemony.
251
 
Nonetheless, it was noteworthy that the CAFTA ‘was not a fully prepared project’ 
when Premier Zhu Rongji proposed the idea in 2000 to address ASEAN concerns 
about the effects of China’s entry into the WTO on ASEAN economies. Studies 
have suggested that economic considerations were at least as important, if not 
more important, as strategic considerations in contributing to the CAFTA 
proposal. According to Du, these strategic considerations included the need to 
maintain a peaceful periphery, build confidence with ASEAN, undermine Taiwan 
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independence, promote multipolarity and multilateralism, and to increase China’s 
regional influence.
252
 It is reasonable to say that the CAFTA initiative by China 
was marginally intended to balance against the US.   
 
Another example was China’s position on developing the EAS. Some scholars 
have argued that China is balancing against the US by supporting the original 
proposal of developing ASEAN+3 into the EAS, and insisting that ASEAN+3 
should serve as the main channel for East Asia cooperation after the EAS 
emerged as a separate regional framework. While their observations of China’s 
action are accurate, they do not provide strong support to their argument that 
China is promoting exclusive regional institutions in Asia to balance against the 
US. The original proposal was recommended by the EAVG and the EASG and 
represented the consensus of the participants, including China, at that time. The 
proposal failed to materialize because some member states changed their 
positions. China has good reasons other than balancing to prefer ASEAN+3 over 
the EAS. As Wu sums up China’s approach succinctly, ‘the APT framework, with 
fewer members and more substantive cooperation than the EAS, is more 
viable.’253 
 
Socialization in Regional Processes 
The constitutive localization model suggested by Acharya seems to offer a 
plausible explanation of China’s approach to institutionalizing ASEAN+3. During 
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the post-reform period, China’s drive for economic development had led to efforts 
of reform and opening up, of integrating more closely with the global economy 
and of participating in a series of international economic institutions. 
Accordingly, China adopted a boundary-transgressing approach towards 
economic sovereignty
254
 and changed its conception and acceptance of 
multilateralism. The establishment of ASEAN+3 was driven by the Asian 
Financial Crisis which underscored the need for regional states to develop 
financial cooperation. As ASEAN+3 is primarily a regional economic forum, its 
norms are consistent with those embraced by China. This explains why China has 
been generally supportive on institutionalizing ASEAN+3 over the years.  
 
Explaining China’s Approach  
 
The First Period (1997-2000)  
In retrospect, China and the ASEAN countries shared considerable convergent 
interests in ASEAN+3 to manage the Asian Financial Crisis. It began in Thailand 
and struck a severe blow across various ASEAN countries, particularly Thailand 
and Indonesia. The connection between the crisis and the development of 
ASEAN+3 was confirmed by several interviewees: 
 
The Asian Financial Crisis provided an opportunity for the development of 
ASEAN+3. (Case B) 
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ASEAN+3 can be considered as a derivative of the Asian Financial Crisis. 
(Case I) 
 
ASEAN+3 was established against the backdrop of the Asian Financial 
Crisis… The Crisis was the immediate cause for the creation of 
ASEAN+3. (Case M) 
 
The catastrophe revealed the interdependence among economies in Northeast 
Asia and Southeast Asia, which necessitated a collective effort to address it. 
According to Wu, ‘As the crisis exposed, Asian economies had become so 
intertwined that a crisis in one place easily spread to another, causing chain 
reactions throughout the region.’255 Accordingly, regional states recognized that a 
joint effort was necessary to tackle the crisis. ‘Among the Northeast Asian states, 
the crisis changed the way business and political leaders viewed their relationship 
with Southeast Asia and increased recognition of the need to develop formal 
relations to deal with any future crises and ensure continued economic growth. 
Among ASEAN members, the crisis underscored the potential benefits of more 
extensive institutionalized links to the major economies of Japan, China and 
South Korea.’256  
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During the early 1990s, APEC was the leading forum for regional economic 
cooperation. As the Asian Financial Crisis erupted, APEC and the IMF were 
found to be inadequate to handle the crisis. Hence, regional states had to explore 
alternatives to deal with the crisis. As some interviewees put it:  
 
Prior to the crisis, regional cooperation was mainly pursued by 
frameworks covering the Asia-Pacific region. APEC was progressing 
steadily. After the crisis, ASEAN was no longer so enthusiastic in APEC. 
Instead, it approached China, Japan and South Korea to dialogue with 
them… If the Asian Financial Crisis did not occur, the weaknesses of 
APEC would not be exposed, and ASEAN+3 would not have developed. 
(Case I) 
 
Without the Asian Financial Crisis, and the response of the US and the 
IMF, I am afraid that the ASEAN states, China, Japan and South Korea 
might not be so active in the development of ASEAN+3, and ASEAN+3 
might not have developed so quickly.  (Case F) 
 
APEC failed to address the crisis effectively due to disagreement among its 
members, particularly the insistence of the US that the IMF should take charge in 
handling the crisis. Unfortunately, the conditions attached to the IMF’s loans were 
believed to worsen the plights of those affected countries and generated 
                                                                                                                                                              
ASEAN countries get out of economic sluggishness is therefore perceived as in China’s national 
interest.’ Wang, "China's Multilateral Diplomacy,"169. 
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resentment from regional states.
257
 This provided the impetus for the development 
of new institutional arrangements so that regional states could manage the crisis.  
 
During the 1990s, China had established diplomatic ties with all ASEAN 
countries and China-ASEAN relations were developing rapidly.
258
 China also 
began to participate in a series of emergent regional processes. When the Asian 
Financial Crisis broke out, China with capital controls was relatively insulated 
from the crisis. China acted responsibly by deciding not to devalue its currency 
and providing assistance to its neighbours. Upon the invitation of ASEAN, China 
agreed to participate in the meeting to discuss the crisis with ASEAN and other 
Northeast Asian states. This meeting marked the genesis of ASEAN+3.  
 
The convergent interests between the ASEAN countries and China were 
demonstrated by two indicators. First, how to manage the crisis was top on the 
agenda of ASEAN+3 in its early years. The agenda of the 1
st
 Summit in 1997 
included ‘the prospect of East Asia in the 21st century, the Asian Financial Crisis, 
(and) deepening economic links in the region’. Managing the Asian Financial 
Crisis was evidently a ‘key agenda’ of the meeting and the following summit in 
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 Second, the regional framework developed dialogues among relevant 
officials and promoted financial cooperation. The 1
st
 meeting among the vice 
finance ministers and the vice chairs of central banks was convened in March 
1999 and elevated to the level of financial ministers in the following year. During 
the 1
st
 Finance Ministers Meeting in May 2000, the members adopted the CMI 
which was a major initiative aiming at supporting its members in difficult times. 
In the following meeting held in September 2000, the members agreed to 




In short, China and the ASEAN countries shared the common interest to manage 
the Asian Financial Crisis through ASEAN+3. The crisis was an external shock 
that hampered regional economies. The inability of APEC and the IMF to handle 
the crisis effectively undermined the confidence of regional states towards them 
and called for the development of alternative channels to manage the crisis 
collectively. China also came to recognize the interdependence of the economies 
in East Asia. This can explain why China supported the development of 
ASEAN+3 even though it was a follower in the regional framework. 
 
The Second Period (2001-2005) 
As ASEAN+3 developed, the convergent interests between China and the 
ASEAN countries had expanded in this period. The regional framework made 
steady progress in promoting financial cooperation and strengthening the financial 
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resilience of its members. After the CMI was adopted in 2000, the 2
nd
 Finance 
Ministers Meeting decided to establish a working group to work out the principles 
of the bilateral currency swap agreements in September 2000. By early 2005, the 
members of ASEAN+3 had concluded 16 agreements amounting to USD 37.5 
billion. Another major initiative was the ABMI introduced in 2003 to promote the 
development of bond markets in East Asia.
261
 Preliminary effort was made by 
ASEAN+3 to strengthen regional financial surveillance by convening peer review 




China’s participation in ASEAN+3 could enable it to pursue two interrelated 
objectives whereby the interests of domestic actors converge.
263
 The first 
objective was to develop closer ties with ASEAN, which would enable it to 
manage the territorial disputes over the South China Sea, build confidence with 
ASEAN, address its concerns on China’s rise and maintain a peaceful periphery 
conducive for China’s development. As pointed out by an interviewee from the 
Foreign Affairs University:  
 
China joined ASEAN+3 to maintain a peaceful periphery so that it could 
concentrate on its own development. In the early years of the regional 
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framework, China hoped to build closer ties with ASEAN through 
cooperation, especially economic cooperation. By generating economic 
benefits, it hoped to build amicable ties with ASEAN and develop a stable, 
friendly neighbourhood. China has upheld two principles regarding 
ASEAN+3: (1) that it should remain ASEAN-driven; and (2) that the 
distribution of benefits should be uneven and tilted towards 
ASEAN…(Case B) 
 
The importance of these strategic considerations was demonstrated in the case of 
the CAFTA. According to several interviewees, the initiation of the CAFTA by 
Premier Zhu Rongji in 2000 was motivated by China’s interest to develop closer 
ties with ASEAN (Case B and Case F) or ASEAN’s concern for China’s WTO 
entry (Case C and Case E). Such considerations also shaped the content of the 
CAFTA. For example, the decision to conclude a FTA with ASEAN as a whole 
rather than with individual countries was shaped by strategic considerations. 
Similarly, the generous concessions made by China under the Early Harvest 
Program could hardly be explained solely by economic factors. A study of the 
decision-making process on the CAFTA found that the Ministry of Commerce 
held different views from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on both issues. Due to 
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The second objective was to pursue economic cooperation. China’s drive for 
development has been an overarching factor shaping its foreign policy in the post-
reform period. From the 1990s onwards, China’s trade with ASEAN rose rapidly. 
In 1997, China’s trade with the ASEAN countries was about USD 25 billion. The 
figure jumped to about USD 41.6 billion in 2001 and reached USD 130.4 billion 
in 2005. The proportion of China’s trade with the ASEAN countries also rose 
from 7.7% in 1997, 8.16% in 2001 to 9.17% in 2005. It is worthy to note that in 
spite of its rapid growth, the proportion of China’s trade with the ASEAN 
countries was relatively low. There existed considerable competition between 
them on markets and foreign investments from the industrialized countries.
265
 The 
growth of China’s trade with the other ASEAN+3 members (including Japan and 
South Korea) was more impressive. It expanded from about USD 109.9 billion in 
1997 to USD 165.3 billion in 2001 and reached USD 426.7 billion in 2005, and 
constituted about 30% of China’s total trade throughout this period. Most of the 
trade was with Japan and South Korea (please refer to Table 10 below for details).
 
China and the other ASEAN+3 members were also involved in regional 
production networks, which fostered economic cooperation among them. An 
interviewee from CAITEC remarked that the production networks in East Asia 
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had facilitated regional cooperation by fostering interdependence among member 
states (Case C), which lend support to China’s motivation to promote economic 
cooperation among member states by participating in ASEAN+3. 
 
In the case of the CAFTA, some scholars have highlighted the economic 
considerations that shaped the initiative. According to one interviewee, China’s 
CAFTA proposal was motivated by its FTA strategy. ASEAN was considered to 
be a suitable candidate for China to launch its FTA strategy after entering the 
WTO due to geographical proximity and the fact that both parties were at similar 
stage of development (Case E). The feasibility study of the CAFTA provided 
further support for the initiative. It suggests that the CAFTA would be mutually 
beneficial to China and ASEAN, contributing to a significant increase in their 
exports to each other (i.e. the projection would be 55% for China and 48% for 
ASEAN) and GDP growth (i.e. 0.3% per year for China and 0.9% for ASEAN).
266
 
In addition, the CAFTA encouraged Japan and South Korea to conclude similar 
agreements with ASEAN, which might lay the foundation for the eventual 
conclusion of a FTA encompassing all the ASEAN+3 countries in future.     
 
                                                          
266
 Wang, "Zhongguo—Dongmeng Ziyou Maoyi Qu," 57 & 63. Similar assessment has been made 
by some scholars. For example, Li Wei argues that the CAFTA would be beneficial to both China 
and ASEAN. The establishment of the CAFTA would help China to diversify its export markets, 
facilitate trade and investment, promote a better division of labour with the ASEAN countries, 
encourage technological cooperation and facilitate the development of regional economic 
cooperation in East Asia. Wei Li, “ZhongguoDongmeng Ziyou Maoyi Qu de Fazhan” The 
Development of the CAFTA, in Zhang and Zhou, Dongya Hezuo de Jincheng yu Qianjing, 125-
131 & 135-136. 
 149 
Table 10:  China’s Trade with ASEAN and ASEAN+3 Countries in Selected 
Years (in USD) 
 
Source: Adapted from the website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China
267
 
Note: *Cambodia only joined ASEAN in 1999. Hence, China’s trade with Cambodia is not 
included in 1997.  
 
 
Overall, the ASEAN countries were receptive to China’s initiatives as suggested 
by the rapid progress in developing the CAFTA and NEAT. When China 
proposed to conduct a feasibility study on the CAFTA in 2000, ASEAN accepted 
the proposal and a joint study group was promptly established. In 2001, the 
leaders in the ASEAN-China Summit agreed to establish the CAFTA within ten 
years and signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation between ASEAN and China (“the Framework Agreement”) one year 
later. By 2004, the two sides reached an agreement on trade in goods in relation to 
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 In the course of developing NEAT, which brought 
together eminent and influential researchers of the ASEAN+3 countries, ASEAN 
agreed to let China play a major role.
269
 The reaction of the ASEAN countries 
was consistent with the engagement strategy adopted by ASEAN towards 
China.
270
 It could also be attributed to a series of actions undertaken by China, 
which changed the perception of these countries towards China in a more positive 
light.
271
 Finally, the desire of the ASEAN countries to benefit from China’s rise 
and address the possible development of an economic bloc in Northeast Asia 




Nonetheless, the ASEAN countries still harboured concerns that ASEAN’s 
centrality in driving regional cooperation would be compromised in the eventual 
development of ASEAN+3. In particular, they were wary that China might 
dominate ASEAN+3. Similarly, China’s enthusiasm in developing closer ties with 
ASEAN and ASEAN+3 had accentuated the urgency for Japan to compete with 
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China for regional influence. Despite its economic influence in the region, Japan 
was ‘non-committal and unenthusiastic’ towards promoting regional cooperation 
in East Asia in the early 1990s. Though it joined ASEAN+3 and offered 
assistance to states affected by the Asian Financial Crisis, there was a perception 
in the region that Japan ‘had again failed to grasp the moment and was unable to 
provide the leadership needed for a East Asian regionalism.’ 273  Nonetheless, 
China’s efforts to promote closer ties with ASEAN and the development of 
ASEAN+3 forced Japan to reconsider its participation in the regional framework. 
These undercurrents surfaced in discussions on the future development of 
ASEAN+3, and shaped China’s approach to its institutionalization. 
 
With ASEAN in the driver seat, China’s relative influence in ASEAN+3 was 
generally limited with the exception of its major role in developing NEAT. If the 
original proposal of developing ASEAN+3 into the EAS were successful, it 
would potentially increase China’s relative influence. While its membership 
would remain unchanged, the ASEAN countries would be joining the EAS as 
individual states rather than as a bloc.
274
 Instead of convening summits in the 
ASEAN countries only, the EAS would convene summits in all the member 
countries, including the Northeast Asian countries. This implies that the three 
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Northeast Asian states would have greater ownership of the regional framework 
and a greater role in shaping its agenda and development.
275
   
 
To recap, the convergent interests between China and the ASEAN countries 
expanded in this period. The regional framework had launched several measures 
to strengthen the financial resilience of its members and promote financial 
cooperation. China had promoted closer ties with ASEAN and contributed to its 
economic development in ASEAN+3, which enabled the interests of various 
domestic actors to converge. The ASEAN countries appeared to have been 
supportive to China’s initiatives. Though China’s role in ASEAN+3 was 
generally limited, the proposal to develop ASEAN+3 into the EAS would 
increase China’s relative influence. Hence, it was more proactive over 
institutionalization by leading the first phase of the feasibility study of the 
EAFTA and the development of NEAT. It also promoted expanding the scope of 
ASEAN+3 to cover political and security issues, supported the evolution of 
ASEAN+3 into the EAS and offered financial support to the ASEAN+3 Unit.
276
      
 
The Third Period (2006-2012) 
In the third period, ASEAN+3 had made limited progress in expanding the 
convergent interests between China and other members. Further efforts were 
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made to deepen financial cooperation and strengthen the financial resilience of its 
members. A major move was the CMIM. In 2008, the CMIM involving a total of 
USD 80 billion was endorsed by the finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 countries. 
The amount was increased to USD 120 billion in 2009 and doubled to USD 240 
billion in 2012. 
277
 Another development was the establishment of AMRO in 
Singapore in 2011. Consisted of the ministries of finance and the central banks of 
the ASEAN+3 countries, AMRO serves ‘as an independent regional surveillance 
unit to monitor and analyze regional economies and support CMIM decision-
making’. It publishes periodic reports on the economic conditions of the 
ASEAN+3 area and individual countries to monitor the condition of regional 
economies. In times of crisis, it is responsible for making assessments, monitoring 




Aside from financial cooperation, ASEAN+3 had made limited progress in other 
areas. Some of the key recommendations of the EAVG and EASG, such as the 
EAFTA and EAS, were derailed in subsequent years. This has been attributed to 
the concerns of the ASEAN countries and Japan about China’s proactive 
participation in ASEAN+3.  Specifically, ASEAN was worried that its centrality 
in driving regional cooperation might be challenged by China. As Sheng remarks, 
‘China, by being proactive with too many initiatives, makes ASEAN find it more 
difficult to maintain the leadership. What is worse, these proactive initiatives may 
make some ASEAN countries feel that the regional strategic balance could be 
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tipped.’279 These worries were exacerbated by the lingering suspicions of some 
ASEAN countries towards China, ASEAN’s capability as well as members’ 
domestic problems. For instance, the 12
th
 ASEAN+3 Summit scheduled in 
December 2008 was cancelled due to the political turmoil in Thailand. All the 
abovementioned factors have constrained ASEAN’s ability to drive regional 
cooperation.  
 
The above concerns were clearly reflected in the development of the EAS, which 
might undermine ASEAN’s role in driving regional cooperation.280 As the EASG 
report points out in its executive summary, ‘the discussions (on the idea) have 
also revealed concerns that ASEAN may be marginalized if the transition towards 
an EAS moves too fast.’ The report mentions that a ‘spectrum of views’ existed 
over the initiative (i.e. the EAS), including ‘how to avoid marginalization of 
ASEAN’ and the potentially contradictory ‘need to give greater ownership to 
China, Japan, and Korea’.281 To address its concerns, ASEAN pushed for the 
expansion of the EAS to dilute China’s influence and ensure ‘that ASEAN 
remains at the centre of any emerging East Asian community’. 282 ASEAN also 
reasserted its centrality by formulating the criteria to join the EAS, insisting that 
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the EAS summits should be hosted in ASEAN countries only, and opting to join 
the EAS as a bloc rather than as individual states as originally planned.
283
   
 
Similarly, Japan was concerned about China’s proactive posture in strengthening 
its ties with ASEAN and promoting the development of ASEAN+3, which might 
undermine its regional influence. In particular, Japan worried that China would 
dominate ASEAN+3. According to Chong, ‘One of the main reasons for Japan’s 
participation in 10+3 is to balance or dilute the influence of China in Southeast 
Asia… By aggressively pursuing a strong China-ASEAN axis within the 10+3 
since 2001 to signing a FTA between China and ASEAN, China has triggered 
strong competition with Japan for influence in Southeast Asia.’284 The offer by 
China to hold the 2
nd
 EAS Summit exacerbated Japan’s worries. In response, it 
pushed for the expansion of the EAS to ‘better balance China’s power and reduce 
China’s influence in the region, which would maintain Japan’s core interests in 
regional cooperation.’285 The role of Japan in bringing about the expansion of the 
EAS was confirmed by several interviewees who cited Japan’s position as a major 
factor shaping the development of the EAS (Case E, Case F, Case I and Case M). 
 
After the EAS was established, Japan strived to promote regional cooperation 
through the EAS rather than ASEAN+3.
286
 For example, it played an important 
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role in undermining the development of the EAFTA by promoting the 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership of East Asia (CEPEA) as an alternative. As 
one interviewee recounted:   
 
The feasibility study of the EAFTA began in 2004 and a report came out 
in 2006. Japan was involved in the process. The plan was to build a 
relatively advanced free trade area based on ASEAN+3 to enhance 
regional integration. In 2006, Japan proposed to conduct two rounds of 
feasibility study for CEPEA, which came up with its own 
recommendations. This created a problem… Confronted with the EAFTA 
and CEPEA proposals, ASEAN felt uncomfortable, so it shelved the two 
reports and only maintained the working groups…287 (Case I)  
 
As the proposed EAS failed to realized, China’s relative influence in ASEAN+3 
remained limited. While the regional framework remained driven by ASEAN, 
China had played a meaningful role in some entities like NEAT and AMRO. 
Aside from its major role in NEAT mentioned previously, China had 
representatives in the Executive Committee and Advisory Panel of AMRO, and 
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Chinese officials were involved as senior staff. Wei Benhua, a Chinese national, 
served as the AMRO director in 2011.
288
    
 
During the third and final period, the expansion of convergent interests between 
China and other members in ASEAN+3 was limited due to the suspicion and 
concerns of the ASEAN countries and Japan that China would dominate the 
regional framework. As the EAS failed to proceed as planned, China’s relative 
influence in ASEAN+3 remained limited. Thereafter, China adjusted its approach 
to institutionalizing ASEAN+3. During the interviews, two interviewees made the 
following observations: 
 
…Later, the development of ASEAN+3 was constrained by multiple 
factors and could not proceed as planned. China made adjustments by 
focusing on the development of economic cooperation with ASEAN, but it 
is still active in ASEAN+3. In 2004, China led the feasibility study of the 
EAFTA…. China also supported the original plan of developing 
ASEAN+3 into the EAS. Whilst Malaysia offered to host the first EAS 
summit, China offered to host the second summit. Eventually, the plan did 
not work out and the EAS became a separate regional organization made 
up of 16 countries. China had made great adjustments, but it is still 
relatively active in ASEAN+3 (e.g. the development of CMI).   (Case E)   
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…China’s support for ASEAN+3 was illustrated by its efforts to promote 
trilateral cooperation, but there were slight adjustments too. After 
positioning ASEAN+3 as the main channel of regional cooperation, China 
has acted accordingly like supporting CMIM and the two-stage feasibility 
study of the EAFTA. Later, China reluctantly accepted the changing 
position of Japan on ASEAN+3… China did not have so much influence 
over ASEAN+3, and was forced to accept that ASEAN+3 was no longer 
that reliable, strong-willed and promoted by all its members. China’s 
approach to ASEAN+3 has not changed, but it could no longer insist that 
it is the main channel for East Asian cooperation. There was a change in 
China’s perception of and expectation towards ASEAN+3. China was not 
as enthusiastic as before; it used to hold high expectations towards 
ASEAN+3. Its attitude changed from a firm, confident and hopeful position 
to not so firm, confident and less hopeful. (Case I) 
 
China continued to support institutionalizing ASEAN+3 when there was 
consensus among its members. For example, China supported efforts by 
ASEAN+3 to deepen and expand cooperation in various areas by being a major 
contributor of the reserve pool of the CMIM and the APTERR. It also supported 
the modest institutional build-up efforts of ASEAN+3 by contributing to the 
ASEAN+3 Cooperation Fund.
289
 At the same time, China modified its 
expectation towards ASEAN+3 and was more flexible on developing cooperation 
outside the rubric of the regional framework. For instance, while China promoted 
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the development of the EAFTA previously, it also supported the RCEP proposed 




To sum up, the case study of ASEAN+3 provides support for the proposed 
explanation of this study. When China joined ASEAN+3, it shared considerable 
convergent interests with the ASEAN countries to manage and address the Asian 
Financial Crisis. The crisis served as the catalyst necessitating closer cooperation 
between ASEAN and its Northeast Asian counterparts. Hence, China was 
generally supportive to institutionalizing ASEAN+3 although it was only a 
follower in establishing the regional framework. As ASEAN+3 developed, the 
convergent interests between China and the ASEAN countries increased. 
Concurrently, the original proposal of the EAS carried the potential to increase 
China’s relative influence in the regional framework. Thus, China adopted a more 
proactive approach to institutionalization. In recent years, China has adjusted its 
proactive approach to ASEAN+3 due to the precautionary reaction of both 
ASEAN and Japan to China’s active participation in the regional framework and 
the failure to develop ASEAN+3 into the EAS.   
 
As for the two alternative explanations, the available evidence does not provide 
strong support for the explanation on balancing against the US. The constitutive 
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localization model, however, seems to offer a plausible alternative account for 
China’s approach to the institutionalization of ASEAN+3.  
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After the end of the Cold War, Northeast Asia has been heavily influenced by its 
past legacies, including the division of the Korean peninsula into North Korea and 
South Korea and the separation of Taiwan from mainland China. Up to the 
present, there is virtually no regional institution involving all the major states 
which have a stake in the region. During the 1990s, a few ad hoc institutions such 
as the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the Four Party 
Talks were established to address the North Korea nuclear threat. Nonetheless, the 
institutional deficit in Northeast Asia persists. Its regional order has been largely 
shaped by realpolitik, by the US alliances in the region as well as by economic 
activities that transcend national boundaries.      
    
Trilateral Cooperation is a breakthrough in the development of regional 
institutions in Northeast Asia. It was initiated by Japan and emerged from the 
participation of China, Japan and South Korea in ASEAN+3. In November 1999, 
the leaders of the three countries held a breakfast meeting on the sidelines of the 
ASEAN+3 Summit. In the following year, they agreed to meet regularly. In 2007, 
the leaders decided to convene separate meetings in Northeast Asia while the 
meetings on the sidelines of the ASEAN+3 summits would continue. Accordingly, 
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the first Tripartite Summit was held in Fukuoka, Japan in December 2008.
290
 
Since its establishment, the membership of Trilateral Cooperation has remained 
unchanged.   
 
With the exception of economic cooperation, China has been generally lukewarm 
towards institutionalizing Trilateral Cooperation. This chapter attributes this to the 
low convergent interests between China and the other two countries in the 
regional framework. Trilateral Cooperation was mainly a natural outgrowth of 
ASEAN+3. Although subsequent developments of Trilateral Cooperation could 
expand China’s convergent interests with the other members in some areas, these 
were overridden by the decreasing importance of China’s intra-regional trade with 
Japan and South Korea, which could shape domestic debates in China against 
further institutionalization. Thus, China’s approach to institutionalization has 
remained reactive though it has assumed a more meaningful role in the regional 
framework over time.   
 
This chapter is organized into five sections. After introducing the institutional 
development of Trilateral Cooperation, the second section reviews China’s 
approach to institutionalization. The third section examines the plausibility of two 
alternative explanations. Next, the plausibility of the proposed explanation is 
assessed by analyzing China’s approach to institutionalizing Trilateral 
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Cooperation in two periods: (1) 1999-2007; and (2) 2008-2013. The last section 
summarizes the findings of this chapter. 
 
The Institutional Development of Trilateral Cooperation 
 
Trilateral Cooperation began as informal meetings among the leaders of China, 
Japan and South Korea on the sidelines of ASEAN+3 summits. Later, these 
meetings were formalized and separate summits were conducted in the three 
countries. These summits formed the core of Trilateral Cooperation. The regional 
framework has also developed a series of dialogue mechanisms covering a wide 
range of issues.
291
 Nonetheless, it has been minimally institutionalized over the 
years. In 2011, the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat was established in Seoul, 
South Korea, marking the first step towards institutionalization. The budget for 
the secretariat is shared among the three countries, and decisions are made by 
consensus by the Secretary-General and two Deputy Secretary Generals.
292
   
 
Among different areas of cooperation, Trilateral Cooperation has made 
achievements mainly in the economic field.
293
 There are two major initiatives 
developed by the regional framework, namely the Trilateral Agreement for the 
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Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment (also named as the 
Trilateral Investment Agreement) and Trilateral FTA. The Trilateral Investment 
Agreement was signed by the economic ministers of the member states in the 5
th
 
Tripartite Summit in 2012, while the Trilateral FTA is still under construction. In 
2002, the leaders of the three countries decided to conduct a study on a Trilateral 
FTA. Subsequently, research institutions of the three countries were involved to 
conduct a study on the economic effects of a possible Trilateral FTA from 2003 to 
2009.
294
 After the study was completed, a feasibility study on the Trilateral FTA 
followed from 2010 to 2011 with official involvement. The research team 
submitted the report to the 5
th
 Tripartite Summit, and the leaders decided to begin 
negotiations on the Trilateral FTA. Three rounds of negotiations were held by the 
end of 2013.
295
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- 1999: In the first (informal) breakfast meeting, the leaders 
agreed to launch a joint study on economic cooperation 
among the three countries. 
- 2001: The leaders agreed to replace the breakfast meetings 
with formal meetings.  
- 2002: The leaders agreed to launch a study on the economic 
effects of a possible Trilateral FTA. 
- 2003: The leaders signed the Joint Declaration on the 
Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among the People’s 
Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.  
- 2005: No meeting was held among the leaders of the three 
countries.  
- 2007: The leaders agreed to start negotiations on the 
Trilateral Investment Agreement as soon as possible in the 
7
th
 meeting. In the 8
th
 meeting, the leaders agreed to hold 





- 2009: The leaders agreed to establish an online secretariat.  
- 2010: The leaders decided to complete a feasibility study on 
the Trilateral FTA by 2012 and establish the Trilateral 
Cooperation Secretariat in South Korea by 2011.  
- 2012: Representatives of the three countries signed the 
Trilateral Investment Agreement. The leaders agreed to 
launch formal negotiations on the Trilateral FTA later in the 
same year.  
 
 
Sources: “Joint Press Statement,” 2007; Lee, 2006; Shi, 2009; Wang, 2012; Wei, 2008, 
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China’s Approach to Institutionalizing Trilateral Cooperation  
 
In general, China adopts a reactive approach to institutionalizing Trilateral 
Cooperation. Regarding the dimension on adaptability, it is noteworthy that China 
has allowed frictions in Sino-Japanese relations to affect the convening of high-
level meetings in the regional framework. In 2005, the 7
th
 leaders’ meeting was 
postponed when bilateral ties hit its lowest point.
297
 History repeated itself in 
2013, and the 6
th
 Tripartite Summit was postponed. No meeting was held among 
the leaders of the three countries during the ASEAN+3 Summit.
298
 The fact that 
China allows frictions in bilateral ties to affect its participation in Trilateral 
Cooperation is somewhat peculiar, which casts doubts on whether China values 
the regional framework. 
 
China has not put forward any major initiative to expand or deepen the functions 
of Trilateral Cooperation. The only exception concerns economic cooperation. 
China has initiated and promoted the development of the Trilateral FTA. In 2002, 
Premier Zhu Rongji proposed to conduct a research on the possibility of 
developing an FTA among the three countries in the Trilateral Meeting.
299
 In the 
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following summit, it suggested speeding up the study. China also pushed for the 




Regarding the dimension on complexity, China has not driven the institutional 
development of Trilateral Cooperation. It merely goes along with the initiatives 
by other members like the development of separate summits
301
 and South Korea’s 
initiative to establish a secretariat for the regional framework. In the latter case, 
China contributes to the budget of the secretariat.  
 
Taken together, China’s approach to institutionalizing Trilateral Cooperation can 
be classified as low. As China’s approach to institutionalization has remained 
more or less the same over the years, the following analysis examines China’s 
approach in two periods: (1) 1999-2007; and (2) 2008-2013.  
 
Alternative Explanations  
 
Balancing Against the US 
As proposed in this study, an evaluation of this explanation draws our attention to 
why China opted to join Trilateral Cooperation and its subsequent behaviour. The 
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available evidence does not provide strong support to this explanation. Regarding 
the first question, Rozman notes that China’s decision to join Trilateral 
Cooperation coincided with deteriorating Sino-US relations in 1999,
302
 when the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade was bombed by the US during a NATO campaign 
against Yugoslavia. Though the association might be plausible, it is noteworthy 
that the capability and image of the US was left largely untarnished by the 
campaign. Besides, if China really strives to balance against the US by 
participating in Trilateral Cooperation, we would expect it to adopt a proactive 
approach to institutionalization. But no supportive evidence could be found. 
China’s participation seems to be largely motivated by interests other than 
balancing, such as developing ASEAN+3 and promoting economic growth at 
home. 
 
As for the second question, Yeo notes that China’s participation in Trilateral 
Cooperation is motivated by its interests to balance against the US:  
 
Despite China’s initial reluctance to participate in trilateral meetings, since 
the early 2000s, China has welcomed trilateral relations. The trilateral 
framework enables China to participate in a regional forum without US 
involvement and strengthen relationships with Japan and South Korea on 
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its own terms. China seeks to dilute US power and influence in the region. 
The trilateral framework, while still lacking political bite, does provide an 




Yet, Yeo’s observation cannot be substantiated by any Chinese initiative that 
seeks to balance against the US. Some scholars have argued that China’s 
promotion of the Trilateral FTA could be considered as an example. After the 911 
Incident, the US was preoccupied with its War on Terrorism. China’s 
participation in Trilateral Cooperation could enhance its economic ties with the 
two US allies in Northeast Asia, disrupt the economic pillar of the US alliance 
system in the region,
304
 and complicate any possible attempts by the US to contain 
China in future. Nonetheless, as suggested by the following analysis, economic 
considerations seem to be equally important, if not more important, in shaping 
China’s initiative regarding the Trilateral FTA. All in all, China’s involvement in 
Trilateral Cooperation does not seem to demonstrate a strong tendency to balance 
against the US. 
 
Socialization in Regional Processes 
Similar to the previous case study on the SCO, the constitutive localization model 
is not applicable in this case. The model focuses on how domestic factors (e.g. the 
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status of existing norms, the availability of local actors to promote new norms, the 
reaction of norm-takers) shape state response to socialization by international 
institutions.
305
 But in the case of Trilateral Cooperation, China was one of the 
founders, and not a norm-taker of the regional framework. Therefore, it is unclear 
how the constitutive localization model can be applied to this case. 
 
Explaining China’s Approach  
 
The First Period (1999-2007) 
At first glance, the convergent interests between China and its Northeast Asia 
counterparts in Trilateral Cooperation were limited. When the regional framework 
emerged in 1999, China and the other two countries had very little in common 
other than the desire to promote exchange and cooperation among themselves as 
well as the need to manage China’s rise.306 There was neither any external shock 
that affected regional states nor any specific issue that warranted the concerted 
efforts of the three states. The lack of convergent interests was reflected in the 
first meeting of the regional framework, which took the form of a breakfast 
meeting involving the leaders of the three countries while they were attending the 
ASEAN+3 Summit. As an informal meeting, it had no agenda, and the three 
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Later on, the search for convergent interests was upset by various developments. 
China joined Trilateral Cooperation to pursue two objectives. One objective was 
to foster coordination among Northeast Asian countries in ASEAN+3. As 
mentioned in chapter 5, China has attached great importance to ASEAN+3 in 
which the three Northeast Asian countries play an important role. As their 
material capability far outweighs their ASEAN counterparts, their financial 
support is crucial to promote cooperation in ASEAN+3. By participating in 
Trilateral Cooperation, China hoped to promote dialogue and build consensus 
with its Northeast Asian counterparts, thereby contributing to the development of 
ASEAN+3. In 2002, Premier Zhu Rongji declared China’s intention in the 
Trilateral Meeting by saying, ‘While China, Japan and South Korea supported 
ASEAN to function as the core (hexin), it is necessary for them to coordinate their 
policies under the rubric of ASEAN+3 to facilitate the development of East Asia 
cooperation jointly.’308 Nonetheless, Trilateral Cooperation had failed to prevent 
Sino-Japanese competition over the membership of the EAS and the choice of 
EAFTA/CEPEA that unfolded in subsequent years.  
 
Another objective was to promote China’s economic development. Both Japan 
and South Korea were China’s top trading partners, and the proportion of intra-
regional trade and investment rose significantly during the 1990s.
309
 In 1999, 
China’s foreign trade with Japan and South Korea totalled USD 91,207,780,000, 
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or roughly one-quarter of its foreign trade. The FDI from these two countries 
amounted to USD 4,247,810,000, or about 11% of the FDI received by China.
310
 
The three countries had been deeply involved in regional production networks in 
sectors such as electrical machinery.
311
 Hence, it would be beneficial for China to 
strengthen its economic ties with Japan and South Korea through promoting 
trilateral economic cooperation. 
 
As noted by Du, the Foreign Ministry and the predecessors of the Ministry of 
Commerce had once considered the Northeast Asian countries as the potential 
candidate for China to conclude its first FTA.
312
 The economic benefits of the 
Trilateral FTA are evident in the joint study. It suggests that the initiative would 
contribute to both GDP growth (1.1-2.9% for China, 0.1-0.5% for Japan and 2.5-
3.1% for South Korea) and welfare benefits (USD 4.7- 6.4 billion for China, USD 
6.7- 7.4 billion for Japan and USD 11- 26.3 billion for South Korea) to all the 
three countries.
313
 Besides, the economic ties with Japan and South Korea were 
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more important to China than those with the ASEAN countries. It is therefore not 
surprising that the Foreign Ministry proposed concluding China’s first FTA with 
the Northeast Asian countries. Nonetheless, the predecessors of the Ministry of 
Commerce had expressed their reservations to the proposal due to troubled Sino-
Japanese relations (i.e. ‘manageability’ concerns) and the lack of enthusiasm of 
Japan and South Korea to the initiative largely due to their vulnerable agricultural 
sector (i.e. ‘feasibility’ concerns). Hence, the preference of the Foreign Ministry 
failed to materialize as a result of political and diplomatic constraints.
314
    
 
By agreeing to explore trilateral economic cooperation in 1999, Japan and South 
Korea seemed to concur with China that economic cooperation could be a foci of 
Trilateral Cooperation. In reality, the three countries hold divergent views on this 
issue. Although Japan was the first to propose developing a Northeast Asian Free 
Trade Agreement (NEAFTA) in 1998,
315
 its stance on trilateral economic 
cooperation had been ‘rather ambiguous (bijiao aimei)’316 and even reluctant. In 
2002, Japan opposed China’s proposal regarding the Trilateral FTA 317  and 
assigned a low priority to China in the country’s FTA/Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) strategy.
318
 It was gravely concerned over a surge in imported 
Chinese agricultural products and manufactured goods after the conclusion of the 
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FTA. Besides, it was uncertain about China’s ability to abide by its WTO 
commitments over areas like the treatment of foreign firms in China. Due to these 
concerns, Japan preferred to conclude an investment agreement before negotiating 





Compared with China and Japan, South Korea seems to be lukewarm towards 
trilateral economic cooperation. There are different assessments regarding South 
Korea’s position on the issue. According to two analysts in the Development 
Research Centre of the State Council, South Korea is the ‘most active’ member in 
promoting trilateral economic cooperation.
320
 In contrast, Lee and Moon argue 
that South Korea’s position is anything but enthusiastic. They note that an 
anomaly of the country’s FTA strategy is ‘the lack of policy efforts to expedite a 
FTA among China, Japan, and South Korea.’ Available evidence seems to concur 
with the latter assessment. Apart from President Kim Dae-jung’s proposal for the 
joint study on trilateral economic cooperation mentioned above, South Korea did 
not take any action to further trilateral economic cooperation. This could be 
explained by its concerns over the impact of liberalization on its agricultural 
sector and the increasingly competitive economic structures of the three countries 
as China upgrades its industries.
321
 
                                                          
319
 Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja, “Asian FTAs: Trends, Prospects and Challenges,” 
Journal of Asian Economics 22, no. 1 (2011): 14; Quan Song, “FTA Talks May Lead to Trading 
Bloc,” China Daily, April 22, 2005 (North America edition), 2 
320
 Zhang and Lu, “Zhongguo de Shidian,” 6-7. 
321 Seungjoo Lee and Chung-in Moon, “South Korea’s Regional Economic Cooperation Policy: 
the Evolution of an Adaptive Strategy,” in Aggarwal et al, Northeast Asia, 52 & 54-55; Xiaoyu 
Sun, “Qianyan” Prologue, in Sun, Zhongrihan Jingji Hezuo, 1.  
 175 
During the first period, the convergent interests between China and the other 
members in Trilateral Cooperation were limited. The regional framework was a 
natural outgrowth of ASEAN+3, rather than motivated by the need to address any 
specific crisis or issue. The development for convergent interests was constrained 
by Sino-Japanese competition for influence in ASEAN+3 and the divergent views 
of the three countries on economic cooperation. As one of the founders of 
Trilateral Cooperation, China could have shaped its direction and development. 
But due to low convergent interests with other members, China was passive on 
institutionalizing Trilateral Cooperation, except for its initiation of the Trilateral 
FTA during this period.  
 
The Second Period (2008-2013) 
As Trilateral Cooperation developed, the convergent interests between China and 
other members remained low as different developments neutralized each other. 
Despite its failure to forestall Sino-Japanese competition for influence over 
ASEAN+3, the regional framework did provided a useful platform for members 
to coordinate their positions regarding ASEAN+3. For example, a major purpose 
of trilateral financial cooperation was to promote financial cooperation in 
ASEAN+3. Since 2001, a dialogue mechanism among the finance ministers of the 
three countries was introduced ‘largely for the ASEAN+3 finance cooperation.’ It 
had a ‘similar agenda’ with its counterpart in ASEAN+3, covering issues such as 




the CMI and its subsequent multilateralization, the development of the ABMI and 




Due to the decreased relative importance of Japan and South Korea to China’s 
economic development, there was no urgency for China to promote trilateral 
economic cooperation. Despite the increase in the volume of intra-regional trade 
with Japan and South Korea, the proportion had dropped continuously from 
25.29% in 1999 to 15.15% in 2012. A closer look at the figures indicates that the 
proportion of China’s trade with Japan ‘has been decreasing (significantly) from 





The proportion of China’s FDI from Japan and South Korea had peaked between 
2004 and 2005 in terms of its volume and its share. Thereafter, it dropped from 
2006 to 2010 and rose again in 2011. In 2012, the total amount of FDI from Japan 
and South Korea totalled USD 10,389,560,000 and constituted about 9.30% of the 
FDI received by China, which was much lower than the figures in 2004 and 2005 
(see Tables 12 and 13 for details). The declining economic importance of Japan 
and South Korea to China might explain why China had assigned a lower priority 
to promoting trilateral economic cooperation. Meanwhile, China had made good 
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progress in negotiating a separate FTA with South Korea, which could provide an 
alternative for China to reap part of the benefits of formulating the Trilateral FTA.  
 
Table 12:  China’s Trade with Japan and South Korea in Selected Years (in USD) 
 1999 2004 2009 2012 
Japan 66,173,980,000 167,835,770,000 228,782,560,000 329,455,780,000 
South 
Korea 
25,033,800,000 90,045,660,000 156,214,790,000 256,415,290,000 
















Table 13: FDI to China from Japan and South Korea in Selected Years (in USD) 
 




Probably due to the failure to implement its original FTA/EPA strategy, Japan 
adjusted its position on trilateral economic cooperation. Japan’s negotiations with 
South Korea on a bilateral FTA were suspended in 2004,
326
whilst China and 
                                                          
324
 The data is drawn from China Statistical Yearbook 2000 (section on “China’s Foreign Trade 
with Related Countries and Territories”), 2005, 2010 and 2013 (section on “Volume of Imports 
and Exports by Countries and Regions” or its equivalent). Website of National Bureau of Statistics 
of China.   
325
 The data is drawn from China Statistical Yearbook 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2013 (section on 
“Actually Used Foreign Investment by Country or Region” or its equivalent). Ibid.  
326
 Shen, “Dongya Jingji Ti FTA Zhanlue Bijiao,” 89. 
 1999 2004 2009 2012 
Japan 2,973,080,000 5,451,570,000 4,104,970,000 7,351,560,000 
South Korea 1,274,730,000 6,247,860,000 2,700,070,000 3,038,000,000 













South Korea had made rapid progress in developing a bilateral FTA.
327
 If the 
bilateral FTA was realized, Japan would suffer from trade diversion.
328
 Therefore, 
it was not coincidental that the leaders of the three countries finally reached 
consensus to begin negotiations on the Trilateral FTA in 2012. However, Japan’s 
more supportive approach was offset by its deteriorating bilateral ties with China 
and South Korea. As a result of the territorial dispute over Diaoyu (Senkaku) 




During the second period, China had increased its relative influence in Trilateral 
Cooperation. As the regional framework made its first steps towards institutional 
build-up, China began to take on substantial roles. After the introduction of 





Summits in 2009 and 2012. With the establishment of the Trilateral Secretariat in 
2011, Chinese nationals had assumed senior positions and provided supporting 
staff there.  Mao Ning and Chen Feng served as the Deputy Secretary General for 




As Trilateral Cooperation developed during this period, the convergent interests 
between China and other members remained low. To some extent, the regional 
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framework had facilitated policy coordination among the three countries in 
ASEAN+3, and Japan seemed to be more committed to trilateral economic 
cooperation. Nonetheless, the decreased importance of China’s trade with Japan 
and South Korea meant that China was in no hurry to promote institutionalization. 
China’s relative influence in Trilateral Cooperation increased in this period. 
Nonetheless, due to low convergent interests with other members, it remained 
reactive over institutionalization. With the exception of the Trilateral Investment 
Agreement, China was passive over promoting cooperation and institutional 




To sum up, the case study of Trilateral Cooperation provides support for the 
proposed explanation. In the first period, the dearth of convergent interests 
between China and other members combined with its founder status had 
contributed to the country’s reactive approach to institutionalization. During the 
second period, the convergent interests between China and other members in 
Trilateral Cooperation remained low. Meanwhile, the relatively decreased 
importance of China’s intra-regional trade with Japan and South Korea had 
forestalled support for further institutionalization. Thus, China’s approach to 
institutionalizing Trilateral Cooperation remained lukewarm even though its 
relative influence had increased during this period.  
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As for the two alternative explanations, the available evidence does not provide 
strong support for the explanation on balancing. The applicability of the 
constitutive localization model in this case is limited as China was a founder of 
the regional framework, not merely a norm-taker.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, regional frameworks have flourished in Asia. 
They have played an increasingly important role in facilitating dialogue among 
regional states and finding solutions to common concerns. China has been deeply 
involved in this development. As a major regional player whose power is still on 
the rise, China’s approach  is likely to have a significant impact on the 
institutional development of these regional frameworks and the emergent regional 
order in Asia.  
 
While scholars notice China’s participation in regional frameworks in Asia, the 
conventional account tends to highlight the evolution of China’s approach to these 
frameworks over time. Most of the existing studies tend to focus on China’s 
participation in selected regional frameworks (e.g. the ARF), and there are few 
comparative analyses of China’s varied approaches in different regional 
frameworks in Asia.  
 
This study attempts to understand variation in China’s approaches to 
institutionalizing regional processes in Asia. Its objectives are two-fold, namely: 
to examine variation in China’s approaches to the institutionalization of regional 
processes in Asia, and to develop an explanation to account for China’s varied 
approaches to institutionalizing regional process. The proposed explanation 
includes two causes, namely: the convergent interests between China and other 
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major members of the regional frameworks, and China’s relative influence in 
these frameworks. The proposed explanation was employed to examine China’s 
participation in the ARF, the SCO, ASEAN+3 and Trilateral Cooperation. 
Overall, the evidence has provided support for the proposed explanation. The 
study has also contributed to the literature by providing a more nuanced account 
of China’s participation in regional frameworks in Asia to complement the 
conventional account. Such an account highlights China’s increasingly mature 
and differentiated approach to utilize these regional frameworks to advance the 
country’s national interests.  
 
The Proposed Explanation  
 
As mentioned above, this study seeks to explain China’s varied approaches to 
institutionalizing regional frameworks in Asia. Institutionalization here involves 
the process in which regional frameworks mature. The study focuses on two 
dimensions of institutionalization, i.e. adaptability and complexity, and suggests 
several indicators for measuring China’s approach to institutionalizing regional 
processes.    
 
Two causes are proposed by this study to explain variation in China’s approaches 
to institutionalization. The first cause is the extent to which China’s interests 
converge with other major members of specific regional frameworks. It assumes 
that regional processes emerged when there are convergent interests among 
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members. The attitude of members towards institutionalization is shaped by the 
extent of their convergent interests. This is initially determined by whether China 
and other members set up or joined a regional process to address a specific issue 
that necessitates closer cooperation among them. Subsequent development of 
convergent interests is shaped by the ability of the regional process to address the 
issue it is set up for, the interaction among domestic actors and the reactions of 
other major members to China’s initiatives and/or positions. 
 
Proposition 1:  The greater the convergence of interests between China and 
other major members of a regional framework, the greater its tendency to 
support further institutionalization of the framework. 
 
The second cause is China’s relative influence in the regional framework. China 
will find a regional framework useful for promoting its national interests if it can 
exert considerable influence in the framework. This study measures China’s 
relative influence by examining China’s role in establishing the framework (i.e. 
whether it is a founder) and China’s subsequent roles in it.  
 
Proposition 2:  The more relative influence China can exert in a regional 
framework, the greater its tendency to support further institutionalization of 
the framework.   
 
 184 
Major Findings of the Case Study Chapters 
 
In chapters 4 to 7, I have applied the proposed explanation to examine China’s 
approach to institutionalizing each of the four selected regional frameworks. 
Please refer to Table 14 below for a summary of the major findings of the four 
case study chapters.  
 
In chapter 4, it was found that China has remained hesitant about the 
institutionalization of the ARF. It has strived to delay the evolution of the ARF to 
the stage of preventive diplomacy, limit its scope and keep the institutional build-
up of the ARF to a minimum. I have attributed this to the low convergent interests 
between China and the ASEAN countries and its low relative influence in the 
ARF. The ARF was neither established to address a common security issue nor 
concern between China and the ASEAN countries. The efforts by the ARF to 
broaden the convergent interests among its members have been hampered by the 
residual misgivings of some ASEAN countries towards China and their divergent 
views over fundamental security issues (e.g. US presence in Asia). Hence, further 
institutionalization of the ARF would have little benefit for China, and might 
constrain its options in defending its national unity and territorial integrity.  
 
In chapter 5, it was found that China has been more proactive on the 
institutionalization of the “Shanghai Five” process (and later the SCO) since 
2000. It has supported the institutional build-up of the SCO, promoted both 
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security and economic cooperation, and financed the regional framework. In this 
chapter, my argument is that China, Russia and the three Central Asian countries 
shared considerable convergent interests to address their common borders, which 
accounted for China’s support for the development of the “Shanghai Five” 
process. After the Millennium, the convergent interests among members have 
expanded. The SCO has facilitated the settlement of the border issue. Through 
participating in the regional framework, China has been able to achieve various 
objectives which converge with the interests of its domestic actors. With a few 
exceptions, other SCO members have been generally receptive to China’s 
initiatives and positions in the SCO. With increased relative influence in the SCO, 
China has actively promoted the institutional development of the SCO and 
cooperation with other members in various areas.      
 
In chapter 6, it was found that China initially adopted a proactive approach to the 
institutionalization of ASEAN+3 after 2000 as evident by its support for the 
development of NEAT, EAFTA and the EAS. But this only lasted for several 
years. When the Asian Financial Crisis broke out, the ASEAN countries and 
China had convergent interests to manage the crisis. Hence, China joined 
ASEAN+3 and was generally supportive of its institutionalization. After 2000, the 
convergent interests between China and the ASEAN countries have expanded. 
ASEAN+3 has managed to promote financial cooperation among members. 
China’s participation in the framework has enabled it to pursue a set of 
interrelated objectives, whilst the ASEAN countries have been generally receptive 
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to China’s initiatives in ASEAN+3. The original proposal to develop ASEAN+3 
into the EAS would increase China’s relative influence. Nonetheless, the wariness 
of some ASEAN countries and Japan towards China in recent years has 
constrained the efforts of ASEAN+3 to expand the convergent interests among its 
members further. After the original proposal for the EAS failed, China it retracted 
from its previous proactive approach to institutionalizing the regional framework.  
 
In chapter 7, the findings showed that China has been reactive towards 
institutionalizing Trilateral Cooperation with the exception of economic 
cooperation. This study notes that this is the result of the low convergent interests 
between China and the other members. Trilateral Cooperation was a natural 
outgrowth of ASEAN+3; it was not developed to address a specific issue of 
common concern that necessitated closer cooperation between China and the 
other two members. Subsequent efforts by the regional framework to expand the 
convergent interests among its members have been constrained by various factors, 
such as their divergent views on economic cooperation and the declining 
economic importance of Japan and South Korea to China. Meanwhile, China 
wields considerable influence in Trilateral Cooperation. This means that China 
could shape its agenda and development of Trilateral Cooperation to avoid 





Table 14: Summary Findings of the Case Studies 




Low IntermediateHigh Intermediate 
High Intermediate 
Low 








Overall Discussion  
 
Cross-case comparison seems to provide further support for my proposed 
explanation. As suggested in chapter 3, the cases of the ARF and the SCO are 
particularly useful for examining the proposed explanation by having extreme 
values on the proposed causes. The case of the ARF is characterized by low 
convergent interests between China and the ASEAN countries and low relative 
influence of China there. In particular, China and the ASEAN countries hold 
divergent views on the role of the ARF in addressing the territorial disputes 
concerning China and other ASEAN members over the South China Sea. As 
expected, China has remained circumspect over institutionalizing the ARF. In 
contrast, China has considerable convergent interest with members of the SCO, 
starting from their convergent interests to address their common borders when the 
“Shanghai Five” process was established. China was a founder of the “Shanghai 
Five” process (and later the SCO). Over the years, it has increased its relative 
influence there by taking on substantial roles. Consistent with the prediction of 
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my proposed explanation, China has adopted a more proactive approach to 
institutionalization in the SCO.  
 
The contrast between the cases of the SCO and ASEAN+3 is also notable. In both 
cases, China was motivated by the need to address specific issues to participate in 
these frameworks. Nonetheless, subsequent developments of its convergent 
interests with other members and the difference in China’s relative influence have 
accounted for variation of China’s approaches on institutionalization. As 
mentioned, China’s participation in the “Shanghai Five” process was driven by 
efforts of its members to address the border issue. As the process developed, 
China’s convergent interests with other members and its relative influence 
increased. Thus, China has adopted a more proactive approach to 
institutionalization. Similarly, China’s participation in ASEAN+3 was driven by 
the need to manage the Asian Financial Crisis but it is a follower in establishing 
the regional framework. Though its convergent interests with other members 
expanded after 2000, this trend could not be sustained as some members were 
wary about China’s proactive participation in ASEAN+3. As the EAS was 
eventually established as a separate regional framework, China’s relative 
influence in ASEAN+3 remained limited. Hence, China has retracted from its 
previous proactive approach to institutionalization in recent years.   
 
Finally, a comparison of the cases of ASEAN+3 and Trilateral Cooperation has 
provided interesting insights (especially because Trilateral Cooperation emerged 
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out of ASEAN+3). China’s approaches to institutionalizing the two regional 
frameworks are different, which is explained via difference in China’s convergent 
interests with other members and its relative influence in the two regional 
frameworks. China’s participation in ASEAN+3 was initially motivated by the 
need to tackle the Asian Financial Crisis which had contagious effects on various 
regional economies. Consequently, it joined the regional framework and has 
promoted financial cooperation. Later, China’s convergent interests with the 
Asian countries expanded and the original proposal of the EAS would increase 
China’s relative influence in ASEAN+3 after 2000. Hence, China had adopted a 
more proactive approach to institutionalization before a turn of events happened. 
In contrast, China’s participation in Trilateral Cooperation was not motivated by 
the need to address any specific issue or problem that rendered existing platforms 
inadequate and mandated a collective effort by the states to address the issue. The 
efforts of the regional framework to broaden the convergent interests among its 
members have been constrained by various factors. Nonetheless, China enjoys 
considerable influence in the regional framework and could prevent developments 
that might undermine its interests. Hence, China’s approach to institutionalizing 
Trilateral Cooperation is reactive. It is neither enthusiastic towards 
institutionalization nor does it seek to delay or undercut such development. 
 
As for the two alternative explanations, the findings of this study do not provide 
strong support for the explanation on balancing. As mentioned in chapter 2, this 
study has assessed this explanation by examining why China opted to join specific 
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regional frameworks and its subsequent behaviour there. So far, the evidence on 
this explanation is mixed. On the first issue, China decision to join regional 
frameworks was not necessarily shaped by considerations of balancing as in the 
case of the “Shanghai Five” process. As for the second issue, balancing could 
have been a major consideration that shaped China’s initiatives and positions. For 
instance, China promoted the New Security Concept in the ARF and endorsed the 
declaration of the SCO summit in 2006. Nonetheless, other economic and 
strategic considerations are also important in shaping China’s initiatives and 
positions in many cases (e.g. the CAFTA, the anti-terrorist exercises in the SCO). 
In short, China’s participation in regional frameworks was only partly motivated 
balancing. China has also demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the US 
over issues of common concern like non-proliferation in the ARF.   
 
The findings of this study show mixed results for the alternative explanation 
regarding socialization. As mentioned in chapter 2, the constitutive localization 
model proposed by Acharya is examined in this study.
331
 So far, Acharya’s model 
seems to offer a plausible account for China’s approach to institutionalizing the 
ARF and ASEAN+3. Given that the ARF is a regional security institution, it is far 
more challenging to socialize China to the norm of cooperative security embodied 
by the ARF and promote its institutionalization. In comparison, the norms of 
ASEAN+3 are in line with those of China as they focus on regional economic 
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cooperation. However, the model is not applicable to those cases in which China 
is not only a norm-taker, but also an important norm-maker like the SCO and 
Trilateral Cooperation.  
 
The findings of this study contribute to the broader literature on China’s 
participation in regional frameworks in Asia and the prospect of regionalism in 
Asia in the following ways: 
 
1. This study has highlighted an important dimension for analyzing China’s 
participation in Asian regional frameworks, i.e. the country’s approach to 
institutionalization. As suggested in the case study on the ARF, China’s active 
participation in a regional framework does not necessarily imply that it 
promotes institutionalization. This is probably due to the fact that when a 
regional framework is more institutionalized, it will be more effective in 
regulating state behaviour.  In the case of China, this is exactly what it intends 
to avoid to ensure freedom of action.    
2. The study has provided a more nuanced analysis of China’s approach to 
institutionalizing regional institutions in Asia by examining variation in 
China’s approaches to institutionalization within and across four selected 
cases. While agreeing with the conventional account that China’s approach to 
regional frameworks has evolved over time, this study emphasizes that there is 
considerable variation in China’s approaches to institutionalizing different 
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regional frameworks. In a way, this can complement the conventional 
account.  
3. The study notes that there is no direct relationship between the nature of a 
regional framework and China’s approach to institutionalization. Although 
both the ARF and the SCO are primarily regional security frameworks, China 
has adopted different approaches to institutionalizing the two frameworks. It 
is remarkably reserved towards the ARF but proactive towards the SCO. 
Similarly, although ASEAN+3 and Trilateral Cooperation are primarily 
regional economic frameworks. China is a lot more supportive to ASEAN+3, 
but remains reactive on institutionalizing Trilateral Cooperation.  
4. The study observes that China is not inherently against the institutionalization 
of Asian regional processes, which offers hope for the prospect of regionalism 
in Asia. But this does not mean that China is a strong advocate for 
institutionalization either. As suggested by the case studies, China has adopted 
an increasingly flexible approach to institutionalizing regional frameworks in 
Asia, which demonstrates its increased confidence and enhanced ability to 
utilize these multilateral platforms to advance the country’s interests.332  
5. What are the implications for institution-building in Asia? As China is a major 
regional power, it is important for regional institutions to engage China. 
Following the proposed explanation in this study, regional institutions hoping 
to engage China constructively should focus on addressing common issues or 
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problems that concern all the affected states. This would ensure that China 
and other member states have considerable convergent interests to start with. 
Importantly, the institutional design of the regional framework should give 
due recognition to China’s status as a major regional power rather than 
dwarfing its influence in the platform. The two dimensions of convergent 
interests and relative influence mentioned above would encourage China to 
adopt a more supportive and even proactive approach to institutionalization. 
In recent years, the efforts by China to initiate new multilateral platforms such 
as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank could be interpreted as China’s 
attempts to explore platforms to promote its interests in a better way.  
 
The Way Ahead 
 
This study is undertaken to examine and account for variation in China’s 
approaches to institutionalizing regional frameworks in Asia. The proposed 
explanation is a promising one for further explorations. Future studies are needed 
to refine and improve the proposed explanation. Firstly, I have developed some 
indicators for measuring China’s approach to institutionalizing the selected 
regional frameworks and the proposed explanation in this study. More efforts 
should be made to develop more precise measurements for the dependent and 
independent variables. For example, how to classify China’s approach to 
institutionalization as high, intermediate or low. Secondly, more efforts should be 
attempted to include the publications by scholars or officials from other member 
 194 
states of the selected regional frameworks, if available. In addition, more 
interviews should be conducted for the case studies of the ARF and Trilateral 
Cooperation for corroborating the data. Finally, the proposed explanation could be 
further assessed by analyzing China’s approach to institutionalizing other regional 
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Purpose 
1.2. Procedure and format of this study 
1.3. Selection process 
1.4. Confidentiality 
1.5. Taping and Record 
1.6. Note-taking 
 
2.  General Information on the Participant's Background 
2.1. Prior experience and/or research in the selected regional processes 
 
3. Questions for Each Selected Regional Framework 
*Questions that are asked across all selected regional frameworks 
3.1. ASEAN Plus Three (10+3) 
(a) Why did China join 10+3 in 1997? What were its common interests 
with the ASEAN states?* 
(b) Did China’s motivation for participation change after joining 10+3?* 
(c) Have China’s common interests with the ASEAN states changed?* 
(d) What are the options that have been raised for institutionalizing 
10+3?* 
(e) What are China’s views on institutionalization?*  
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(f) What are the views of ASEAN states on institutionalization?* 
(g) The China-ASEAN FTA has been established for four years. When 
China advocated it in 10+3 and other regional institutions, some 
observers had stressed that this was motivated by strategic 
considerations and they noted that the East Asian countries were 
heavily dependent on markets outside the region. What were China’s 
major considerations in initiating the FTA with ASEAN? 
(h) What are the effects of the FTA in promoting bilateral trade and 
strategic relationships between China and the ASEAN states?  
(i) Compared to 10+3, a relatively new regional institution is the East 
Asia Summit (EAS). While China stressed that 10+3 should be the 
major channel for promoting regional cooperation, some ASEAN 
states prefer the EAS instead. What are the rationales behind China and 
these ASEAN countries? 
(j) Does the absence of the US in 10+3 and its presence in the EAS affect 
the policy of China and the ASEAN states regarding these 
institutions?* 
 
3.2 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
(a) Why did China join ARF in 1994? Did it share common interests 
with other major members?* 
(b) Did China’s motivation for participation change after joining the 
ARF?* 
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(c) Have China’s common interests with other major members 
changed?* 
(d) What are the options that have been raised for institutionalizing the 
ARF prior to the assigning of the ASEAN Secretariat to coordinate 
the work of the organization?* 
(e) What are China’s views on institutionalization? * 
(f) What are the views of other major members on institutionalization?* 
(g) The ARF is currently progressing from the stage of confidence building 
to that of preventive diplomacy. China has advocated that preventive 
diplomacy should focus on non-traditional security issues. Why does it 
adopt such a position?  
(h) In recent years, some countries have attempted to internationalize the 
territorial disputes over the Spratlys in the ARF. How do these attempts 
affect China’s policy towards the institution? 
(i) The ARF was originally formed to address the uncertainties brought 
about by the end of Cold War. However, the institution remains 
severely limited in dealing with traditional security issues decades after 
its formation. What are the contributing factors for this? 
(j) Has the involvement of the US and its allies in the ARF affected 
China’s policy towards it?* 
 
3.3 Trilateral Cooperation 
(a) Why did China sponsor the establishment of Trilateral Cooperation? 
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What were its common interests with Japan and South Korea?* 
(b) Did China’s motivation for participation change afterwards?* 
(c) Have China’s common interests with Japan and South Korea 
changed?* 
(d) Sino-Japanese relations has always been described to be “warm in 
economic relations, cold in political ties”, and bilateral ties has 
deteriorated to the lowest point for several times since the 1990s. Will 
Sino-Japanese ties affect China’s policy towards Trilateral Cooperation? 
(e) What are the options that have been raised in institutionalizing 
Trilateral Cooperation prior to the establishment of the Trilateral 
Secretariat?* 
(f) What are China’s views on institutionalization?*  
(g) What are the views of Japan and the South Korea on 
institutionalization?* 
(h) Though China proposed to establish a free trade area with Japan and 
South Korea, it took years for the three of them to reach consensus to 
begin negotiations in 2012. Why did it take so long for China, South 
Korea and Japan to strengthen their economic cooperation? 
(i) Trilateral cooperation has largely focused on economic cooperation, 
while cooperation on traditional security issues is severely limited. 
What are the contributing factors for such development? 
(j) Has the status of Japan and South Korea as US allies affected China’s 
policy towards the institution?* 
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3.4 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
(a) The SCO originated from the “Shanghai Five” mechanism developed 
in the 1990s. Why did the mechanism carried on after the five 
countries signed two treaties on CBMs and the mutual reduction of 
military forces in the border region in 1996 and 1997? 
(b) What led China and other states to transform the “Shanghai Five” 
mechanism into the SCO? 
(c) Did China’s motivation for participation change after the founding of 
the SCO?* 
(d) Have China’s common interests with other member states changed?* 
(e) In the development of the SCO, China is often said to play an active 
role in the institutionalization of the organization. What are the 
contributory factors for China’s enthusiasm in developing the SCO?* 
(f) What are the views of Russia and other Central Asian states on 
institutionalizing the SCO?* 
(g) What are the options that have been raised in institutionalizing the 
SCO?* 
(h) Since its establishment, the SCO has been rather reserved in 
admitting new members. What is the position of China on the 
expansion of the SCO? 
(i) It has often been noted by commentators on the SCO that China’s 
economic relations with SCO members lag far behind their political 
ties. What are your views on this comment? 
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(j) How did US involvement in Central Asia after 911 influence China’s 
policy towards the SCO? Is the SCO a quasi-alliance against the 
United States?* 
 
At the end of the interview, the investigator will thank the participant for his/her 






 Date Place 
Case A October 2013 Beijing 
Case B October 2013 Beijing 
Case C October 2013 Beijing 
Case D October 2013 Beijing 
Case E October 2013 Beijing 
Case F November 2013 Beijing 
Case G November 2013 Beijing 
Case H November 2013 Beijing 
Case I November 2013 Beijing 
Case J November 2013 Shanghai 
Case K November 2013 Shanghai 
Case L November 2013 Shanghai 
Case M November  2013 Shanghai 
 
 
 
 
